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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the lessons the U.S. Army drew from the war in Vietnam and how 
these lessons influence current Army attitudes toward peace operations. The thesis finds that the 
Army's failure in Vietnam contributes not only to the Army's aversion toward peace operations, 
but also to its reluctance to participate in any limited war. 
toward peace operations. The thesis examines the development of the lessons of Vietnam, 
especially the emergence $jf the "never-again" school by surveying the articles written in Army, 
Military Review and Parameters about Vietnam and peace operations between 1972 and 1995. The 
thesis describes the Army's confusion over the meaning of Vietnam in the 1970s, shows the 
Army's building a consensus around certain lessons of Vietnam in the 1980s and examines 
application of these lessons of to peace operations in the 1990s. 
Two events were influential in shaping the Army's understanding of the lessons of 
Vietnam: the publication of the book, On Stratenv, in 1982 and a speech given in 1984 by 
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. Harry Summers's book on America's failure in Vietnam 
and Secretary Weinberger's speech on pre-conditions for U.S. military intervention codified the 
Army's accepted lessons of Vietnam. These two events codified the many lessons of Vietnam into 
The Lessons of Vietnam. 
The thesis concludes by focusing on how the lessons of Vietnam influence the Army's 
attitude toward peace operations attitudes and influenced its policy. It first describes how Operation 
Desert Storm curtailed the growth of the competing LIC subculture. Second., the thesis illustrates the 
hesitant attitudes of authors Writing in the periodicals and the Army's reluctance to embrace peace 
operations. Autobiographies of senior officers are used to support the attitudes found in the the 
military journals. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the lessons the Army drew from the war in 
Vietnam and then to analyze how these lessons influence current Army attitudes toward 
peace operations policies, force structure and doctrine. Though no sweeping agreement 
exists about the lessons of Vietnam, this work posits that the Army’s understanding of the 
lessons of Vietnam was distilled through the work of retired Army colonel Harry G. 
Summers Jr. and transformed into policy by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger’s six 
tests for the use of military force in foreign policy. The paper will argue that Weinberger’s 
criteria became the accepted standard by which the Army and the President whether military 
intervention is appropriate. Though the focus of this thesis will remain on A m y  attitudes 
toward peace operations, it is obvious there is a relationship between Army attitudes and 
U.S. foreign policy in general. 
B. THE QUESTION 
thesis posits that, in part, the Army’s views about peace operations are influenced by its 
collective experience in Vietnam. Drastic changes in the international structure (such as the 
collapse of the Soviet threat) are often not enough to jar the Army fiom its cultural 
paradigm. Further, ambiguity in the meaning of international events prevents the Army 
from acting on its experience. A new international equilibrium may not exist. Doctrinal 
and structural innovations are difficult when a clear threat is lacking. 
environment.’ With the increase of peace operations and other non-traditional military 
missions, one might expect to see the Army jump at the opportunity to obtain increased 
responsibilities and resources by participating in these missions. Assuming new roles and 
successfully accomplishing new missions could strengthen the Army’s domestic power and 
prestige. Presidential directives, domestic political pressures, technological developments 
and even wars have attempted to change the Army’s self-perception and doctrine. 
Why does the U.S. Army think about peace operations the way it does? This 
Often innovation is a lengthy process and requires sustained change in the external 
Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1991). Rosen talks 
about innovation in doctrine, structure and strategy. He concludes that whatever the cause of change, in 
periods of peace and even limited war, innovation takes time to become institutionalized. 
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C .  CULTURE AND VIETNAM AS POSSIBLE ANSWERS 
The main finding of this thesis is that current Army attitudes toward peace 
operations are both directly and indirectly a product of the Vietnam war. The majority of 
the Army reached a consensus on the lessons of the Vietnam war in the 1980s. The many 
different lessons of Vietnam became The Lessons of Vietnam. The Lessons have become a 
predominant school of thought in the United States Army. The Lessons are that the United 
States should not commit troops without the consent of the majority of the public; the 
United States should not commit ground forces unless there are clearly identified, attainable 
political and military goals; the United States should use force only with the intent of 
winning and by use of overwhelming force; the United States should only commit forces in 
defense of vital national interests; and when not in defense of a vital national interest, use of 
military force must be "legal" and support international law, Later in this thesis, the "other" 
lessons of Vietnam are described in their various shapes. 
A predominant school of thought in the Army took the lead in formulating 
The Lessons of Vietnam. A less influential subculture developed other lessons of Vietnam, 
but these secondary lessons have not been fully institutionalized. Some of the ttother" 
lessons of Vietnam are that overwhelming force does not always work; using military force 
in areas that are not vital to U.S. ;iational security interests is feasible; military operations 
cannot be conducted in isolation of political guidelines; winning the hearts and minds of a 
foreign population is essential to limited war victory; and understanding foreign cultures is 
possible only through extensive education and training in customs, history and languages. 
Both internal and external factors influenced the development of both sets of 
lessons. Internally, the Army's desire to improve its credibility caused iz, to institutionalize 
The Lessons into its doctrine and course curricula. Externally, an insurgency in El 
Salvador and a communist regime in Nicaragua caused the Army to develop The Lessons 
quickly. These events in Latin America also spurned development of other lessons. 
D. RELEVANCE 
This thesis is of value to the Army because it advances understanding of how Army 
resistance in adapting to contemporary threats could in some circumstances endanger the 
country's reputation and national security.2 During the ebb and flow of warfare in the 
Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes, (New York: Free Press, 1990). The book studies 
three types of failures in military operations. One type of failure is called the "failure to adapt" and its case 
study is the British at Gallipoli in August 1915. This section of the book is concerned with the 
operational level of analysis, but the idea has application to the strategic and policy levels. 
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history of the United States, the Army has latched onto its brief but glorious major wars. 
The Army downplays most missions not resembling a “big” war. Its most common duty, 
however, has been and appears to be for the foreseeable future, as “the nation’s obedient 
and loyal military ~ervant.”~ The old Mexican Border Patrol mission, for example, may 
reintroduce itself as more than just a peripheral mission. Shake-ups in the global political 
situation have begotten “new” missions that the Army cannot and should not turn away 
from. 
Justifying large defense budgets will be increasingly difficult in the future. In the 
past the Army justified its robust capabilities by refemng to the Soviet threat. To retain 
even modest resources, the Army is now faced with the challenge of convincing Congress 
that a future Soviet-like threat exists. An alternative line of reasoning is that the increased 
requirement to intervene in internal conflicts or participate in peace operations requires 
substantial resources. Herein rest the two conflicting views of the Army’s role in U.S. 
national security policy and hence, the Army’s own understanding of that role: is the Army 
the multi-purpose servant of the nation or does the Army concentrate on setting the global 
standard for performance on the high-intensity battlefield? 
domestic disturbances. In the twentieth century, however, the Army has resisted these 
reoccurring domestic and limited missions. A recent RAND Corporation study has 
identified various self-perceptions the Army could pursue in the post cold war world. The 
study postulates three major visions of the Army.4 
First., the Army could continue to see itself as the defender of Europe. This view is 
centered on a “big“ war in central Europe. Second, it could see itself as an expeditionary 
force, based in the United States but ready at a moment’s notice to deal with the worlds 
problems. This view is still a big-war outlook but with a non-European slant. Third, the 
Army could retum to a role known well in its history as servant of the nation. The Army’s 
primary mission in this vision is dealing with domestic unrest and continental security 
threats. 
The Army has a long tradition of fighting limited foreign wars and controlling 
Carl Builder, The Masks of War, (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Press, 1989) p.187. 
John K. Setear, Carl H. Builder, M.D. Baccus and Wayne Madewell, The Army in a Changing World: 
The Role of Organizational Vision, RAND Corporation Study, R-3882-A, June 1990, pp. vii, 23,41-55. 
Prepared for the U.S. Army, Contract No. MDA903-86-C-0059. This RAND study extended Russell 
Weigley’s argument in The American Wav of War, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973) and 
provided a useful point of reference for the Army’s thoughts about itself. The RAND study specifically 
describes the Army’s current vision of itself as the defender of Europ. 
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With the simultaneous changes in international order and talk of a revolution in 
military affairs, the Army should be cautious about its attachment to the big-war paradigm. 
If the Army continues to define itself as the defender of Europe and the champion of 
armored warfare, it may fmd itself ill-prepared to deal with America’s next war, regardless 
of that war’s characteristics or peculiarities. In this paper, peace operations (though often 
ill-defined) are chosen as representative of these “new,” non-big-war missions. These 
types of missions were chosen because they are not futuristic, remote and hypothetical but 
because they are contemporary, abundant and hotly debated. In a sense, the growing 
importance of peacekeeping suggests that “the future is now” and that the Army must 
change if it is to prepare for today’s conflicts. 
Preparing for the next war instead of the last war has long been a goal of the armed 
services and vital to national security. The Army does not know when or where the United 
States’ next war will be but it does know much about America’s past wars. One past war 
that has been dissected extensively is America’s experience in Vietnam. The war 
preoccupies American society and references to the conflict still linger in the co~ntry’s 
foreign policy  debate^.^ As America contemplated intervention in Bosnia and as the United 
States withdrew from its commitment in Somalia, journalists raised the Vietnam 
connection6 after President Bush prematurely buried it in the wake of Desert St01-m.~ 
E. PARADIGMS 
A relatively wide consensus exists about the current Army paradigms of itself and 
warfare. Current Army doctrine reflects the way the Allies won the Second World War. 
The Army won that war by overwhelming the enemy with firepower, manpower and 
industrial-power.8 With a fully mobilized society behind it in the Second World War, the 
Army waged an extreme form of annihilatory warfare. Improvements on ways of waging 
total warfare were a growth industry. This mobilization resulted in the development of the 
ultimate weapon of destruction: the atomic bomb. 
See, for example, Hany G. Summers Jr., Congressional Testimony, 15 June 1995. Summers testified 
before Congress on the inability of air power to bring a decisive conclusion to the war in Bosnia and 
repeatedly evoked the quagmire of Vietnam as an analogy. 
A.M. Rosenthal, The New York Times, “Dole In Bosnia,” Editorial, p. A17, April 18, 1995. 
Ann Devroy and Guy Gugliotta, The Washington Posr, “Bush to ‘Move Fast’ on Mideast Peace,” March 
2, 1991, p. A13. President George Bush said, “It’s a proud day for Americans and by God, we’ve kicked 
this Vietnam syndrome once and for all.” 
See, for example, Russell Weigley, The American Wav of War. 
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When the Army fired the first atomic artillery shell in May, 1953 an Army officer 
noted, “it symbolized the addition of an awesome new weapon to the Army’s arsenal but 
also symbolized the true beginning of the atomic era for the Army.”g This development led 
to the “pentomic” Army that was smaller and designed to be more mobile than the previous 
World War I1 and Korean War configurations.1° Though force size decreased, firepower 
increased. Warfare was being stretched to a previously inconceivable extreme with the 
introduction of “tactical” nuclear weapons.” 
This overwhelming use of force was indicative of the American Army’spreferred 
way of war. Nineteenth century Russian military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz would 
have been amazed how close armies could now come to waging what was for him only a 
theoretical extreme: absolute war.12 Nuclear weapons proliferated at both the local and 
inter-continental levels and total war moved from a theoretically distant possibility to a 
realistically near probability. Initially, atomic bombs fit into the Army’s cultural 
understanding of the overwhelming use of force. Eventually, the Army would leam the 
limits of nuclear weapons. 
The reality of 1950 was that no country wanted to fight a nuclear war over Korea. Thus, 
Korea was the first nuclear-era limited war confronting the United States. Korea 
reintroduced the Army to the political constraints involved in warfare. Unfortunately, the 
U.S. Army was still thinking in terms of a global scale, high-intensity world war. General 
Ridgeway, commander of the Eighth Army and U.S. Commander-In-Chief (CINC) in the 
Far East admits, “The concept of ‘limited’ war never entered our councils.”13 
That cultural legacy, an aversion toward limited warfare, plagued strategists during 
both the Korean and Vietnam Wars. In the 1950s the Army wanted to bring the fight to 
Reality regularly constrained the Army from waging this preferred type of total war. 
Robert A. Doughty, Leavenworth Papers, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General 
Staff College, 1979) p.14. 
lo A.J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986) p. 
103- 127. The Pentomic Division consisted of five “battle groups” bigger than a battalion but smaller than 
a brigade, each with five companies. The net effect on troop strength was a 3,000 soldier loss per division. 
Bacevich’s book provides a thorough survey of the development of the Army between the Korean and 
Vietnam Wars. 
Special thanks to Professor Pamck Parker, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate 
School, for explaining the myth of tactical nuclear weapons. Any use of a nuclear weapon on the European 
battlefield would have immediately had strategic implications. Once the government commits the Army to 
a war, the Army tends to want to wage that war in isolation from its political master. The Army’s failure 
to grasp the absurdity of “tactical” nuclear weapon supports this tendency. 
l2 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Sir Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1984) pp. 75-80,579. 
l3 Robert Doughty, Leavenworth Papers, p. 7. 
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the Chinese and use nuclear weapons if necessary. In the 1960s the political constraints 
again frustrated the Army, because they prevented total destruction of the enemy. The 
Army again wanted to wage the war in isolation from political considerations. This desire 
to be autonomous in the conduct of operations causes problems that continue to haunt 
Army strategists today. Despite the requirement to perform limited warfare tasks, the Army 
has spent a great deal of effort peripheralizing these non-big-war tasks. 
F. ARMY CULTURE 
Sociologist Karl Weick pointed out that, “there is no such thing as experience until 
a manager does ~omething.”~~ Weicks point is that experience is isolated until it gets 
socialized and interpreted. He calls this process “enactment.” Experience becomes 
meaningful when leaders act on or when they test experiences. 
What the Army leaders did with the “experience” of Vietnam largely influenced that 
war’s place in Army history. It is imperative to trace the development of what is often 
called the Never-Again School (i.e., the actions political and military leaders should never 
again take in the conduct of war or, perhaps some would say, foreign policy) because 
believers of this school of thought have built the Army’s cu1t~ue.l~ The roots of this 
school reside in the military’s frustration over not being allowed to bring the Korean War to 
a “decisive” conclusion by using overwhelming force. The Army decided that, “there 
should be no more limited, local wars fought by American forces on the Asian continent 
without the freedom to use any weapons in the American arsenal, including nuclear 
ones.”16 
The conclusion of the Korean war was dissatisfying to the Army. It wanted to 
avoid wars like Korea in the future. Specifically, the Army wanted to avoid the difficult 
tests that limited wars present.17 This avoidance in the 1970s helped shape the predominant 
l4 Karl E. Weick, The Social Psvchology of Organizing, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Company, 1979) p. 148. 
l5 Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft Diplomatic Problems of Our Time, 
Third Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) p .261. Chapter 19, The Role of Force in 
Diplomacy: A Continuing Dilemma for U S .  Foreign Policy, details the development of the Never-Again 
School. It also introduces the “Limited War“ school. Pages 263-268 explain the Secretary of Defense 
Caspar Weinberger-Secretary of State George Schultz debates over the use of force in U.S. foreign policy 
and the impact of Vietnam on their respective schools of thought. 
l7 Karl E. Weick, The Social Psvchologv of Orpanking, p. 150. Fear of failure leads to the avoidance of 
testing. Since the Army failed under the political constraints of Vietnam, it wanted to avoid similar limited 
conflicts in the future. Though the Army scarcely admits it, the Army failed at counterinsurgency in 
Vietnam and subsequently avoided pursuing any counterinsurgency docuine or forces. 
Russell Weigley, The American Wav of War, p. 45 1. 
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Army culture. Army culture did not adapt itself to the realities of Vietnam and as a 
consequence that war was lost.18 This propensity to avoid the limited war test continues to 
shape Army culture. 
America's understanding of the international environment demanded that the Army 
develop a strategy for stopping communism in Southeast Asia.lg One or two of 
Eisenhower's dominos tumbled, but the predicted catastrophic chain of events failed to 
materialize. Despite the supposed seriousness of the international situation and the threat to 
U.S. national security, the Army was unable to develop a victorious strategy in over ten 
years of trying. 
Bureaucratic reasoning justified increased spending on equipment and training for 
the war in Vietnam. Yet the Army developed the helicopter, designed for use on a 
European battlefield, and applied it to Vietnam. It was common for the Army to innovate 
from the European scenario. Innovations were the adapted for other uses. It would have 
been in the Army's organizational interests to embrace the war and use it to increase its 
share of resources. Success would have guaranteed the Army much domestic status and 
access to even more resources. But as will be shown, many believed the Army never fully 
employed itself in the war in Vietnam. 
balance of power nor enticements of increased prestige and resources could dislodge the 
Army from its big-war paradigm. The experience of Korea could not separate the Army 
from this paradigm. Only ten years after it first said "never again" about Korea, the Army 
faced an eerily similar challenge in Vietnam. Concerns about a regional conflict becoming 
a global conflict prevented the Army from waging a more total form of warfare in both 
cases. The Army tended to see increased military power as the solution to the problem in 
both Korea and Vietnam. 
The strength of Army culture was so strong that neither threats to the international 
G .  SEQUENCE 
Chapter II elaborates the notion that culture has explanatory power in describing the 
Army's attitudes and policies toward peace operations. The chapter introduces competing 
theories that are also useful in explaining how the Army deals with the lessons of Vietnam. 
l8 Other factors contributed to America's defeat in Vietnam but the focus of this thesis is on the Army and 
its Understanding of itself in the context of the Vietnam war. 
l9 This idea begs the question, how does a military stop a political ideology? For the Army, the answer is 
totally defeating the enemy and then having civilians reeducate the population. This was the WWII 
solution that could not be easily applied in Vietnam. 
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The methods and research design used to trace the development of the Vietnam lessons are 
also described. 
Chapters III, TV, and V trace the development of the lessons of Vietnam and show 
how the never-again school progressed. These three chapters cover 23 years from 1972 to 
1995. Each chapter addresses a period with distinctive characteristics. Each chapter covers 
a different number of years, which presents some statistical challenges. The break points, 
however, are purposeful. In each instance, a significant event marks the end of one period 
and the start of another. 
Chapter II surveys the articles written about Vietnam and peace operations in the 
1972-1981 period. Because America’s military involvement ended in 1972, that year was 
chosen as the starting date of the research. Many events from which the Army drew 
lessons had not yet happened in Vietnam prior to 1972. Most of the articles are, not 
surprisingly, focused on Vietnam and not on U.S. involvement in one of the few U.N. 
sponsored peace operations of the era. This nine-year time span is referred to as the first 
“phase” or “period” throughout the thesis. 
Chapter IU shows a lack of consensus within the Army on its understanding of the 
lessons of Vietnam. The subjects written about in the periodicals referring to Vietnam were 
more numerous in this period than in later years. The overall number of articles devoted to 
Vietnam is low because the Army turned away from Vietnam and toward Europe. The 
shock of America losing its fust war had not yet set in. The Army denied not only its 
responsibility to defend all U.S. interests, but also its responsibility in the loss of the war. 
Evidence from this chapter shows confusion over the meaning of Vietnam and explains the 
Army’s reluctance to implement organizational action in the wake of its defeat. 
This chapter’s focus is on the Army’s building a consensus around certain lessons of 
Vietnam and constructing meaning from the experience. This period’s start is marked 
roughly by two events. The primary event was the Army’s genuine attempt at 
organizational learning in 1979 by commissioning a study intended to move the Army 
beyond the stagnation of the 1970s. The research was eventually published as a book in 
1982 and is used as the primary point of departure; the study represents a clear, official 
attempt to better understand the lessons of the Vietnam War. The other significant event, 
two years after publication of the book On Strategy, was a speech by the Secretary of 
Defense about pre-conditions for U.S. military intervention. Secretary Weinberger’s 
Chapter rV describes the second phase which starts in 1982 and ends in 1989. 
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speech codified most of the Army’s culturally accepted lessons of Vietnam. These two 
events cause the lessons of Vietnam to become The Lessons of Vietnam. 
The period described in Chapter IV is characterized by the political-military turmoil 
in the Middle East and Latin America and the Army’s response to that turmoil. Vietnam 
veterans wrote extensively between 1982 and 1989 about Latin America and Low Intensity 
Conflict (LIC) and referenced the Vietnam war. A LIC subculture, growing out of the 
Vietnam counterinsurgency experience, boomed during this period. This subculture made 
huge strides toward institutionalizing the “other” lessons of Vietnam-those lessons not 
embodied in the Weinberger doctrine. 
officers during this period. Many of these officers, fully indoctrinated into the dominant 
Army culture, rose to influential positions in both the Army and the American government. 
The positioning of these officers and the understanding of The Lessons of Vietnam help 
explain Army policy toward future LICs. 
attitudes and influenced Army policy. Operation Just Cause in December 1989 marks the 
beginning of this period. The Panama invasion was in many ways a culmination of the 
Army’s increased focus on LIC, Latin America and drug wars. Operations Desert Shield 
and Storm and the collapse of the Soviet Union were two significant events influencing 
peace operation attitudes during this period. 
Autobiographical accounts by senior Army officers start this chapter and show one 
manifestation of the accepted lessons of Vietnam. Articles Written about peace operations, 
or U.S. intervention in general, are presented and support this tenuous Vietnam-peace 
operation relationship. Vietnam was on the minds of many authors as they wrote about 
peace operations; authors either directly reference the war or refer to its normative lessons. 
officers with company and field grade experience in Vietnam became general 
Chapter V focuses on how the lessons of Vietnam influence peace operations 
9 
10 
11. THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 
A. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This paper identifies those factors influencing Army doctrine and structure. The 
argument presented here is that culture frequently influences doctrine more than the nature 
of the international system (the structuralist approach) or more than the Army’s functional 
needs (the bureaucratic or organizational approach).20 
Theorists make arguments about strategic and political culture influencing foreign 
and domestic policy choices. The paper focuses on one aspect of larger United States 
strategic-political culture: the U.S. Army. Emphasis can be placed squarely on the Army’s 
organizational culture as distinct from larger cultural considerations. At this level of 
analysis, the paper examines how culture has affected the US Army and its doctrine during 
the years between 1972, the year marking the end of US military involvement in Vietnam, 
and the present. Military culture provides just one possible explanation for doctrinal and 
organizational change and innovation. 
needed to secure a position domestically and residual power left to play a part in 
international politics.21 This study supports the notion that the U.S. military is firmly 
subordinated to its civilian leadership and no danger of a coup exists.22 Bureaucratic 
Army interests are pursued only to gain more resources and independence of action. The 
Army’s ultimate goal is not to rule the United States. 
Culture may not be a deterministic variable but is more often an intervening 
variable, mitigating or magnifying the impact of other causes of change.23 Culture in this 
way works like a preference.% If options are available to a country, its culture would help 
to determine its choice of available options. In some cases a less successful end-state may 
be accepted if it is reached both within the means available and in accordance with the 
Scholars have devoted attention to issues such as the amount of military power 
2o Elizabeth Kier, “Culture In Military Doctrine,” International Security, vol. 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995) pp. 
65-93. 
21 Ibid. See also Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking About Strategic Culture,” International Security, vol. 
19, no. 4 (Spring 1995) and Stephen Peter Rosen, “Military Effectiveness,” International Security, vol. 19, 
no. 4 (Spring 1995). 
22 Stephen Rosen, Military Effectiveness,” p. 27. For an interesting coup scenario, however, see Charles 
Dunlap, ‘The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012,” Parameters, Winter 1992-93, pp. 2-20. 
The article was the National Defense University winner of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay 
Competition in 1992. 
23 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking About Strategic Culture,” p. 41. 
24 Bid, p. 47. 
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cultural preference. In other instances, when international and regional power balances are 
ambiguous, organizations may attempt to manipulate the environment to their advantage. 
B. STRUCTURAL AND BUREAUCRATIC APPROACHES 
Three broad theories (structural, functional and cultural) are examined for their 
utility in explaining current U.S. Army attitudes toward peace operations, notably in light 
of experiences in Vietnam. Because they shape doctrine and structure, military attitudes are 
one factor influencing foreign policy. Attitudes are influential in areas beyond nuclear 
weapons and treaty  negotiation^.^^ Perhaps more importantly, they are relevant to policy 
decisions involvkr. use of conventional military force. Those cases when use of a military 
force is contemplated, such as peace operations, are particularly pertinent. 
the organizational action. In this explanation, the organization and its members are 
motivated to act based on a momentous shift in international power relationships. States 
position themselves to balance against any emerging threats. Accordingly, they shape their 
armies in hopes of establishing a new equilibrium. 
This approach posits that militaries develop similar doctrines given the same sets of 
environmental conditions and based on expectations about the future behavior of 
opponents. But failure to adapt doctrines, structures or procedures to foreign power 
configurations often results in failure and defeat.Z6 Though structuralists agree that arriving 
at like doctrines and force structures is the result of an iterative process, they don’t really 
say how many iterations might take place before sameness settles in.27 
Structuralists might agree that as the number of small countries defeating big ones 
increases, the higher the probability that states would shape their forces to deal with these 
apparent asymmetries in power. Structuralists would hypothesize that militaries would shift 
away from a “losing” paradigm and toward a “winning” paradigm. Unfortunately for 
structuralists, history is replete with examples of “Davids” defeating (or at least defending 
against) “Goliaths,” even in recent decades. In the 1970s, Viet Cong/North Vietnamese 
The structuralist claims that the external environment is the deterministic cause of 
25 See for example Roger Cohen, Negotiating Across Cultures, (Washington D.C.:United States Institute 
of Peace Press, 1991). 
26 Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes, (New York: Free Press, 1990). The authors cite 
three major reasons for military failure one of which is a failure to adapt to changes in the environment, 
technology and organization. Also, Bany Posen, The Sources of Militarv Doctrine, (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1984) provides an extensive application of institutionalization to military orgmization. 
He uses firance and Germany between the World Wars as his case study. 
27 Stephen Peter Rosen, “Military Effectiveness,” p. 15. 
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communists affected a United States withdrawal. In the 198Os, Afghan “rebels” 
successfully repelled the Soviet expansion. In the 199Os, a few hundred seemingly 
undisciplined, poorly armed Somali clansmen were able to “defeat” the most powerful 
country in the world. 
Proponents of the functional model would claim that organizational interests propel 
armies on courses of action from which these armies will secure “greater certainty, 
resources, autonomy, and prestige.”28 Traditionally the argument is made that this pursuit 
of power and resources will lead to offensive doctrines. Functionalists argue that only 
civilian intervention will prevent an army from choosing an offensive doctrine. They reason 
that because the country on the offensive controls the tempo of the fight it gains an 
advantage on the battlefield. 
doctrine is no longer justified, however, one would expect to see the organization adopt a 
doctrine that facilitates its playing a large role in the new system. If the old offensive 
paradigm was no longer valid, a functionalist would hypothesize that the Army would 
embrace its new mission. The survival instincts of an organization would cause it to 
embrace drastic changes to retain funding and to remain a player in the game of domestic or 
even international politics. 
cases where armies did not pursue “faddish” doctrines or strategies once the international 
system changed. The theory has merit but does not explain all the phenomena in question. 
Though the bureaucratic quest for power and structural shifts in the international system 
undoubtedly provide answers for various changes of doctrine, structure and strategy, other 
explanations are useful. An increasingly large body of literature, for example, points to 
culture as an explanation for some of the choices armies make. 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that culture is the most influential factor shaping 
current Army attitudes toward peace operations. This hypothesis expects to see the Army 
trying to twist the contemporary realities of peace operations into the old paradigm of 
overwhelming force. While other explanations have held sway over Army attitudes on 
different issues, the Army’s propensity for using overwhelming, highly mobile and 
mechanized force prevents it from effectively coping with the peculiarities of peace 
operations. 
If the nature of the international environment changes so much that an offensive 
Though individual cases show how tempting this explanation is, there are many 
28 Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and Military Doctrine,” p. 88. 
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C. THE CULTURAL APPROACH AND CULTURAL SPLITS 
Many political scientists have attempted to define culture. Intuitively people know 
what culture is; but when asked to describe culture, they regularly have a difficult time. 
Elizabeth Kier’s definition is adequate: “the set of basic assumptions and values that shape 
shared understandings, and the forms or practices whereby these meaning are expressed, 
affirmed, and communicated to the members of the organi~ation.’~~ Armies share attitudes 
and values. These attitudes and values are important factors in doctrine, force structure and 
strategy formulation. They also shape how the army responds to changes in the external 
environment.30 
But identifying culture and measuring its effects is complicated. More than one 
culture can simultaneously survive in an organization, though one culture usually 
 dominate^.^^ These two subcultures jockey for position within the organization, each one 
trying to become the dominant school of thought. The pulling and hauling of these sub- 
cultures can reduce the amount of power an army generates. The argument that a divided 
society reduces a state’s power32 can be extended to a divided military; splits in the army 
prevent the state from generating maximum amounts of power by misallocating resources, 
raising doubts and reducing motivation. Furthermore, competing subcultures function 
more like ideologies and “play a direct and visible role in determining military policy.”33 
This split in ideologies manifests itself in different views on the use of force in foreign 
policy and in organizational views on the role of the military in American society. These 
views have many variations and nuances. 
One traditional split is between those who believe the Army is the defender of U.S. 
interests in Europe and those who believe the Army has a broader role as the nation’s 
general military servant.34 The Army’s notion of being Europe’s defender comes from land 
warfare experiences in both the First and Second World Wars. General military service is 
derived from tasks the Army traditionally performed when not engaged in war in Europe. 
This type of Army performs a broad range of tasks that includes patrolling U.S. borders 
and territories, providing domestic emergency services and building canals and dams.35 
29 Ibid, pp. 69-70. 
30 Ibid, p. 70. 
31 Alastair Johnston, “Thinking About Strategic Culture,” p. 45. 
32 Stephen Rosen, ‘‘Military Effectiveness,” pp. 26-29. 
33 Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and Military Dochine,” p. 78. 
34 John K. Setear, Carl H. Builder, M.D. Baccus and Wayne Madewell, The Army in a Changing World, 
!?bid, p. vii. 
vii, 23,41-55. 
14 
A second split evolved around the use of force as an instrument of foreign policy. 
The dichotomous relationship between use of force and diplomacy existed long before Carl 
von Clausewitz wrote On War in the nineteenth century, but his work sparked U.S. Army 
interest in the subject. Clausewitz's famed, "War is. . . a continuation of political 
intercourse carried on with other means"36 is continually debated by officers in the Army. 
fiom its ultimate political purposes.37 In this debate, the Second World War again proves 
influential. Because the American Army helped destroy the Axis Armies with little regard 
to political considerations (until the Summer of 1945), some members of the U.S. Army 
believe all wars should be waged with such totality. 
h y  was not fighting in Europe and draw different conclusions about the use of force in 
politics. Total subjugation of the enemy may not always be possible. These officers 
remember the War of 18 12, wars with Mexico, the Spanish-American War, Korea and 
Vietnam as examples of the Army's need for restraint. For them there is no "never again" 
mentality; they have a "probably again" mentality. 
culture and subcultures. These different views have enough supporters to have maintained 
a presence in Army writings. They have developed into two schools of thought about the 
Army's role in American society. Evidence of these schools of thought is found in doctrinal 
and periodical writings across a broad range of military subjects. 
Much of the debate revolves around to what extent war can be waged in isolation 
Conversely, other officers look at the missions the Army conducted in the years the 
A combination of these competing views interacts to develop and define Army 
D. VIETNAM, CULTURE AND PEACE OPERATIONS 
Vietnam War and its subsequent doctrinal and structural choices. The paper illustrates how 
the Army chose a position in this ideological split. It suggests a culturally-shaped 
understanding of Vietnam and peace operations. A subculture, rallying around 
counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam and eventually "low-intensity conflict" in Latin 
America, unsuccessfully challenged the dominant Army subculture. The dominant Army 
This thesis examines the Army's cultural learning and development regarding the 
36 car1 von Clausewitz, On war, p. 87. 
37 Army officers have written volumes about Clausewitz's On War. Many officers skip over the part where 
Clausewitz ties the military to its political-civilian master. Clausewitz knew that effective military 
operations require synchronized, mutually supportive political-military efforts-but always with the political 
instrument in the "fore." Rather than examine this part of On War, these officers highlight Clausewitz's 
views on "absolute" war and war taken to the "extreme"-the part that reinforces the Army's self-perception. 
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(sub)culture promotes the use of overwhelming firepower, manpower and industrial power 
in conquering an enemy and its army. As the Army has discovered, overwhelming 
firepower is not always the best strategy when conducting successful peace operations. 
subjects in professional military journals. Authors from the two competing subcultures 
tried to influence the Army’s action by writing about their perceived lessons of Vietnam in 
these journals. It appears, however, that the Army heeded only the predominant 
subculture’s recommendations. The Army took only selected lessons from the war and 
assimilated them into its practices. 
different judgments about the lessons of Vietnam than did fellow officers serving in the late 
1960s or early 1970s. The nature of an assignment as an ARVN (Army of the Republic of 
Vietnam) advisor, with a Special Forces Group or in a Civilian Operations and 
Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) team varied drastically from an assignment 
on a long range patrol team (LRP) or in a mechanized unit. The former missions were 
focused on training and winning the “hearts and minds” of the South Vietnamese Army and 
people. The latter missions were focused on killing the enemy. For a killer, winning the 
trust of the indigenous population was a secondary priority. For the teacher, killing Viet 
Cong was a secondary mission. 
from one type of war to another, or at least to have gone through different phases of one 
war, it would not be surprising to find various and dissimilar lessons. This divergence of 
experiences explains much of the controversy surrounding the war and could hamper the 
Army’s absorption of lessons not fitting into its present view of itself. As Elizabeth Kier 
notes, because culture “screens out parts of reality by limiting what we see and even what 
we can imagine,”38 the Army runs the risk of losing some valuable experience through its 
cultural filter. What the Army does not act on, it loses. 
Karl Weick discusses how organizations fail to test various aspects of an 
e ~ p e r i e n c e . ~ ~  Consequently, leaders’ failure to “enact” these lessons prevents them from 
ever “learning” from them. He claims there is no such thing as experience until leaders or 
To measure this cultural bias one can trace debates on the nature of war and related 
Additionally, veterans serving in Vietnam in the early 1960s may have formed 
Because the war in Vietnam continued for so long and appears to have changed 
38 Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and Military Doctrine,” p. 78. 
39 Karl Weick, The Social Psvcholow of Orgarkin% pp. 147-169. In Chapter 6, Enactment and 
Organizing. (Weick, p. 150) Though the Army scarcely admits it, the Army failed at counterinsurgency in 
Vietnam and subsequently avoided pursuing any counterinsurgency doctrine or forces. 
16 
managers of an organization “do something” with the experience: i.e., enact those 
experiences.40 
In the case of Vietnam, the Army chose to enact only those lessons that fit in with 
the Army’s understanding of itself. The “something” that it did was return to a European 
focus. What it did not do was test further doctrine on counterinsurgency. As previously 
noted, fear of failure leads to the avoidance of testing. 41 Though the Army scarcely admits 
it, the Army made a feeble attempt at counterinsurgency and failed in Vietnam. 
Consequently, it avoided pursuing any counterinsurgency doctrine or forces. 
process is given below: 
An example of how the Army may incorporate these cultural biases into its thought 
When an object is sampled only portions of it are pulled out for closer 
inspection but these are sufficient to give some indication of what is going on. Notice 
that after a sample has been extracted subsequent exploration would tend to confirm these 
hunches. Perceptual activity seems to move in the direction of self-fulfilling rather 
than self-defeating prophecies . . . . 42 
When applying Weick’s thoughts to a “sample” where the “object” is the Vietnam 
War, one sees how the Army may have reasoned its understanding of Vietnam. The 
“portions pulled out for closer inspection” are usually the involvement of North Vietnam in 
the conventional war from 1965-1975, the success of the Army against the Viet Cong or 
the American withdrawal in 1972, leaving the South Vietnamese on their own. These 
events are enough to indicate that the United States failed in Vietnam and was struggling to 
understand why. The extracted sample could be: the United States defeats the Viet Cong 
by 1969 but is withdrawn from the battlefield against the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 
by a hostile public and a back-stabbing government. “Subsequent exploration” is 
represented by the Army’s introspection and its “hunches” by its belief that the U.S. won 
all the battles but lost the war (and therefore it must be the government’s, the public’s or the 
media’s fault). “Perceptual activity” was done by authors writing articles absolving the 
Army and writing doctrine that avoids the problem. These writings reinforced the Army’s 
self-fulfilling prophecy that the U.S. Army should not fight wars where use of 
overwhelming force is restricted by civilian politicians (or that the Army won the war, 
thereby negating the need for examination). It would be painful for the Army to admit the 
self-defeating prophecy that the U.S. Army had no idea how to fight a war where it could 
40 Ibid, p. 148. 
41 Ibid, p. 150. 
42 Ibid, p. 154. 
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not simply overwhelm the enemy with military and industrial power (e.g., Vietnam or 
peace operations). 
happened in Vietnam. What it thought happened in Vietnam reinforced its negative attitude 
toward limited war. What the Army thought happened in Vietnam resembles what it thinks 
will happen in peace operations. 
What actually happened in Vietnam is not as important as what the Army thought 
E. METHODOLOGY 
This paper finds part of the answer to the question of what influences Army 
attitudes toward peace operatio:#<: by tracing debate on the various lessons of Vietnam over 
the past twenty-three years. The paper examines how the profession of arms, doctrine and 
strategy shape the Army’s culture. The paper examines whether or not the commonly 
accepted lessons of Vietnam are applicable to the US Army today in describing its attitudes 
toward peace operations. 
Army policy on peace operations. The first method uses an aspect of organizational theory 
that claims that individuals export their experience and knowledge to their organizations and 
that organizations subsequently develop policies around those accepted sets of ideas and 
e~periences.4~ Experiences work their way into the Army through war veterans and 
eventually manifest themselves in doctrine and force structure. This approach will be called 
the institutionalization explanation.44 
A similar phenomenon occurred in the US Army in Vietnam. Individual 
experiences in Vietnam were varied. Interpretations of those experiences ranged widely as 
well. Each individual carried with him or her an understanding of the way the world 
functioned. Each person carried those beliefs with him into the post-war era and to his new 
environment. Value systems had been altered and the more influential individuals modified 
entire systems and organizations. But which of the many individual lessons were adopted 
by the Army and transformed into doctrine or policy? If the lessons of Vietnam were 
learned and adopted by the Army, there should be a solid trail of evidence, still visible 
today, in unofficial literature, official publications, training emphasis and perhaps even 
Two methods will be used to examine the origins and development of the current 
43 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations, (Bergen, Norway: 
Universititforlaget, 1982), pp. 10-23, 54-68. 
See Barry Posen, WSonrces of Militarv Doctrine. 
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organizational structure itself. Examining what is published in the policy debate should 
provide this evidence. 
Conversely, if the lessons resided only in those with f i s t  hand experience, then 
traces of Vietnam references should dwindle commensurate with the number of Vietnam 
veterans. As the bulge of Vietnam-era officers on active duty shrinks, so too, should their 
influence on Army doctrine regarding conflicts similar in nature to the one in Vietnam. In 
this vein, the paper examines who is writing about what in the selected military journals. 
This corollary to the institutionalization explanation claims that the experiences live 
on in the organization through individuals. Unless the beliefs of the individual are imbued 
into the organization, their experience departs with them when they leave the organization. 
If individuals make no effort to transfer their experiences or are simply unsuccessful in so 
doing, future generations will have a weak reference point from which to conduct future 
planning and operations. Even if valiant individual efforts are made at incorporating certain 
lessons, cultural impediments could prevent their assimilation into an accepted view or 
position. The Army has an implicitly historical understanding of its role as the defender of 
U.S. interests in Europe. Most recently it also became the inheritor of blitzkrieg-type war. 
Any lesson not supporting this culturally accepted understanding runs the risk of being 
marginalized. Unless an entire generation of officers agrees that the Army’s role requires a 
paradigm shift, no significant lessons or changes will be implemented. 
generational change explanation may possibly support a cycles theory, whereby lessons, 
attitudes and behaviors are passed on in cycles from one generation to the next45 These 
two modes of inspection should yield measurable results. 
The steady decrease of Vietnam veterans on active duty over time along with the 
number of authors with active duty experience writing about Vietnam should measure the 
generational change and effect. As the decreasing quantity of Vietnam veterans is 
juxtaposed onto the results of the research, one should expect to see an inverse relationship 
if the lessons were institutionalized; i.e. if the lessons of Vietnam are absorbed into the 
culture, the number of references to Vietnam when writing about peace operations should 
increase or at least remain steady as the number of veterans decrease. Alternately, if the 
generational change theory holds true, i.e. the lessons of Vietnam are adopted into the 
This method will be referred to as the generational change explanation. The 
45 Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Cvcles of American History, (Boston, MA: Houghton Miffin Company, 
1986), pp. 43-45. 
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culture, the number of Vietnam references should taper off along with author retirements or 
departures (see Figure 1). 





Figure 1. Institutionalization, Generational Change and the Lessons of 
Vietnam. 
Of course the institutionalization and generational change explanations will not 
answer every question raised. Other factors influencing the mentions of Vietnams are 
possible. In some cases the lessons of Vietnam may be so thoroughly internalized that the 
author under consideration finds alluding to Vietnam unnecessary. In other cases the 
editors of the periodicals may have some personal biases that influence not only the content 
of the articles, but also their titles, photos and captions. Perhaps the most likely factor 
influencing the number of references to Vietnam, however, will be an external event 
causing a shift in focus in the professional publications.& Understanding the nuances of 
structural change and doctrinal adaptation is important. The change in the international 
order has served as an independent catalyst for reexamination of the structuralist, 
bureaucratic and cultural theories in the field of international relations and civil-militaq 
relations. 
To examine the relationship between the organization, the individual and the 
environment, a learning cycle model introduced by James March and Johan Olsen will be 
used.47 They draw heavily on a complete learning cycle model formulated in previous 
46 A special thanks to Professor David Yost, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate 
School, for his assistance in clearly articulating other explanations of why references to Vietnam may or 
may not occur. 
47 James March and Johan Olsen, Ambiguitv and Choice in Organizations, p. 57. 
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works.48 March and Olsen, however, modify the model by examining an incomplete 
learning cycle. The model is portrayed graphically in Figure 2 with the double lines 
representing places in the cycle where the learning can be broken, disrupted or 
misinterpreted and thus, become incomplete. 
Organizational Learning Model 
Individual 
Action 
1 - t 
Environmental 1 1  Response Organizational Action 
The concept of the learning cycle model is straightforward. Individuals possess 
certain beliefs based on their environment. These individuals then act on their beliefs, 
sparking organizational action. The organization then takes action to shape the environment 
or least function in the new environment. 
Breaks or blockages in the learning cycle are expected between individual action 
and organizational action when the organization fails to institutionalize the individual's 
experience. This failure to institutionalize experiences can happen in three ways. First, 
individuals may not act on their beliefs or may do so in an unconvincing way. Lack of 
personal motivation and organizational prejudice could prevent individuals beliefs from 
being acted on. Second, the organization may be so rigid that it is unable to change. 
Inefficiency or "red-tape" could prevent the organization from assimilating individual 
experiences. Third, the range of individual beliefs and actions is so divergent that no clear 
48 bid, p. 56. 
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message is sent to the organization. In this case, what the organization recognizes, it 
grasps, and what looks unfamiliar or complex, it filters out. 
suggests a modification in the learning cycle between individual action and organizational 
action. A second problem occurs before the cycle even starts when ambiguous individual 
experience confuse individual beliefs. In the modified case, the writers would be trying to 
influence the Army’s action by writing about their perceived lessons of Vietnam but the 
Army would not heed their recommendations. In the second case, veterans serving in 
Vietnam in an advisory capacity in the early 1960s may have formed different beliefs about 
the lessons of Vietnam than did fellow officers serving in a conventional American unit in 
the late 1960s or early 1970s. Because the war in Vietnam waged on for so long, it would 
not be surprising to find a wide distribution of lessons. 
These divergent experiences no doubt explain much of the controversy surrounding 
the war. The model shown in Figure 3 shows what has potentially gone awry. Two 
different cultures grow in an organization. Individuals closely identifying with the beliefs 
embodied in these two subcultures take action to influence the organization. The 
Organization, however, accepts only certain actions as legitimate. In this case, the Army’s 
actions are developing doctrine and designing force structure. If the Army does not act on 
the lessons of the subcultures, then no restructuring or doctrine development would be 
expected. Also, for the weaker subculture to gain legitimacy, it must conform to the 
predominant subcultures methods. 
be expected, but rather a continuous flow of beliefs, actions and responses. Because the 
war was short, operations were integrated and the experiences were similar its lesson are 
probably more focused. All this “learning” stems from an original environmental response 
starting with the American Civil War.49 After the Union Army cycled the lessons through 
itself, it marched off to the First World War. After digesting those lessons (which 
complemented previous lessons learned, i.e. use of overwhelming force) it liberated 
Europe and won the Second World War.50 The lessons of the Second World War (again, 
The thesis examines the Army’s learning cycle regarding the Vietnam War and 
If Desert Storm were examined using this model, no deviations in the cycle would 
49 See Russell Weigley, The American Wav of War, for the history of the American Army’s propensity to 
conduct annihlatory warfare since the American Civil War. 
50 See Andrew Krepinevich, The Armv and Vietnam, (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Press, 1986). 
Though Krepinevich wrote this work in 1986 his observations about the Army’s concept of war were 
prescient and his notions seem validated by the Army decisions in the wake of Desert Storm. He rightly 
explains that the US Anny derives all of its significant doctrine from its experience in the Second World 
War and that it views Korea and Vietnam as aberrations. Doctrinaires made the realities of these wars fit 
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overwhelming force) then cycled through and brought America the Army that prevailed in 
Desert S t01-m.~ 
Beliefs of individual subculture 
Organizational 
Action Devoted 
to subculture A 




Figure 3. Incorporating Culture into the Organizational Learning Model. 
March and Olsen point out ambiguity as one of the major reasons for breaks in the 
learning cycle is ambiguity. They describe ambiguity as a situation where it is not clear 
what happened or why it happened.52 In this situation, organizations will be slow to act on 
non-homogeneous lessons. Karl Weick points out a reason for not learning from previous 
situations is a failure to act on the perceived lessons.53 Because leaders are afraid to fail, 
they avoid further tests of situations already known to be difficult. The Army draws 
conclusions and acts on some while avoiding the testing of others.54 
into the Army Concept of war. The Concept is the term Krepinevich uses throughout his book to describe 
the Army’s dominant doctrinal paradigm and will be used throughout this thesis. 
51 Harry G. Summers Jr., “Full Circle: World War I1 to the Persian Gulf,” Militaly Review, February 
1992, pp. 38-48. 
52 James March and Johan Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations, pp. 10-23 and 54-68. 
53 Karl Weick, The Social Psvchologv of Organizing, p. 150. 
54 Ibid, pp. 147-169. 
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One major assumption thus far has been a relationship between the type of warfare 
waged in Vietnam and the type of unwarjGare waged in peace operations. The intent is to 
establish a relationship in the literature between attitudes toward various forms of "limited" 
warfare and peace operations. The way people thought about Vietnam influences what 
they write about low-intensity conflict and ultimately, peace operations. These two types 
of operations at a minimum fall on the same end of the "spectrum of conflict," awayfrom 
total warfare. Low intensity conflict and peace operations are also doctrinally linked by the 
Army. 
revealing an institutional schism at some point after America's defeat in Vietnam. 
Discussions of High and Mid-Intensity Conflict versus debate over Low-Intensity Conflict 
and Counterinsurgency (HIC, MIC, LIC and COIN respectively). When and where do 
peace operations enter the debate? And later, after peace operations are part of the 
discussion, how do different UN Charter chapter actions influence the debate? 
Using the theories and methods outlined above as templates, along with the development 
of the lessons of the Vietnam war and the evolution of US involvement in UN peace 
operations, this paper should illuminate the reasons for current military attitudes about, and 
perhaps even our complex political policy toward, peace operations. 
Clear breaks in the literature and doctrine should appear regarding types of war, 
F. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The primary method for extracting information about the Army, Vietnam and peace 
operations was content analysis. Parameters, Military Review and A m y  were the three 
periodicals searched. These periodicals were chosen because they most embody the 
general nature of the subject being investigated and are the most widely read by Army 
officers. The research starts with periodicals in 1972 and closes with the Winter or 
September 1995 issues. Going back further than 1972, a time when the US was still 
involved in Vietnam, would only provide inconclusive tactical, operational and strategic 
analysis. Not only was the war still on-going but also appreciable understanding of the 
"lessons" was unlikely. 
Two search methods were used. First, the Air University Periodical Index was 
used with a few search words: Vietnam, peace operations, peace-keeping, peace 
enforcement and peace making. The initial search did not turn up a significant number of 
articles. The search was expanded to United Nations, Low Intensity Conflict, Doctrine and 




that a more detailed method would be necessary. For a second method, each issue of each 
periodical was examined for articles that had either peace operations or Vietnam as a 
primary or secondary topic. 
This second search method resulted in 484 articles being included in the data set. 
Just skimming these articles for mentions of Vietnam and peace operations, several other 
trends surfaced. In trying to measure Army attitudes as the dependent variable, many of 
these trends seemed intuitively pertinent and consequently became their own independent 
variable. 
Listed below are the thirty independent variables each article was coded for and a 
1. Article #: 1 through 484 
2. Journal: Parameters, Army, Military Review. 
3. Date: Month and year. Parameters is a quarterly publication. March, June, 
simple explanation of the coding if necessary: 
September and December were used for the Spring, Summer, Autumn and Winter issue 
dates, respectively. 
recorded in the order shown in the publication. The exception was if one author was 
recognized as a repeat contributor to the journals; that author was then listed first, 
regardless of his position in the original order. 
5. Background of Author: Active Military, Retired Military, Civilian Academic, 
Government Civilian, Military Reserve, Foreign National, Both Retired and Academic, 
Dual Reservist and Academic, Unknown. Academic meant either graduate level education, 
or a professional journalist. Retired meant at least twenty years active duty. Military 
Reserve also included National Guardsmen. 
4. Author: Last name, first name: When two or more authors were listed they were 
6. Vietnam Experience: yes, no, unknown 
7. Main Subject: The main subject of the article was listed. It ranged widely. 
Some examples include: Vietnam, peace operations, doctrine, logistics, force structure, 
personal accounts, LIC, professionalism, tactics, operations, strategy, special operations, 
reserves, VOLAR (volunteer Army), civil affairs, readiness and lessons learned/ history. 
Professionalism meant any topic dealing with the military or soldiering as a profession. 
Leadership, essays on Clausewitz and the Army as a career were examples of articles 
included under professionalism. 
Vietnam as Subject: primary, mention, none 
Peace Operations as Subject: primary, mention, none. See definitions above. 
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10. Level Of Discussion: Strategic, Operational, Tactical, Relations (Political- 
Military), Combination (Strategic, Operational and Tactical), Both (Strategic and Policy), 
Policy. These categories were later recoded as either policy-strategy or tactical-operational. 
1 1. Military Professionalism: Primary, mention, none, Stab-in-the-back. Articles 
on leadership, ethics, the operational art of war, careerism, duties and responsibilities were 
coded in this category. If any discussion of a stab-in-the-back appeared in the article it was 
coded thusly, regardless of the other categories. The intent of including the “stab” notion 
in this category was to examine the Army’s perception of civilian interference in the 
execution of professional military duties. Being coded stab-in-the-back did not mean the 
author claimed there was a stab, just that the topic of the military’s being betrayed by the 
government, media or people was mentioned. A mention showed an awareness of this 
legacy of the Vietnam war. 
12. Role of militarylAmy: Primary, mention, none. The question asked when 
coding an article with this variable was, “Does this article talk about the role of the Army in 
war or use of military force in foreign policy?” 
War was referenced frequently in the journals. It also worked its way into articles 
mentioning Vietnam. The potential connection was 
13. Arab-Israeli War Mention: yes, no. Not surprisingly the 1973 Yom-Kippur 
in*********************************** 
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******************************awing on or purporting to identify lessons learned 
from a previous conflict?’ 
16. Basis or Reference: Clausewitz, Summers, Krepinevich, Others. Prussian 
General Philosopher Carl von Clausewitz was often the basis for writings on military 
strategy. Harry Summers gained prominence after the publication of his book on the 
lessons of Vietnam in 1982. Andrew Krepinevich wrote the antithesis to Summers’s work 
in 1987. Other theorists included Sun Tzu, B. Liddell Hart and Jomini. 
17. Organizational Change: Primary, mention, none 
18. Spectrum of Conflict: Yes but undetermined, High Intensity Conflict (HIC), 
Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), No mention. The two part question asked here was, “Does 
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the author use the term ‘spectrum of conflict’? If so, is it an article promoting low intensity 
or high-mid intensity paradigm?” 
19. Doctrine or Army Field Manual 100-5, FM 100-20 or 100-23: Yes, No: “Does 
this article reference doctrine?’ 
20. Use or Mobilization of Reserves or Draf: Primary, mention, none. “Does this 
article discuss the role or mobilization of the Reserves, National Guard? Is the Draft or the 
Volunteer Army discussed?” 
2 1. Concept: Pro, Anti, Unknown. Borrowed from the term Krepinevich uses to 
describe the Army’s fixation with overwhelming firepower, armored warfare and Europe. 
The question asked was, “Does the author consciously address the divergent paradigms of 
war and take a position?” Most authors did not take a position. 
22. AdvisorslSOF: Primary, Mention, None 
23. National Interest: yes, no. Items 23 through 28 are Caspar Weinberger’s six 
tests for determining the use of military force in foreign policy. “Did the author mention 
this subject?” These items were mentioned by authors before Weinberger’s speech. 
24. WinlEnd-State: yes, no 
25. Political-Military Objectives: yes, no 
26. ReassessmentlGradualism: yes, no 
27. Public Support: yes, no 
28. Last Resort: yes, no 
29. Latin America: Primary, Mention, No mention. “How was Latin America 
Several mentions of Vietnam occurred but they were not in the context of U.S. 
mentioned in this article?, 
involvement. For example, articles about the French experience in Indochina or the 
Chinese-Vietnamese war were not included in the content analysis. Also, several personal 
accounts from Vietnam were printed but not included. Stories about the faithful fire-base 
dog or the dangers of venereal disease in Saigon were excluded. Similarly, the words 
“peacekeeper” and “peacekeeping” were sometimes used in the context of an 
intercontinental ballistic missile or the deterrent effect our conventional forces had on Soviet 
aggression in Europe.55 Neither of these type of articles were included in the data set. 
For ‘purposes of this paper, the term “peace operations” is used to mean 
peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace making and all other derivations used to describe 
55 For an example, see the 1972 Secretary of the Army status report, Robert F. Froehlke, “Peace-Keeping 
with Pride and Integrity,” Army, October 1972, pp. 16-19. 
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the use of military troops in either United Nations or multilateral missions. Usually these 
terms are used with the intention of describing an observer-type mission. Though Desert 
Storm was a U.N. sanctioned mission, it was not entirely characteristic of the type of peace 
operation or “limited war” envisioned here. One could, of course, argue persuasively that 
Desert Storm was both a “peace operation” and “limited” but compared to the operations in 
the decade before it and those military operations in the four years following it, Desert 
Storm was not limited. Also, some debate appeared in the journals about whether the 
attack on the U.S. Marine deployment to Lebanon in 1984 was a peace operation. As 
time wore on there was agreement that the Marine mission was a peace operation, albeit ill- 
conceived. 
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111. TOO HOT TO HANDLE: 1972-1981 
A. OVERVIEW 
Although approximately 500 articles were reviewed and included in the study, they 
represent a fraction of the material actually published in three periodicals: A m y ,  Military 
Review and Parameters. Over 7,500 articles appeared between 1972-1995 and more than 
2,800 in the 1972- 198 1 period alone. In this first ten-year period, only 162 of these 2,800 
articles (5%) mentioned Vietnam. 
of Vietnam or peace operations. The subjects of the other articles ranged from nuclear, 
chemical and drug wars to force planning, training and maintenance. Professionalism was 
the most frequent general subject. Of the 485 recorded articles, 87% mentioned Vietnam 
while only 20% mentioned Peace Operations. These figures include articles whose primary 
topic was either Vietnam or peace operations and those where these subjects were just 
mentioned . 
Less than 10% of the total discussion in these journals revolved around the events 
The majority of authors had served in the military, and the majority of those 
serving were on active duty when they wrote their article. In all, 54% of the authors 
writing on both subjects claimed Vietnam experience either in their biography or in the text 
of their article. Sixty-six authors wrote more than once and several wrote three and four 
times; one author contributed to these three periodicals on these two subjects fourteen 
times.56 The actual number of authors, and consequently the actual number with Vietnam 
experience, is significantly less than the 54% indicated above. 
In 100 cases it was difficult to determine Vietnam experience. The authors’ years 
of service were during the Vietnam years but vague descriptions like, “. . . served in 
command and staff assignments in COWS (continental United States) and overseas,” 
made it impossible to attribute Vietnam experience with any certainty. It was unclear if 
these authors were embarrassed about writing articles referencing Vietnam while not having 
served there or whether they assumed that since they were writing about Vietnam readers 
would assume first-hand experience. This ambiguity possibly represents severe 
internalization of the Vietnam war. 
56 Hany G. Summers Jr. authored 14 articles on these subjects. He authored many more that did not have 
Vietnam or peace operations mentioned. His voice becomes influential in the debate and will be shown. 
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Of the 232 authors writing about Vietnam as a primary subject, 126 (54%) actually 
served there. Of the 42 authors writing about peace operations as a primary subject, 19 
(45%) served in Vietnam. Over 48% of the authors writing on both topics were on active 
duty in one of the US Armed Services regardless of Vietnam experience. 
were often incisive. A Canadian General nicely summarized the contemporary attitude in 
his review of the 1976 edition of FM 100-5: 
Eight foreign nationals made contributions to the literature and their observations 
There is hardly a reference to the recent Vietnam War with its potential for conflict with 
China-a profound change from a mere decade ago. Thus the strategic thrust of FM 100-5 
clearly is directed toward Russia, its allies and the areas of the world influenced and 
supported by Russia57 
This outsider perspective helped explain the Army’s position for most of the 1970s. 
B. THE ARMY’S SHOCK, DENIAL AND INTROVERSION 
In the years immediately following the end of the American involvement in 
Vietnam the war seemed to be seldom discussed. As American involvement dwindled, so 
too, did the number of periodical pages devoted to the subject. The reverse seemed true in 
civilian academic jo~rnals.58 Figure 4 shows the number of articles mentioning Vietnam 
between 1972 and 1976. The total number of articles appearing in the periodicals remained 
relatively constant during these same fow years. In this same period 1,600 articles were 
published in the three journals. 
Perhaps some distance needed to be placed between the events of the war and any 
meaningful commentary on them. Passions still ran high; Vietnam was too hot a topic to 
discuss.59 After reaching a low point in 1976 the number of articles stabilized somewhat. 
By comparison the number of articles either drawing on a preconceived lesson of, or 
claiming to identifjt a new lessonfrom Vietnam declined into the 1980s. Figure 5 shows 
the decline. 
57 Dan G. Loomis, “FM 100-5: A Review,” in Military Review, March 1977, p. 68. 
58 See for example, Joe P. Dun ,  “In Search of Lessons: The Development of a Vietnam Historiography,” 
Parameters, vol. IX, no. 4 (Winter 1994-95) pp. 28-40. The author provides an extensive bibliography of 
the literature on Vietnam, most of which come from civilian sources. 
59 Anthony Wermuth, “The Evolving Domestic Forum for National Security Debates,” Parameters, vol. 
IV, no. 2, (June 1974), p. 72. Also, one author writing as late as 1990 said, “Although we are still to 
close in time to the Vietnam War to grasp fully all of its implications, the passing of time permits some 
aspects of the war to be judged less on emotion and more on the merits of the case.” James B. Motley, 
“U.S. Unconventional Conflict Policy and Strategy,” Military Review, January 1990, p. 15. 
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Figure 4. Early Mentions of Vietnam in the Periodicals. 
From the subjects and tone of the articles there was no clear consensus on what the 
lessons of Viemam really were. In the mid-l97Os, some authors denied the loss of 
Vietnam. In 1973, the Commander of the US Army-Pacific wrote the following passage 
about the American experience in Vietnam, 
What we did there was give the people of South Vietnam a reasonable chance to choose a 
way of life, free from intimidation or force. Men and women of the US Army went into 
Vietnam with their heads high and they came out with their heads high-Mssion 
Accomplished! 6o 
Reading that passage today gives the reader an uneasy feeling knowing that history 
does not share the author’s view that the Army accomplished its mission. With top officers 
expressing views like these in 1973, it is evident the Army would have trouble agreeing on 
and assimilating certain lessons in the decade to come. 
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Figure 5. Mentions of the Lessons of Vietnam Between 1972 and 1981. 
The number of authors who had Vietnam experience and remained on active duty 
decreased during most of phase one. This trend indicates either an unwillingness or 
inability to write coherently about Vietnam. More officers with Vietnam experience wrote 
articles about peace operations in 1993 than did Vietnam veterans about Vietnam in 1973. 
Cultural impediments, like senior officers hypothesizing a victory and claiming heads were 
held high, prevented prospective authors from writing on the subject in those years 
immediately following the US troop exit. Most authors’ experience probably did not leave 
them feeling victorious or motivated to write about the “win.” Arguing with conventional 
wisdom about the war could jeopardize a career. 
written on the tactical and operational aspects of war nearly matched the number of articles 
on the strategic or policy levels. Phase one, however, had proportionally more articles 
written at the tactical-operational level than the other two phases.61 Figure 6 shows the 
When the war was written about between 1972 and 1981, the number of articles 
76,69 and 46 articles were written at the tactical-operational level in the three respective phases. 162, 
203 and 11 1 total articles were written in each phase. 
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growing gap in the level of discussion, particularly between phases one and two. 
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Figure 6. Gap Between Tactical-Operational and Strategic-Policy Levels of 
Discussion. 
The focus during this early period was on battlefield events. A representative article 
is titled, “On Heavy Artillery: American Experience in Four Wars.”62 The article is the 
Parameters, Summer 1973 centerpiece, authored by a distinguished military professional 
and uses Vietnam as its capstone example. Another example is an article titled, “Give Me a 
Tank,” where the author boosts armored warfare and harkens back to its superiority in the 
Second World War.63 He gently comments that tanks were not of much use in Vietnam 
and implies that the United States should not fight in places where tanks are not useful. 
Lastly, an article entitled, “It’s Knowing What’s Out Front That Counts,” describes 
tactical intelligence tasks on the battlefield.64 The author assumes a geographical “front,” 
an assumption that did not go unchallenged by soldiers who fought the illusive Viet Cong. 
Korean war paradigms did not agree with the realities of Vietnam. Most authors served in 
operational or tactical positions where they were not exposed to war policy or strategy 
These examples show how authors viewed the war. World War II and even the 
62 S.L.A. Marshall, “On Heavy Artillery: American Experience in Four Wars,” Parameters, vol. WI, no. 
2 (June 1973) p. 2-20. 
63 Albert Garland, “Give Me a Tank,” Army, November 1972, pp. 29-31. 
64 Robert S. Boothe, “It’s Knowing What’s Out Front That Counts,” Military Review, November 1974, p. 
13. 
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formulation. Even those authors (and editors) that were involved at a strategic level chose 
to focus on the operational aspect of the war.65 As a result the early debate was limited to 
the events of the battlefield in Vietnam. Dialogue about the events in the office of the 
President, the halls of the Capital and the streets of America was still mostly taboo. From 
the cultural theory described earlier, taboo issues are generally not tested; they are avoided. 
Challenging the Army’s conventional wisdom about the Vietnam war-that the Army 
had indeed accomplished its mission-seemed unpopular. Articles obviously written as a 
reaction to the war often left out Vietnam as a subject or case and consequently did not meet 
the criteria for inclusion in ihe data set.& Other articles sought to address the subject in less 
legitimate ways including one authored by a Soviet colonel on limited w a ~ f a r e . ~ ~  While the 
war was discussed, the reader is left with the impression that Vietnam was not lost, its 
lessons were of limited value and that wars like Vietnam were not welcome. 
While the articles were evenly split between the strategy-policy and tactical- 
operational levels of war during this early period, the specific subjects discussed varied 
more than in the later phases. Figure 7 shows the number of subjects for all three phases.68 
This narrowing of the scope of the subjects shows the building of a consensus amongst 
authors. The large number in the 1972-1981 phase, however, shows a lack of consensus 
about the meaning Vietnam and it effects on the future of the American military. 
Much has been written about the Army’s professional failure and its need to 
rediscover the “operational art” and the profession of arms.@ The civilian critique of the 
Army was much harsher than officers criticism of the service. Gradually the subject of 
professionalism became a fashionable topic in military journals. In fact, Parameters 
65 For example, Army reprinted a portion of the eighth chapter of William C. Westmoreland’s book, A 
Soldier Reports, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976) and titled it, “Westmoreland in Vietnam: 
Pulverizing the Boulder,” February 1976, pp. 36-44. In an introductory note, the Army editors describe the 
excerpt as Westmoreland’s personal recollection of strategy development, but the description is mostly 
about the operational and even tactical levels of the war. 
See for example Roger Darling, “Analyzing Counterinsurgency,” Military Review, June 1974 , pp. 54- 
66. Not one mention of Vietnam appears in this twelve page aaicle. Pictures accompanying the text are 
from insurgencies in Bangladesh and Bolivia, but none from Vietnam. If Vietnam viewed as an insurgency 
why were no references made to it? Either the author and editor were internalizing the experience or they did 
not see any portion of the Vietnam war as a counterinsurgency. Roger Darling was not an active duty 
officer. 
67 T. Kondratkov, “What is a ‘Limited War’?” MiZitary Review, March 1974, p. 72. The article is a reprint 
from Soviet Military Review. 
69 See for example, Richard A. Gmriel and Paul L. Savage, Crisis in Command, (New York Hill and 
Wmg, 1978). 
A reminder that more articles w:x written in phase I1 but on fewer subjects. 
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published its first issue in the 1970s to provide a forum to further the operational art of 
war. 
Subjects by Phase 
58 
50 
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Figure 7. The Decreasing Number of Primary Subjects When Discussing 
the Vietnam War and Peace Operations. 
Even when the professional failure in Vietnam was recognized, it was not often 
attacked directly. Several articles communicate decay in the Army’s professionalism. In, 
“Army’s Military Arts Gap: Few Artists in the House,” for example, the author calls for a 
revival: 
The choice is a clear one. The military can continue its passive role in the development 
of the higher levels of its art or it can make a deliberate effort to develop an “in-house” 
capability for dealing on that plane. It is not the lack of talent. Thus far, it appears to be 
more a lack of a coherent plan?O (emphasis added) 
The reader is left to assume that at the “higher levels of its art.,,, the author is 
referring to the military leaders who were responsible for developing not only the war’s 
military strategy but also for assisting in development of apolitical-military strategy. The 
implication is that these senior officers had not performed to standard. General William 
Westmoreland bore much of the blame, though it later became popular to say the Army was 
asked to do things it was not designed to do.71 
70 Edward B. Atkeson, ‘‘Army’s Military Arts Gap: Few Artists in the House,” Army, March 1975, p. 10. 
71 Donald B. Vought and John C. Binkley, “Fort Apache or Executive Suite? The US Army Enters the 
1980s,” Parameters, vol. VIII, no. 2 (June 1978) p.25 
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Research from this study shows that in the early years of the 1970s debate on 
professionalism in the context of Vietnam remained relatively constant. Figure 8 shows the 
number of articles on professionalism during phase one. Roughly four articles per year 
appeared with professionalism as its primary topics while two or three articles just 
mentioned the subject. Though articles on other subjects may have included mentions of 
professionalism, those addressing Vietnam and peace operations averaged only around 
eight articles per year (less than half of the articles each year). 
Vietnam and Professionalism 
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Figure 8. A Relatively Small Number of Articles on Vietnam Mentioned Professionalism. 
Many of those articles referenced the military’s being betrayed by high-ranking 
civilians and in fewer instances, senior military leaders. The President, the Secretary of 
Defense, the Congress, the American public and limited war theorists all bore a share of the 
blame. The military’s feeling of abandonment on the battlefield without the political will to 
sustain it or the tools needed to win were repeatedly written about. 
For many officers, the outcome of the Viemam conflict merely confirmed what they had 
known all along: the absurdity of fighting limited, protracted war. . . For these officers, 
the lesson of Vietnam was that the Army should return to doing what it did best: 
managing violence. ‘Soldiers should be soldiers and not sociologists.’ This position was 
officially articulated in 1976 by General Fred C. Weyand. In a 1976 article, then-Chief of 
Staff identified as one of the great mistakes of the war the Army being called on to 
perform nonmilitary tasks that were ‘beyond its capability.’ The implied solution for the 
future was for the military to concentrate on killing tasks to the exclusion of others. . . In 
some ways, the US Army professionals returning from Vietnam resembled the German 
Army of 1919 lookin at the press and the anti-war elements in society as the perpetrators 
of a stab in the back. ?2 
72 bid. 
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Not all authors were as explicit in referencing the stab-in-the-back myth, but a direct 
reference was not uncommon. 
In the same article, the authors footnote Sam Sarkesian who noted that 40% of 
Command and General Staff College (CGSC) students found civilians responsible for 
getting the military into a war it did not want to fight. Figure 9 shows the number of 
articles mentioning a stab-in-the-back. About the same time that helicopters evacuated 
personnel from the roof of the US embassy in Saigon, the stab-in-the-back myth began 
growing roots.73 The failure of Desert One halted a growing fervor for shifting blame off 
the military; the Iran hostage rescue attempt was purely a military failure. By 1980, 
mentions of betrayal were curtailed. 
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Figure 9. The Number of Articles Mentioning a Stab-in-the-back. 
The CGSC students also questioned the role the senior officers played. In one 
version of a now famous story, a student at CGSC surprised a senior officer. In supposed 
no-holds-barred information-gathering sessions with general officers, students were 
encouraged to talk about problems in the officer corps. In one group, a student asked the 
general about the practice of falsifying reports and pressuring subordinates just to please 
higher headquarters. The general denied it ever happened in the unit the general 
commanded. Another student spoke up claiming to have falsified a report and told the 
73 See for example, DeWitt C. Smith Jr., “From Yesterday’s Fears to Today’s Realities,’’ Parameters, vol. 
VII, no. 1 (Spring 1977) pp. 40-44. Parameters liked the article so much they ran it again in the Summer 
1995 issue @p. 63-67). 
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general that he was in the general’s unit in Vietnam when he did it.74 The general became 
indignant, pulled rank on the major and quashed the session’s intended honesty and 
candor. Whether or not the general was aware of reporting problems is not as important as 
the fact that there was a problem. This anecdote shows that ethics, trust, honesty and 
dedication to the art of war were being violated at all levels. This type of environment was 
not conducive to the learning of painful lessons. 
Luttwak published a 1980 article entitled, “The Decline of American Military Leadership.” 
He writes: 
Civilian academics joined the chorus of military critiques. For example, Edward 
There are plenty of engineers , economists, and political scientists in the officer 
corps -but where are the tacticians? There are the many skilled personnel managers, 
logistical managers and technical managers-but where are the students of the operational 
art of war? And at the top there are man competent (and politically sensitive) 
bureaucrats-but where are the strategists? s 
The military had abdicated its responsibility as warriors and protectors of the state. Military 
leaders acquiesced. The officer corps had become an Army of technicians and managers. 
Similarly, Bernard Brodie noted: 
I mean that the professional military, with very few exceptions contributed little but 
resistance-especially resistance to the idea of restraint-and have continued ever since to 
contribute little or nothing to the understanding of the basic strategic-political problems 
of our times. That is not to be wondered at, because they have been improperly educated 
for that part of their job. They have, in fact, a trained incapacit for dealing with it, and 
their performance in Vietnam should be all the proof we need. 7 1  
Peter Paret goes so far as to say that during this period, military history as a 
component of the operational art, was a field of study in danger of not having a “continual 
74 James Fallows, National Defense, (New York: Random House, 1981) p. 121. 
75 Edward Luttwak, “The Decline of American Military Leadership,” Parameters, vol. X, no. 4 (Winter 
76 Bernard Brodie, “Why Were We So (Strategically) Wrong?” Foreign Policy, Number 5 ,  Winter 1971- 
72, was reprinted in the June, 1972 issue of Military Review. His article is in response to a previous one 
written by Colin Gray attacking civilian strategists’ role in the war. Several articles were imported from 
Orbis, Foreign Affairs, and other civilian academic journals. Parameters even started a feature in each issue 
where the editor comments on a political-military piece published in an outside periodical. The editors also 
included a section titled, “A View From the Fourth Estate.” Generally, the conmbutors in this section were 
either professors from civilian universities or well-known journalists. Occasionally, government officials 
or retired officers would print something in this section. When retired Colonel David Hackworth entered an 
article in this section, some readers were outraged. Readers blasted the editors for allowing Hackworth to 
contribute in the View From the Fourth Estate section because of his controversial resignation “in protest” 
over Army policy in Vietnam. Some judged him a turncoat and viewed him unworthy of the status afforded 
to other authors conmbuting in this particular section of Parameters. After Harry Summers retired and 
wrote in A View From the Fourth Estate, however, no one’s ire was raised. 
1980-81) pp. 82-88. 
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institutional presence in American higher education.’m He does recognize, however, that 
the service schools barely kept the tradition alive. 
Part of the Army’s reprofessionalization effort did involve using military history 
and past military theorists as a basis for understanding the Vietnam dilemma. Hardly any 
references to Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Jomini, B. Liddell Hart and others were mentioned 
from 1972 to 1977; only one or two mentions (out of roughly 15 articles) of these theorists 
occurred per year (see Figure 10).78 
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Figure 10. Mentions of Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Jomini, B. Liddell Hart 
and other military theorists. 
In 1978 a slight increase in the number of references to Clausewitz, and other 
military theorists began. This increase coincides with publication of a new warfighting 
doctrine, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, “Active Defense” and with efforts to invigorate the 
Army’s professional development program. Debate and controversies like the one at the 
CGSC seminar help stimulate use of these past military thinkers. Though Clausewitz 
provided an excellent forum to further the operational art, he was also used to legitimize 
the stab-in-the-back myth. 
No one starts a war or rather, no one in his Senses ought to do so, without first being 
clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct 
it?9 (emphasis added) 
77 Peter Paret, Understanding War, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 217. 
78 Again as a reminder and for comparison, approximately 300 articles appeared on all subjects (nuclear 
weapons, training exercises, etc.) each year. 
79 Carl von Clausewitz, On war, p. 579. 
39 
This passage was oft quoted and paraphrased in articles between 1972-81. The 
not-so-subtle implication was that the senseless irrationality of civilian leadership got 
America into an unwanted war and with no coherent plan. This quote reoccurs in writings 
in following years. Awareness of a potential stab in the back is seen throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s. Even officers with no Vietnam experience mention the legacy of distrust. 
C. THE YOM KIPPUR CONNECTION 
One of the biggest surprises in the study was the number of articles referencing the 
1973 Arab-Israeli War.80 What did the Arab-Israeli and Vietnam wars have in common? 
At first, the connection between Vietnam and the October 1973 war was not obvious, but 
eventually the Arab-Israeli war’s influence on doctrinal development and the lessons of 
Vietnam was clarfied. Both wars had an impact on the development of Army doctrine. 
In most all of these 31 cases the author’s attitude toward the war was one of fondness. The 
prevailing tone was not only that the Arab-Israeli war was the type of war the United States 
was trained to fight but also that it was the model for future wars. The implication was that 
Vietnam was the aberration and that it had few lessons to offer the US Army as it prepared 
for its true mission, “the first battle” on the plains of central Europe.81 
The American Army’s dubious experience of Vietnam was reinforced by 
observations of the October 1973 battles and gave a new twist to the U.S. Army’s long- 
standing notion about war.82 In addition to overwhelming firepower winning wars, 
maneuver was a key to success. The Army, quantitatively inferior to the Soviets in 
conventional armaments, identified with the Israelis who fought outnumbered and won. 
The possibility of synthesizing the maneuver and firepower characteristics of war started 
the Army’s rethinking of doctrine. 
The publication of the 1976 version of FM 100-5 stined some debate on doctrine. 
In 1975 and 1976 only one article whose primary subject was doctrine mentioned Vietnam. 
After the manual explaining Active Defense circulated in the Army the number of references 
increased. In 1977 there were seven references, in 1978, there were four and in 1979, 
The Arab-Israeli war was referenced in 31 articles where Vietnam was mentioned. 
In some cases the war in 1967 was cited. If the 1967 war was cited in the context of being the type of 
war the United States was capable of fighting, it was included. 
81 Zeb B. Bradford and Fredenc J. Brown, “Implications of the Modern Battlefield,” Military Review, July 
1977, p. 3. 
82 John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973- 
1982, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office [GPO], 1984) p. 2. 
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seven references appeared. In most of these articles, Vietnam was a negative point of 
reference and was an example of how not to conduct war (e.g. by allowing Civilian limited 
war theorists to sway policy makers’ decisions). When the war was used positively it was 
at the tactical-operational level and demonstrated how to win wars (e.g. by having 
helicopters move soldiers on the battlefield and destroy the enemy). 
articles written about Vietnam or peace operations addressed organizational change 
throughout this fxst phase. As the decade wore on the Army became content with its 
organizational structure. No subculture pushing for change appeared. Accordingly, Figure 
11 shows that fewer articles mentioned organizational change than those that did not, 
particularly from 1978-8 1. Whatever the Army thought of itself in this period relating to 
Vietnam, it was not reorganizing itself. On the occasions when organizational change was 
debated, history tells us the Army was slow to act on that debate.83 
There are two exceptions to this rule of lethargic change. Many articles addressed 
the acquisition of new weapons systems. The prevailing opinion was that the Army’s ten- 
year fixation on Vietnam had caused it to neglect weapons development programs which 
allowed the Soviets to catch up.84 Helicopters and the XM1 tank were the most discussed 
weapon systems. General Howze of The Howze Board fame wrote a series of articles on 
the original Army aviation stimulus: the use of helicopters and tactical innovation for use 
in the European theater. It was evident his articles were designed to rejuvenate thinking on 
the use of the helicopter fleet in Europe. 
mobilization of the reserves, use of the draft and an all volunteer Army. Authors agreed 
that the decision to mobilize the reserves during Vietnam hurt the military efforts5 While a 
few authors saw problems with their exclusion in tactical and operational terms (bringing 
Except for a two year dip in 1975 and 1976, approximately the same number of 
The other exception to the Army’s inability to restructure itself was debate over 
83 Seventy-four articles mentioned some type of change but the Army actually changed little in this 
context. Keep in mind that changes were occurring in the Army and they were Written about but not in the 
cuntext of Vietnam or limited war. Many articles not included in the sample addressed changes as a result 
of intermediate nuclear forces, as an example, but few dealt with change as an acknowledged function of 
Vietnam. 
84 Donn A. Starry, “ A Tactical Evolution: FM 100-5,” Military Review, August 1978, p. 3 and Army 
interview with General Fred C. Weyand in the October 1976 issue, p. 20. 
85 John D. Bruen, “Repercussions from the Vietnam Mobilization Decision,” Parameters, 
vol. 11, no. 1 (Spring 1972) p. 30. See also Eliot A. Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1985) for a detailed description of this process. 
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certain types and quantities to force on the battlefield) others saw the strategic blunder 
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Figure 1 1. The Decreasing Number of Articles Mentioning Organizational Change. 
The Total Force Concept (TFC) was one of the accepted lesson of the war. This 
reorganization of the active-reserve force ratios is the result of the dual concerns of 
maintaining public support and the mremental approach to force sizing in Vietnam. The 
TFC placed large numbers of logistical units in the reserves while keeping many of the 
fighting units on active status. In effect, this prevented the President from going to war for 
extei ded periods without calling up the reserves. Relatively low numbers of articles 
debated the point because it was a readily accepted concept. The number of articles 
referencing the reserves an mobilization issues by year is shown at Figure 12. 
86 See Phillip D. Coleman, “Civil Affairs in Transition: Should We Question Present Doctrine?” Military 
Review, April 1975, p. 42 for an example of an article on the tactical and operational employment of 
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Figure 12. Number of Articles Mentioning Reserve Mobilization, a 
Volunteer Army or the Draft. 
The variable coded, The Concept,87 was designed to show whether the author 
strongly supported a conventional, big-war paradigm. Conventional war was defined as 
anything looking like European land warfare in 1945, Arab-Israeli conflicts in 1973 or even 
the NVA sweep of the South in 1975. Figure 13 shows that in every year but one between 
1972 and 1981, more authors favored a big-war paradigm than were against it. Though the 
absolute numbers seem low, they are not insignificant. Approximately half of the authors 
each year took a position. The large majority of authors did not take a strong position 
either for or against The Concept or wrote on a subject (or at a level) where the question 
was not relevant. It also should be pointed out that the mentions listed here were all in the 
context of the Vietnam war. Literally hundreds of articles during this period were devoted 
to past, present and future conventional war in central Europe. Because none of those 
articles mentioned the war in Vietnam or peace operations, however, they were not 
included in the sample. 
87 The term, The Concept is borrowed from Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., The Armv and Vietnam. On pages 
4-7, Krepinevich defines The Concept. Briefly, he says that the h y  "Concept" is the U.S. Army's 
approach to how wars ought to be fought. 
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Figure 13. In Every Year but 1977, More Authors Noticably Chose a Big-War 
Paradigm When Writing about Vietnam and Peace Operations. 
When this preference for a big-war is combined with the lack of discussion on 
organizational change, it becomes clear that the Army’s collective view of itself was not 
changing much in the ten years following the end of US involvement in the war. What the 
Army had done was look back for a familiar sign-post through the fog and ambiguity of the 
lessons of Vietnam war; central Europe and reserve mobilization were the two visible 
markers. The preference for mechanized, fire and maneuver warfare worked to filter out 
the less agreeable lessons of Vietnam. 
D. PEACE OPERATIONS 
Peace operations were a non-subject for most of this first period. Almost all 
references to peace operations we- ; related to the US involvement in the Multinational 
Observer Force placed in the Sina after the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Only one or two 
articles per year even mentioned peace operations. Most articles were descriptive, 
explaining the mission and how soldiers spent their time. Frequently the connotations 
were less than inspiring. One article entitled, “How to Not Fight: Putting Together a US 
Army Force for a UN Peacekeeping Operation,” addresses the “new” mission. The author 
mentions the difficulty of taking trained killers and turning them into observers. 
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In preparing his unit, no leader can overlook the frustrating aspects of a task where 
achieving nothing is the goa2, or living with the paradox of using a fighting force not to 
fight.88 (emphasis added) 
The author undoubtedly spoke for the majority of the Army when during this phase 
he notes that the goal of peace operations is “nothing.” The author deserves credit for 
being prescient in his understanding the difficulties of a peacekeeper’s mission but the title 
of the article and his tone reflect the Army’s cultural view of such operations. This view is 
still present in the U.S. Army. 
E. PHASE I SUMMARY 
The organizational learning model pointed out breaks in the learning cycle. During 
this early period, two breaks in the cycle occur. The first break occurred when individual 
beliefs were not transformed into individual action. In the case of authors writing in 
military journals immediately after Vietnam, many officers did not write on articles based 
on the beliefs drawn from their Vietnam experience. 
A second break in the learning cycle model occurs when individual actions are not 
translated into organizational action. In the case of the Army in Vietnam, two factors are at 
work. Primarily, the authors’ inability to clearly reach consensus on the perceived lessons 
of Vietnam prevented the Army from implementing organizational action. The Army 
developed Active Defense in response to part of the failure but the h y  took no steps to 
develop a counterinsurgency capability. Those officers acknowledging the failure of 
counterinsurgency doctrine in Vietnam chose not to develop new doctrine and procedures. 
Counterinsurgency doctrine was not tested for further applicability. 
Additionally, authors on active duty faced institutional pressures from the service to 
comply with the accepted norms. Senior officer first complied with, then ignored and 
eventually denounced civilian limited war theorists. Any officer countering this established 
culture was surely marginalized. It would have taken courage to write an article 
contradicting General Weyend’s position that the mission in Vietnam was accomplished. 
As other study’s have shown, professional courage was lacking in the Army of the 
1970s.89 Those officers bold enough to say that the Army had lost in Vietnam and urge the 
Army to investigate a better strategy for the “next time’, rather than turn its back on the 
~ 
James C. Wise, “How to Not Fight: Putting Together a U.S. Army Force for a U.N. Peacekeeping 
Operation,” MiEitary Review, December 1977, p. 20. 
89 See both James Fallows, National Defense, and Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, Crisis in 
Command. 
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problem had little effect on organizational action. The best effort of the officer corps was 
TFC and Active Defense. 
The nine years immediately after the end of the US involvement in Vietnam could 
best be summarized as a period of shock, denial and introversion for the Army. With the 
exception of a reversion to NATO-centric operations, moderate research and development 
and the sweeping TFC initiative, the Army did not change much. There were no sweeping 
changes being considered like a Counterinsurgency Division or giving increased status to a 
counter culture. Some observers of Army structure equate the development of the Light 
Infantry Division to a Counterinsurgency Division. Others see the creation of Special 
Forces as an independent branch of the Army as a huge institutional gain for critics of The 
Concept. These two sweeping changes eventually occur, but not until later in the 1980s. 
The shock over the loss of Vietnam influenced what was written the journals and 
appears to have influenced what was written in the Army’s official publications. Certain 
subjects like why the A m y  lost in Vietnam were unofficially off-limits. As shown by 
General Weyand’s comments there was often no perceived loss to write about. The 
majority of the participants were either numb or shocked by the Army’s less than glorious 
departure from Vietnam, the attitudes of the people back home and the reactions of both 
civilian and military leaders. 
Army’s cultural notion that US troops did not have a role in limited war and only a narrow 
purpose in security assistance. US weapons and equipment were more useful than US 
personnel. The Army undoubtedly breathed a sigh of relief when Nixon delivered his 1970 
Guam speech announcing America’s new p0licy.9~ 
Critics argue that during the Army’s period of introversion efforts to reinvigorate 
itself it accomplished little by 198 1. The total failure of Desert One in its attempt to rescue 
embassy hostages in Iran supported this stagnation argument.91 Of the many lesson of 
Vietnam, some had already begun to be accepted while others were filtered out. Senior 
Army leadership failed to integrate specific yet valuable lessons into doctrine. Winning the 
“hearts and minds” of the Vietnamese people was an original aspect of U.S. strategy. Few 
authors came to its defense, however, between 1972 and 1981. 
The Nixon Doctrine was an obvious reaction to US failure and reinforced the 
90 Authors were aware of the impact the Nixon Docmne would have on the Amy and its concepts were 
generally accepted. See Raymond R. Bameal, “Thesis: Massive Retaliation, Antithesis: Flexible 
Response, Synthesis: The Nixon Doctrine?” Military Review, p. 65. 
91 For a description of the Desert One rescue attempt and a brief discussion of the ramifications of its failure 
(particularly on joint and special operations) see John E. Valliere, “Disaster at Desert One: Catalyst For 
Change,” Parameters, Autumn 1992, p. 69-81. 
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The Army did manage to do a self-assessment in those years though the fruits were 
delayed for a decade. The benefits of the Army’s reform, however, were not born out until 
the successful completion of Operation Just Cause in Panama and Operation Desert Storm 
in Kuwait and Iraq. Other consequences would result in the Army roles in El Salvador, 
Honduras and Nicaragua throughout the 1980s. 
In response to external civilian accusations and the less direct internal calls for 
reform in the 1970s, General Walter T. Kerwin’s, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army 
decided to make some good come of the increasingly apparent failure in Vietnam. In 1979, 
he directed the US Army War College to compile the various lesson of Vietnam, analyze 
them and address concerns. General Kerwin’s intent when commissioning the study was 
to capitalize on the Army’s growing interest in reforging itself into a capable and 
professional organization.92 
manual while denying any real necessity to fix its limited or unconventional warfare 
doctrine or practices. Force structure remained the same. War fighting doctrine had not 
changed significantly; plans and operations just got narrower, more Euro-centric and more 
tactical. FM 100-5 was overly focused on central Europe and provided little utility in other 
regions of the world where the likelihood of war was acknowledged to be higher.g3 By 
denying its role in non-NATO areas, the Army dangerously divorced itself from its 
responsibility of defending all US interests. What exactly the Army learned about itself in 
this introspective period, other than that it needed new weapons and to refocus on the first 
battle in Europe, is not entirely clear. The Army simply shelved many lessons of the 
Vietnam war particularly those dealing with non-armored warfare. 
During this period the Army tinkered around the edges of its integral operations 
92 August 1995 phone conversation with Harry Summers who worked for Kerwin in 1979. 
93 Donald R. Morelli and Michael M. Ferguson, “Low Intensity Conflict: An Operational Perspective,” 
Military Review, November 1984, p. 2-16. See graph on p. 7. Reprinted in George Edward Thibault, 
Dimensions of Military Strategy, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1987) p. 343. 
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IV. SHAPING THE CONSENSUS: 1982-1989 
A. ON STRATEGY 
The person charged with executing the War College study on the lessons of 
Vietnam was then Lieutenant Colonel, now retired, Harry G. Summers Jr. He was sent to 
the US Army War College with the mission of making some sense out of the often 
divergent lessons of the Vietnam War. His work eventually took the form of a book called, 
On Strategy, and was first published in 1981.94 
FM 100-5 and Clausewitzian analysis as its framework. Clausewitz and other military 
theorists had been revived in the profession of arms in the 1970s and Summers capitalized 
on it. Summers’s book is, 
To reach its primarily military audience, the book used the principles of war from 
now being used as student text at the Army War College, the Army Command and 
General Staff College and the Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, and for selected 
seminars at the National Defense University, the Air and Naval War  college^?^ 
Clearly the Army attempted in the early 1980s to operationalize the lessons of the 
Vietnam war. In terms of the organizational learning model presented in Chapter II, the 
organization attempted to complete the learning cycle. The Army hoped to change the 
environment by extracting individual experiences and consolidating them through a study 
and institutionalizing the effort by requiring its officers read the book. 
As the title indicates, Summers’s book is about the strategy of the Vietnam War not 
its tactics. He assumes outright that the Army’s operations and tactics were successful. His 
assumption avoids a myriad of “other” lessons of Vietnam. The lessons of Vietnam found 
in On Strategv are political-military and professional military lessons. In phase one 54% of 
the articles were written on strategy-policy subjects. In phase two, after Summers’s 
94 In the phone interview, Summers explained that he was sent to the Army War College to compile the 
various lessons of the Vietnam War and draw some conclusions. Originally, his results were to be 
published as a paper within the Army andfor the Army. After the paper gained widespread support by the 
Army elite it was put in the form of a book to reach a wider audience. The first edition of the book, QJ 
Stratew: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1981) was soon put on the 
mandatory reading list at the War College and the Command and General Staff College. Colonel Summers 
also stated that there were some Generals who opposed the release of the book and it being made required 
reading. Among these he said, were member of the Special Operations community and the Army’s Office 
95 Harry G. Summers Jr., On Stratew: A Critical Analvsis of the Vietnam War, (Novato, C A  Presidio 
Press, 1982) p. 13. This edition of the book is essentially the same as the 1981 edition. Only the forward 
and the epilogue vary and even then only slightly. 
of History. 
49 
publishes his book, 77% of the articles address strategy-policy subjects. On Strategy not 
only stimulated debate on the lessons of Vietnam, but it alsofocused debate onto political- 
military relations. 
Summers’s primary finding was that because no clear political objective was ever 
articulated, strategic direction was lacking. Consequently, even successful military 
operations and tactical exploits were contributing to an errant strategy, a strategy that could 
never win the war. In his now famous exchange with a North Vietnamese officer in 1975, 
Summers conveys his point: 
“You know you never defeated us on the battlefield,” said the American 
Colonel. 
so,” he replied, “but it is also irrelevant.7796 
The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark a moment. “That may be 
The two officers talked to each other on completely different levels of analysis. The 
North Vietnamese officer more clearly understood an Army’s role in the politics of war. 
The American colonel was centered on an Army’s role on the battlefield. The conversation 
reflects the American preference to wage war in isolation of its political master. 
If political objectives were ever clear, Summers claims, they quickly changed and 
thus remained illusive. Twenty-two different reasons for US conduct of the war were cited 
versus only one for North Vietnam.97 On this subject there is some agreement: because 
of transitory objectives or objectives put in negative terms (the U.S. objective is to not let 
North Vietnam win), political and military officials had no clear consensus on what the 
strategy was to defeat North Vietnam and stop communist expansion. What did “defeat 
North Vietnam mean?” Defeat its army? Or just force North Vietnam to stop supporting 
the insurgency? 
The fnst theme of his book sets out to answer these questions. For Summers, the 
answer involves recognizing the need for civilian leaders to setpolitical objectives so the 
armed services can develop complementary military objectives. Together the military and 
civilians develop a strategy to achieve those goals. 
On a second point, Summers has gained equal notoriety, though the debate is still 
alive.98 Summers concluded that the nature of the war was not properly identified. Was 
96 Harry Summers, On Strategy, p. 21. 
97 Hugh M. Arnold, “Official Justifications for America’s Role in Indochina, 1949-67,” Asian Affairs, 
September/October 1975, p. 31. As seen in Hany Summers, On Strateg p. 140. 
98 See MacKubin Thomas Owens, “Vietnam as Military History,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Winter 1993-94, 
p. 112 for a brief example. Also, in “Commentary and Reply,” Parameters, Autumn 1992, pp. 103-104, 
Summers and John W. Gamer debate how the U.S. could have won in Vietnam. Paul F. Braim, “Vietnam: 
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South Vietnam fighting a full blown civil war or a war of aggression against North 
Vietnam? Or was the conflict a Vietcong counterinsurgency operating in South Vietnam? 
proposes application of overwhelming US force as the solution.99 He states that the US 
role should have been confined to (or allowed to depending on one’s perspective) 
conducting a war against the aggressors, North Vietnam. In his solution to what would 
have won the war, US forces serve in conventional ground warfare role facing the North 
Vietnamese Army (NVA) in North Vietnam and patrolling the Laotian and Cambodian 
borders, but with no restrictions on crossing borders. In effect, that is what the Army did 
from 1965 to 1972. Defeating the NVA is a central point of Summers’s solution, a 
dominant theme in establishing military objectives and an imperative in d e f h g  
Clausewitz’s center ufgravity.l0O To his credit Summers fairly critiques his sponsor. The 
inability of the Army leadership to agree upon the nature of the war and determine what it 
would take to defeat the threat is a second theme of the book. 
Summers comes down on the side of the war of North Vietnamese aggression and 
An opposing view is that the U.S. role should have been assisting the South 
Vietnamese government and Army (ARVN) in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations with 
specially trained US soldiers. This idea is best developed by Andrew J. Krepinevich Jr. in 
The Armv in Vietnam. He claims the Army could have supervised successful COIN 
operations but the Army’s institutional commitment to The Concept prevented it from doing 
so. The Concept is Krepinevich’s moniker for Army doctrine, based on mechanized 
warfare in Europe during the Second World War. He claims the Army marginalized those 
wanting to shift focus onto COIN operations in Vietnam. The Army then clung too tightly 
to the Concept, eventually deploying conventional forces to fight unconventional warfare 
leading to the erosion of US will to fight. Krepinevich cites many other reasons for 
American failure in Vietnam but both he and Summers agree on one point: the Army was 
not properly used. In addition to assessing the nature of the conflict, applying a force of 
appropriate capability and size is definitely a theme of Krepinevich’s book and a third point 
of Summers’s book. 
The Fighting Flares Again,” Parameters, Autumn 1995, pp. 124-128, notes how Robert McNamara’s book 
stirred the controversy again. Others like Sam Sadcesian, Lany Cable, Steven Metz and Andrew 
Krepinevich have written about the changing nature of the war and the feasibility of stopping the 
insurgency in its early phases. 
99 Hany Summers, On Strategv, pp. 170-173. Also, during a discussion on the topic Professor Larry 
Cable from the University of North Carolina-Wilmington described Summers’s interpretation of a solution 
for Vietnam as taking the Air-Land Battle doctrine and just scaling it up or down to suit a purpose. 
loo Carl von Clausewitz, On War, pp. 484487,597-599. 
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A fourth theme of Summers’s work identifies the role of the American public in the 
war effort. Summers includes chapters on the Congress and the People and emphasizes 
the importance of obtaining their consent. He stresses public support as a requirement for 
conduct of war and discounts limited war theorists. Using Clausewitz’s trinity of the 
army, the government and the people,lol Summers highlights the faulty way in which 
civilian limited war theorists influenced the administration to fight the war isolated from the 
American public. Vietnam was a war fought in cold blood, devoid of the emotions of the 
American people. lo* 
despite his claim to the ~ 0 n t r a r y . l ~ ~  Though Summers denies this legacy and writes that the 
military did not always hold up its end of the political-military deal, he repeatedly connotes 
the failure of the civilian leadership to provide clear objectives, particularly at the 
Presidential and Secretary of Defense levels as the root cause of the Vietnam debacle.’” 
He claims that by preventing soldiers from pursuing VC and NVA infiltrators into Laos, 
Cambodia and North Vietnam political leaders artificially constrained the Army. He 
illuminates the discussion of constraints by introducing the subjects of limited war and 
“victory.” He dismisses the idea that the war was unwinnable but harps on the need to 
overwhelm the enemy with ground forces and firepower.1o5 
limited means, limited objectives and victory. He realizes that, 
Summers’s findings are insightful but carry with them a stab-in-the-back myth 
Summers is no fan of limited war but he does grasp the relationship between 
. . . from the perspective of our total victory in World War 11, Korea still looked like a 
defeat and it is only from the perspective of our actual defeat in Vietnam that we can see 
Korea was actually a victory.1o6 
Defining a “win” by determining a desired end-state and stating a clear objective was the 
fifth broad theme of Summers’s work. 
In both commissioning Summers’s to write the book and the requirement that its 
officers read it, one see the foundations for the Army’s institutionalizing the lessons of 
lol Ibid, p. 89. 
lo2 Harry Summers, On Smtegv, p. 62. 
lo3 Ibid, p. 33. 
lo4 Summers valiantly tries to stay focused on the military and its role in the political-military equation in 
an obvious and mostly successful attempt at strengthening the profession of arms (see, for example, p. 
258). He continually lets his feelings of victimization show through, however (see, for example, pp. 34-35, 
lo5 Harry Summers, On Strategy, p. 172. 
lo6 Ibid, p. 170. 
236,246-249). 
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Vietnam. Not many veterans would argue with his selected lessons and conclusions. 
Indeed, his book gained wide support in the military and academic communities. lo7 Both 
On Strategy and The Armv in Vietnam were reviewed by the same retired general and the 
reviewer’s personal bias, representative of the Army’s cultural bias, shows.108 
Of the two accounts of US failure in Vietnam, Summers’s work is more accepted 
probably because it was less offensive to the Vietnam-era military decision makers.l@ 
Dissenting voices on Summers’s use of Clausewitz seldom appeared and when they did the 
seeds of the message did not fall on fertile soil.l10 
Strategy explanation fit better with cultural norms, i.e. The Concept. He omitted any 
tactical lessons and filtered out those that did not fit the Clausewitzian framework of 
analysis. Summers’s assessment was a more satisfying apology111 for what went wrong in 
Summers’s take on Vietnam, soon became the Army’s official view because the 
lo7 See for example, Charles Maechling Jr. in Parameters, vol. XIV, no. 3, (September 1984) pp. 38 and 
41. Stephen Peter Rosen Winning the Next War, p. 35 and Stanley h o w ,  Vietnam, (New York, 
Penguin Books: 1991) p. 19 both cite Summers’s conversation with the North Vietnamese Colonel 
regarding winning on the battlefield but losing the war and agree with his assessment. Two examples of 
periodical references of Summers’s conversation are in, Cass D. Howell, “War, Television and Public 
Opinion,” Military Review, February 1987, p. 71 and Max G. Manwaring and Robert M. Herrick, “A 
Threat Oriented Strategy for Conflict Control,” Military Review, July 1987, p. 7. Perhaps most 
importantly On Strategv is recognized by Michael Handel, “Masters of War: Sun Tzu. Clausewitz and 
Jomini,” (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1992) p. 160, “Much is owed to the important and timely work of 
Colonel Harry G. Summers on the lessons of Vietnam War.” 
lo8 Bruce Palmer reviewed both books in Parameters: Summers’s book on pages 90-91 in the December, 
1981 issue (he reviewed the original version of On Strategy published by the Government Printing Office- 
the one for “official” Army use) and Krepinevich’s book on pages 83-85 in the September, 1986 issue. 
Palmer attempts to provide balanced reviews, finding both positive and negative points in each book but it 
is obvious in the first three sentences of each review where his favor rests. On Summers’s book, “This is 
an extraordinarily good book that is well worth careful reading and study by every military professional. 
Its central purpose is to make a strategic appraisal of the Vietnam War from the point of view of the United 
States, a formidable task by any measure. The author. . . has done a remarkable job.” On Krepinevich’s 
book, “The author has devoted a good deal of research and thought to his subject. The result of his work, 
however, is disappointing-a long, rambling, one-sided discourse that lacks the balance, cohesion and 
objectivity of a truly professional and scholarly book. His bete noire, is what he calls, “The Army 
Concept,” which he paints as a doctrinal mindset fmed rigidly on modem “mid-intensity” conventional 
warfare set in Western Europe against the Soviet Union: and his villains are, “the Army brass,” (whoever 
they are) on whom he blames all American shortcomings in Vietnam.” Unbelievers should read both 
reviews in their entirety. 
lo9 Summers in referenced 62 times in the articles reviewed. Krepinevich is only six times. Though not 
all authors shared Summers’s opinions, most did: they often quoted him or referenced him as the definitive 
source on the subject. See also Palmer’s comments in footnote 72 above. 
110 Eric Alterman, “The Uses and Abuses of Clausewitz,” Summer 1987, Parameters, pp. 18-32. This 
article is the author’s only recorded contribution in any of the three journals. His assessment of Summers’s 
use of Clausewitz is less than flattering. 
G. Murphy Donovan, “Sustaining the Military Arts,” Parameters, September 1989, p. 14. 
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Vietnam than any other work at that point and probably since.l12 Figure 14 shows the 
increasing influence Summers’s book in relationship to the articles referencing lessons of 
Vietnam. 
Mentions 














Figure 14. The Impact of Harry Summers’s Book On Strategy on Writings about 
the Lessons of Vietnam. 
But Summers’s view was still somewhat unpolished and not quite packaged for 
civilian policy-maker’s consumption. Though his work circulated in military circles much 
of its theme involved the civilian leadership and policy makers. Summers’s lessons needed 
the addition of political nuances and a powerful sponsor before it could be fully 
transformed from its original simple analysis to an official policy. 
l2 In a conversation about the book with a classmate, a Lieutenant Commander and SEAL in the Navy 
said, “I don’t know if that’s the right interpretation or not, but it sure makes you feel good.” 
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B. THE WEINBERGER DOCTRINE 
According to Michael Handel, Summers’s book, 
. . . . had a very positive influence on the development of the United States military’s 
thinking on strategy in the early 1980s as well as (albeit indirectly) on the formulation of 
the Weinberger Doctrine.”113 (emphasis original) 
Indeed, shortly after On Stratem became required reading at the service schools, Secretary 
of Defense Caspar Weinberger delivered a speech in which he identified six tests governing 
US military intervention. These tests would help determine whether or not the US should 
use military force in its foreign policy. 
On 28 November 1984, Secretary Weinberger stated: 
1. The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular 
engagement or occasion is deemed yital to our or that of our allies. 
2. If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do 
so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of a n i n g .  If we are unwilling to 
commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit 
them at all. 
3. If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined 
political and militarv obiectiveg. And we should know precisely how our forces 
can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And we should have, and send, the forces 
needed to do just that. 
4. The relationship between our objectives and the 
I - - m u s t  be continually reassessed and adjusted if 
necessary. 
5. Before the United States commits combat forces abroad there must be some reasonable 
assurance we will have the mart of 
representatives in w. This support cannot be achieved unless we are candid in 
making clear the threats we face; the support cannot be sustained without continuing and 
close consultation. 
6. The commitment of US forces to combat should be a last resort.114 
we have committed-their .. 
their elected 
Many of Harry Summers’s “military” lessons of Vietnam find their way into 
Weinberger’ six tests, the antithesis of American intervention in Vietnam.115 The Vital 
113 Michael Handel, Masters of War, p. 160. 
114 These points are taken from Weinberger’s 28 November 1984 speech at the National Press Club in 
Washington D.C. as seen in Defense, January 1985, pp. 2-8. All emphasis added. Each test will be referred 
to by the emphasized abbreviation throughout the paper. These shortened names are also used as categories 
in the content analysis coding. 
115 Summers stated that he was told by a third party that Weinberger’s speech writer had read Summers 
book and been influenced by it. Also, In Bob Woodward, The Commanders, (NewYork: Pocket Star Books, 
1991) p. 89, he points out that General Colin Powell was Weinberger’s military assistant and that Powell 
was intimate with the speech, its content and its formulation. Powell and Summers were contemporaries; 
Summers’s book, On Strateev 11: A Critical Analvsis of the Gulf War, (New York Dell, 1992) p. xii, was 
written in honor of Powell, “Friend, Leavenworth Classmate and Outstanding Soldier whose strategic 
guidance led the way to victory in the Persian Gulf war.” As will be shown, Powell’s understanding of the 
lessons of Vietnam are nearly indistinguishable from those of his friend and classmate. 
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National Interest and Last Resort tests are the more political of Weinberger’s six criteria 
and are not specifically discussed in On Strategy. Regarding Vietnam the Vital National 
Interest test debate is over whether or not President Eisenhower’s domino theory proved 
valid. In retrospect, clearly US military intervention in Vietnam fails this test. 
Supposedly, if Vietnam fell to communism, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and eventually all 
of Asia would tumble We dominoes under the weight of Soviet directed expansion and also 
become communist. After conquering the South, Vietnam did war with neighboring 
Cambodia in what appeared to be the next domino. After Vietnam fought with China, 
however, it became apparent that communism was not a synthesized global political force. 
Without any U.S. intervention, the dominos quit falling, (at least in Asia). Through the 
benefit of hindsight, one can now see that defeating North Vietnamese communists was not 
a vital U.S. national interest. Of the six tests Vital National Interest was mentioned fourth 
most often (133 times or 27%) in the articles examined. 
The Last Resort test is written in the finest tradition of just or legal recourse to war 
and historically not a concern of the profession of anns subject to civilian control. Not 
surprisingly it is the least written about of the Weinberger lessons( 41 times or 8%). If one 
considers the Army’s premium on the element of surprise, this low ranking makes sense. 
Giving the opponent every chance to submit their will necessarily negates surprise as a 
principle of war. Also, Surprise was a chapter in Summers’s book. As will be shown, the 
Last Resort test evolves into a multilateral test and develops an odd relationship with the 
Vital National Interest criterion. 
The Win criterion is a two part test and also supports an accepted On Strategy 
lessons. First, discourse about winning, and more recently, a desired “end-state” once 
again became a worthy topic of scholarly research. Entire books devoted to the subject 
were published.1l6 One author even stretched the point by reminding readers how some 
things had not changed much from the 1919-21 US involvement in Russia’s Civil War and 
US involvement in Vietnam. The author claims both situations were rushed into with out a 
plan for an exit.l17 How to get out became one of the criteria for determining US military 
intervention. 
Fred MC, Everv War Must End, (New Yo&: Columbia University Press, 1991) p. vii. IMC flatly 
admits, “I worked on this book when American involvement in the war in Viernam had become an 
agonizing search for an exit. The United States had become entrapped in painfully prolonged fighting, 
unable to marshal a strategy to end the war satisfactorily.” 
117 Edward W. Coffman, “The Intervention in Russia, 1918-1921,” Military Review, September 1988, p. 
71. 
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Total and limited war theorists argued this point of victory steadily throughout the 
1980s, particularly as the US Naval presence in the Persian Gulf grew. The Schultz- 
Weinberger debates capture the controversy at the highest levels of policy. Their two 
positions on this criterion and the relationship between victory, end-state and objectives is 
contextual. Fred IklC provides a dose of perspective. 
Judged a bit coarsely, the United States lost the Vietnam War. The Gulf War 
was clearly won by the United States-if judged in military terms. In political terms, 
though, the verdict must wait. In the Viemam War, the victory won by America’s 
enemy was a Pyrrhic one. Hanoi, soon after its victory, became embroiled in prolonged 
hostilities in neighboring Cambodia from which it is still trying to extricate itself. 
Then, in 1979, Hanoi had to fight off a military incursion form China-its staunch ally in 
the long war against the United States. All this time, Vietnam’s economy deteriorated 
so much that “victorious” Hanoi is now humiliatingly dependent on foreign aid, over 
which Washington-the defeated enemy-has much to say. Could it now be said that by 
seeking South Vietnam’s total defeat and the humiliation of the United States, Hanoi, in 
fact lost the peace.118 
Second, by stating, “Lf we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources 
necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all,” Weinberger 
presents an all or nothing approach. Overwhelming force “guarantees” a win. By not 
allowing the Army to use overwhelming force in Vietnam, the government prevented the 
Army from winning: the stab-in-the-back. The Win criteria seeks to reassure the military 
there will never again be a stab-in-the-back. Winning was the second most mentioned 
Weinberger test in the selected articles (160 times or 33%). 
was the third most discussed lesson of Vietnam (137 times or 30%). It echoes one of 
Summers’s major themes. Weinberger’s tests and Summers’s points are nearly identical 
on this topic. 
lesson of Vietnam and Weinberger’s fourth test (89 times or 20%). Summers made the 
case for proper implementation of the military, using it to overwhelm the enemy. 
Weinberger’s interpretation differed slightly from Summers’s. Weinberger emphasized 
reassessment of forces based on shifting objectives while Summers focused on only one 
Securing achievable political and military objectives was Weinberger’s third test and 
Reassessing Force Size, Composition and Disposition was the fifth most mentioned 
Bid, p. viii. Not only does Ikl6 address the Win criteria but he also mentions Weinberger and addresses 
his other criteria. He even mentions the stab-in-the-back myth. In the revised edition, he states that when 
he first wrote the book that he purposely avoided mentions of Vietnam (p. viii) for fear of them taking on a 
“disproportionate weight,” but admits that “the influence of the present is strong enough, without quoting 
from today’s newspapers.” A similar line of reasoning may be applied to authors writing in military 
periodicals about counterinsurgency and limited war immediately after Vietnam. 
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objective: destroying the enemy’s military power. If the enemy Army was smaller than the 
US force, then US forces could be scaled down but still be large enough to overwhelm the 
opposing forces. Weinberger’s perspective reflects his extensive political experience and 
knowledge that total destruction of the enemy is rarely the objective. This suggestion of 
shifting objectives (or having to send for reinforcements) did not fit well into the Armies 
cultural understanding of how Army’s win wars and was the likely reason for it ranking as 
the fifth most mentioned of the Weinberger tests. Nevertheless, this test is congruent with 
the all or nothing implication of the Win criterion. 
The number one lesson of the Vietnam war is the importance of gaining the 
American public support when committing forces. Despite the John Mueller study 
showing that public support was high during a large portion of the war, the level of debate 
here shows that after the war it was the greatest concern.119 As the war dragged on, into 
the 1970s, the public began to have doubts about the justification of the expense. 
Figure 15 traces development of the mentions of public opinion. Between 1972 
and 198 1 only three to six mentions of public support were recorded per year. Public 
support was an issue for authors but as a subject remained involatile. Starting in 1985, 
however, mentions drastically increased, reaching their height in 1988 with 25 mentions. 
Increased use of the military in both the Gulf and Central America caused authors to warn 
readers of the dangers of not having public support when committing the military. 
Weinberger’s points were not lost on the military professionals. Though his lessons were 
discussed by authors before he formally introduced them, his sponsorship of specific 
lessons helped establish them as the lessons of Vietnam. In the first phase of the study only 
five authors mentioned the six lessons collectively in their articles. In the second phase, 
however, the number of articles mentioning all six Weinberger tests or footnoting his 
Though designed for policy use at Secretary of Defense and Presidential levels, 
John E. Mueller, “ Trends in Popular Support for the Wars in Korea and Vietnam,” The American 
Political Science Review, June 1971, pp. 358-375. Mueller shows how support waned as the war dragged 
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Figure 15. The Increase in Mentions of Public Support During 
the Mid- 1980s. 
speech tripled to fifteen articles. Figure 16 shows the rise and fall of Weinberger’s six tests 
in the literature along with mentions of Harry Summers’s book Several detailed articles 
specifically addressing the Weinberger Doctrine appeared in the professional journals 
authored by active duty officers.120 Weinberger’s speech would continue to influence 
authors in military journals in the 1990s.l2l 
More subtly, many articles were written referencing the subjects Weinberger listed 
in his tests but referenced neither Weinberger or his speech nor Summers or his book.Iz 
Institutionalization of specific lessons of Vietnam had begun. Authors stated these lessons 
as a matter of fact. Summers’s and Weinberger’s words were used, but the text was not 
supported with a footnote. Certainly authors had no intent to plagiarize; they simply 
assimilated the lessons and recognized them as the accepted cultural interpretation. 
I2O For an early perspective see, David Twining, “Vietnam and the Six Criteria for the Use of Military 
Force,” Parameters, vol. XV, no. 4 (Winter 1985-86) pp. 10-18. Twining also quotes Summers. 
Additionally, David H. Petraeus, “Lessons of History and Lessons of Vietnam,” Parameters, vol. XVI, no. 
3 (Autumn 1986) pp. 43-53. Petraeus footnotes dozens of excellent sources on this subject. David 
Jablonsky, “Strategy and the Operational Level of War: Part I,” Parameters, Spring 1987, p. 67. Part two 
of the article appeared in the June 1987 issue. 
121 For 1990s’ examples, see Edwin J. Arnold, “The Use if Military Power in Pursuit of National 
Interests” in Parameters, Spring 1994, pp. 4-1 1, Thomas R DuBois, “The Weinberger Dwaine and the 
Liberation of Kuwait,” Parameters, Winter 1991-92, pp. 24-38 and John F. Hillen 111, “UN Collective 
Security: Chapter Six and a Half,” Parameters, Spring 1994, pp. 27-37. 
122 S e e  for example, David Petraeus, “Korea, The Never-Again Club and Indochina,” Parameters, December 
1987, p. 59-70. 
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Figme 16. References to Summers‘s Book and Weinberger’s Speech Increased Through 
the 1980s. In the 1990s Weinberger’s Tests Were Extensively Applied to Peace Operations. 
The Army War College sponsored an study and publication of a book on the 
Weinberger Doctrine and traced its roots back to the lessons of the Vietnam War: “It is 
clear that the views of former Secretary Weinberger were strongly influenced by the 
Vietnam War, where the United States won every major battle, but lost the larger war.”123 
Though Summers had retired from active service and was not a member of the team that 
wrote this book, his influence is felt in both tone and words. 
American involvement in Vietnam but were in response to the sagging credibility of 
conventional US forces. First Vietnam, then a failed desert hostage rescue and finally the 
Weinberger’s tests did not materialize out of thin air ten years after the end of 
1z3 Alan Ned Sabrosky and Robert L. Sloane, The Recourse to War: An Anpraisal of the “Weinberger 
Doctrine,” (Carlisle Barracks, P A  Strategic Studies Institute, 1988). p. 14. The edited work included 
essays by active duty officers, retired officers and academics. The words in the sentence are similar to those 
from Summers’s book about his conversation with the NVA Colonel. This reappraisal does have a good 
critique of the tests. Also, George Schultz, in his book Turmoil and Triumph: Diplomacy. Power. and the 
Victorv of the American Ideal (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons’, 1993) pp. 649-650 gives his version of 
the problems with Weinberger’s doctrine. He says following these test would have stopped the United 
States “dead in its tracks” on intervention in Gren&.. He states that the tests were “the Vietnam Syndrome 
in spades, carried to an absurd level, and a complete abdication of the duties of leadership.” 
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bombing of Marine barracks in Lebanon, left national and military pride in a pile of rubble. 
Within days of the barracks bombing President Reagan ordered the invasion of Grenada 
and the expulsion of “communist troops” from the island. Many viewed the operation as 
an excessive debacle but others saw it as the beginning of the resurgence of the US as a 
credible military power. 
applied to the US intervention in Grenada: stopping communist expansion is the western 
hemisphere was a vital US national interest; stopping its spread and reinstating a 
democratic government were the political goals; rescuing students, destroying Cuban forces 
and capturing equipment were the military objectives; overwhelming the enemy with 
Special Operating Forces (SOF) and conventional land, sea and air forces would ensure 
victory; reinstating an anti-Cuban, democratic regime and returning students to school was 
the desired end-state; as initial missions were completed, the force size and composition 
were reduced, the operation was completed swiftly and successfully thereby assuring 
public support; though US actions may not have been a last resort, it proceeded under the 
auspices of collective security-the Organization of American States (OAS) asked for 
assistance. Application of each test could be debated at length but the groundwork had 
nonetheless been laid for future operations. 
Secretary of State George Schultz and Secretary Weiriberger debated the use of 
force issue throughout the 1 9 8 0 ~ . 1 ~ ~  Coercive diplomacy and limited use of force had 
retained a measure of respectability as tools of U.S. foreign policy. As American 
assistance to countries in the middle-East increased during this period, so too, did limited 
U.S. military involvement. Protection of reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers was accompanied 
by oil platform attacks, airbus shoot-downs and F-1 1 1 air strikes. Though the Army was 
not in the fore-fiont of these middle-East controversies, its policy and attitudes were center 
stage in Central America. 
Though Weinberger’s criteria were not yet publicly articulated, the tests were 
I 2 4  Clay T. Buckingham, “Ethics and the Senior Officer: Institutional Tensions,” Parameters, Autumn 
1985, reprinted in the Autumn 1995 issue on pp. 98-110. In describing ethical tensions officers face 
regarding the use of force, the author uses the Schultz-Weinberger debates to emphasize that the tensions 
exist at the highest offices of political-military affairs. 
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C. THE LATIN AMERICAN CONNECTION 
Many claimed the Vietnam war was an aberration.125 Future wars would be unlike 
the one fought in Vietnam. But ten years after the U.S. exit from Vietnam, an insurgency 
in El Salvador and a communist government in Nicaragua occupied much of the Army’s 
strategic thought.lZ6 Debate over United States’ involvement in the region reached its peak 
1988.’” Weinberger’s tests were influencing the U.S. Army’s involvement and kept 
commitment at the advisory level. 
Despite the dwindling numbers of active officers with Vietnam experience, the 
number of articles written by them and referencing Vietnam remained relatively constant 
from 1972-1985, increasing only slightly. Beginning in 1986, however, dramatic 
increases occurred. Both the number of articles about Vietnam and the number of Vietnam 
veteran authors increased. Between 1986 and 1989, 159 articles were written referencing 
Vietnam, nearly as many as the Vietnam articles for the other 20 years combined. Mentions 
of Vietnam during this five year period did not decrease as a function of retirements and 
departures from the Army. Fewer numbers of Vietnam veterans were on active duty but 
the amount of references to Vietnam increased. Figure 17 shows the increase. 
Only one feasible explanation accounts for the increased authorship on the subject 
by Vietnam veterans. The Vietnam war was on the minds of those authors writing about 
events in Latin America. When the frequency of articles referencing the political-military 
situation in Latin America graphed in Figure 18 with the number of articles referencing 
Vietnam, the correlation is striking. 
peaked. A total of 122 articles were written referencing both Vietnam and Latin America. 
Clearly, Vietnam was on the minds of the people concerned about US foreign policy 
toward Latin America. With titles like, “The Nicaraguan Domino” authors clearly 
conveyed a perceived linkage between 1960’s policy in Southcast Asia and 1980’s policy 
in Latin America.128 Authors perceived linkages between Vietnam and Nicaragua much the 
way they would come to view linkages between Vietnam and Bosnia. 
As the conflict in Latin America became acute, concern over US intervention 
125 See, for example, Cass D. Howell, “War Television and Public Opinion,” Military Review, February 
1987, p. 78. 
lZ6 See, for example, Alden M. Cunningham, “U.S. Strategic Options in Nicaragua,” Parameters, March 
127 26 of 47 articles (55%) from 1988 mentioned the political-military situation in Latin America. This 
number was higher than in any other year of the study. 
128 Edgar O’Ballance, “The Nicaraguan Domino,” Military Review, October 1983, pp. 2-10. 
1988, pp. 60-72. 
62 
It is not surprising that there is an association between Vietnam and Latin America, 
but the strength of the relationship is revealing. Phrases similar to, “no more Vietnam” 
appeared regularly in these articles.129 Also, references to tying the military’s hand or 
unnecessary restrictions regularly appeared. 
0 
03 04 05 06 07 00 89 
I Year 













--- Vietnam Mentions 
Figure 17. The Number of Vietnam Veterans Writing about Vietnam. 
Nearly 25% of the articles mentioning the Win criterion also mentioned a stab-in- 
the-back syndrome. Articles just mentioning professionalism remained relatively constant 
throughout the twenty-three year period, while articles coded “stab-in-the-back” climaxed 
in the years 1985-1989. Five, eight, ten, six and five articles discussed betrayal in each of 
129 Examples include, Cunningham, “U.S. Strategic Options in Nicaragua” p. 70. The January 1989 
issue of Military Review is dedicated to Vietnam but many articles place the war and its lessons in the 
context of Latin America. 
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Figure 18. The Relationship Between the Number of Articles Mentioning Vietnam and 
the Number of Articles Mentioning Latin America. 
these respective years. Figure 19 shows the sharp rise of concern about the civilian 
leadership getting the Army haphazardly involved in Latin America. Authors (and editors) 
in these years seemed determined to educate their readers on the similarities and differences 
between Vietnam and Central America and the dangers of confusing the two conflicts.130 
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Figure _ . .  19. A Sharp Rise in Discussion of a Stab-in-the-back is Evident in the 
D. LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT AND DOCTRINE 
In the mid-198Os, Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) officially entered the Army 
vocabulary.131 The 1982 version of FM 100-5 introduced the AirLand Battle (ALB) 
doctrine but was yet to officially recognize LIC as term. The term had been mentioned 
sporadically in the early 1980s but 1985 was the first year that it was mentioned more than 
once in the same year. The 1986 edition of FM 100-5 divided warfare by “intensity” 
(High Intensity Conflict [HIC] and Mid Intensity [MIC]) and fully legitimized use of the 
term. The phrase became official and part of the accepted Army culture. 
At first the term was designed to explain and incorporate contemporary realities, 
e.g. counterinsurgencies in Central America, rescue operations on Caribbean Islands and 
peace operations in the middle East. Counterinsurgency as a term, however, could not be 
used because of its Vietnam connotation.132 LIC was the replacement phrase and is the 
original connection between Vietnam and peace operations. 
I3l US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-1, The Army (Washington D.C.: Government 
Printing Office [GPO], August 1986) pp. 8-9. 
132 Frederick M. Downey and Steven Metz, “The American Political Culture and Strategic Planning,” 
Parameters, September 1988, pp. 35-36. Counterinsurgency “smacked of Vietnam defeat.” Also, Thomas J. 
Kuster Jr., “Dealing with the Insurgency Spectre,” Militmy Review, February 1987, p. 21. The author 
claims the United States was psychologically unprepared for another counterinsurgency war as a result of 
the failure in Vietnam; the term LIC helped soothe fears of the never-again school students. David Decker, 
“Civil Affairs: A Birth or a Stillborn?” Military Review, November 1987, pp. 60-64. The author makes 
the case the Army did not care whether it had a COIN dochine or not. 
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Several authors recognized the absolute avoidance of counter-insurgency as 
mission, much the way Krepinevich noted in his book.133 Krepinevich occasionally was 
mentioned, though his voice paled in comparison to S~mmers.13~ LIC as a replacement 
was called, “a nonsense phrase.”l35 The service schools all but stopped teaching the 
subject of counterinsurgency in the period after Vietnam136 but Latin America changed all 
that. 
President Reagan’s decision to support the counterinsurgency in El Salvador caused 
the Army to examine the doctrine it had shelved a decade prior. External events prompted 
decision maker choices, causing the Army to change. FM 100-20, Military Operations in 
Low Intensity Conflict was published in final draft in June 1988. The manual was a 
synthesis of the “old” COIN doctrine and “new” contingency operation characteristics. The 
general concepts of FM 100-5 were applied to the LIC manual to make it familiar to the 
audience. 
LIC seemed to help the Army both understand and explain events in Latin America. 
It helped prepare the Army for potential conflicts in the region and gave them a new 
paradigm in which to view these aberrant wars. Many articles had LIC as the main subject 
and were usually written as a reaction to El Salvador, Nicaragua and others.137 More often 
than not, the American experience in Vietnam was drawn on. 
Operations made up one of the three official subcategories of LIC along with terrorism and 
co~mterinsurgency.138 Peace operations were peripheral missions for the Army and 
participation was infrequent.. During the 198Os, only the Marine’s mission in Lebanon and 
the Army’s presence in the Sinai were mentioned in the journals. The exception was a 
comprehensive survey of the Latin American political-military situation and its potential for 
Peace operations were also officially judged to be low in intensity. Peace 
133 Rudolph C. Barnes, “The Politics of Low Intensity Conflict,” Military Review, February 1988, p. 5. 
Barnes says the Army, “threw the counterinsurgency baby out with the bath water” when revamping its 
doctrine. 
134 Krepinevich was mentioned a scant six times in this context and of having a sound argument. 
Krepinevich’s book never became required reading at the service schools. Also, this book had only three 
years to gain a following before Desert Storm crushed the LIC subculture. Summers’s book had a five year 
head start. 
135 Charles W. McInnis, “A Nonsense Phrase,” Military Review, May 1988, pp. 59, 64-69. 
136 Michael Pearleman, “The Fall and Rise of LIC Doctrine and Instruction,” Military Review, September 
137 During this second phase, 27 articles had Central or South America as its main subject. Of those 27 
articles, only two did not mention Vietnam. Those two mentioned peace Operations. 
138 John B. Hunt, “Emerging Doctrine For LIC,” Military Review, June 1991 I pp. 51-60. This mrcle 
provides a good overview of how COIN became LIC and how peace operations fell under the LIC rubric. 
1988, pp. 78-79. 
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peace operation missions.139 Almost by default, peace operations were categorized under 
the LIC acronym along with counterinsurgency, a dreaded hangover fiom Vietnam. COIN 
became synonymous with LIC in the 1980s. In the 1990s LIC would become 
synonymous with peace operations. 
about what went wrong in Vietnam, soldiers began to associate Vietnam with a category: 
HIC, MIC or LIC. Describing war using a spectrum of intensity, veterans of the 
counterinsurgency war in Vietnam could discuss their experience with a new vocabulary 
and without strong stigma.l4 This categorization at first seemed to please the entire 
audience. 
Equipped with the ALB terminology and as the Army furthered its introspection 
Soldiers that served as advisors in unconventional or civil affairs units or fought 
against the Viet Cong saw the fundamental difference between the type of war they fought 
and the type of war their peers fought in later years. These American soldiers’ experiences 
in Vietnam resembled what the Army was doctrinally calling LIC and what they were 
reading about (or seeing) in Latin America. Even the terrain was similar. During the 1980s 
a competing subculture centered around Latin America involvement, LIC-counter- 
insurgency doctrine and the Vietnam lessons began to establish itself. Figure 20 shows 
how after an idle period in the 1970s, LIC and SOF mentions increased throughout the 
1980s. 
Conversely, the armored warfare that consumed the middle-East and caused the 
Army to “sweep away counterinsurgency doctrine”141 looked nothing like Vietnam’s LIC. 
This mechanized warfare, however, did have some parallels to the October war’s MIC 
characteristics. The Arab-Israeli conflict also looked more like the battles fought in the 
Second World War, though on a smaller scale. Jf the European Theater of Operations in 
World War I1 was HIC and Mitla Pass was MIC, then for the second generation Vietnam 
veterans Tet was MIC, too. Veterans operating from a big-war paradigm had a vocabulary 
to discuss their experiences as well. Conveniently, discussions about Vietnam could now 
139 John Child, “Peacekeeping and the Inter-American System,” Military Review, October 1980, pp. 40- 
54. 
Two articles do a good job at capturing the proceeding debate about whether Vietnam was a war or an 
insurgency. Michael Brown, “Vietnam: Learning From the Debate,” Military Review, February 1987, pp. 
48-55 and James R. Ward, “Insurgency or War?” Military Review, January 1989, pp. 14-23. Ward cites 
Summers as the leading voice in the “war” school. 
141 Cecil B. Currey, “Preparing for the Past,” Military Review, January 1989, p. 10. Currey is the 
formerly anonymous author of the controversial “Cincinatus” book and article decrying Army leadership in 
the Vietnam war. 
67 
take place with official terminology each subculture comfortably not seeing the other’s 
point of view. 
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Figure 20. Special Operationing Forces (SOF) and Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) 
Mentions Increased Throughout the 1980s. These mentions coincide with force 
structure and doctrinal innovations. 
Introducing levels of intensity allowed two schools of thought to develop. The 
“war” school rallied around On Stratem and The Concept while the “insurgency” school 
lacked a seminal work to promote its ideas. Toward the end of the 1980s’ Krepinevich’s 
The Armv in Vietnam, the best antithesis to Summers’s On Stratem thus far, allowed 
students of the insurgency school to better express their views. As Krepinevich and others 
pointed out, however, the insurgency school was at an institutional disadvantage since 
Korea or even World War 11. As a inferior subculture it would have difficulty having a 
voice in the planning of Army strategy and operations. The new terminology at least 
provided a vocabulary for the schools to at least learn from the debate about the ~ a r . 1 ~ 2  
subculture concerned with “low-end” irregular, guemlla and unconventional war was still 
By using the terms high, mid and low to describe intensity of war, however, the 
142 The labels “war” and “insurgency” school are taken from Michael L. Brown, “Vietnam: Learning From 
the Debate,” pp. 48-55. 
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subordinated. The predominant (sub)culture, the one successfully promoting The Concept, 
had retained the upper hand. But significant changes were taking place. 
In 1986 the Goldwater-Nichols Act quietly but drastically changed the way America 
wages war. On the political end of the spectrum, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC) was created to address the 
use of SOF in the increasing number of limited military engagements. On the military end 
of the spectrum the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was created. 
The SOCOM Commander was supposedly given equal footing with the other CINCs and 
had a direct line to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The ascendancy of both these 
positions represent the growth of a subculture born out of failure in Vietnam and that 
matured in the Persian Gulf and Latin America. 
E. PHASE I1 SUMMARY 
After the introspection of phase one, the Army hammered out its understanding of 
Vietnam largely through the work of Summers and others supporting his thesis in the 
periodicals. Despite the claim that Vietnam was so complex that the war did not lend itself 
to learning easy lessons,143 Weinberger and Summers established very similar positions on 
the lessons of Vietnam. The many lessons of Vietnam were distilled into afew lessons. 
Table 1. shows the decrease in the number of subjects despite the increase in the number 
of articles written on the subjects. For the Army these lessons interacted with the 
experiences in Central America where limited training operations and advisory missions 
represented official US involvement but obfuscated it level of commitment: the Army’s 
version of gunboat diplomacy. Gradually a consensus was formed around the Summers- 
Weinberger points . 
international events. First, a perceived need to get troops to Europe quickly (primarily to 
show resolve) gave rise to the concept of power projection and rapid deployment forces. 
Fortunately for the Army, the sparsely-equipped light infantry divisions designed to fly to 
Europe were also well suited for use in the underdeveloped jungles of Central and South 
America. If they were properly trained at home and employed in those tropical jungles as 
“genuine light infantry,” then they could be successful in COIN, 
peace operations. 
The Army did take some organizational steps during this period as a reaction to 
and eventually 
143 Timothy J. Lomperis, “Giap’s Dream, Westmoreland’s Nightmare,” Parameters, June 1988, pp. 18-32. 
144 William S. Lind, “An Operational Doctrine for Intervention,” Parameters, December 1987, p. 32. 
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Increasing Number of Articles 
Decreasing Subjects 
## of subjects 58 
# of articles 162 
Phase 




Table 1. The Number of Articles on Vietnam and Peace Operations Increased 
from the 1970s to the 1980s but the Number of Primary Subjects Decreased. 
Second, as the Army continued to refme its AirLand Battle doctrine it emphasized 
the mission of the “deep battle.” Operating in eastern Europe, deep behind enemy lines, 
would become an essential part of a NATO victory. SOF units trained for this mission. 
Reconnaissance and the deep battle were their pieces of the big-war paradigm pie. Again, 
fortunately for the Army, these special operation soldiers with above average intelligence 
and gifts for language were also well suited to perform the advisory missions that would 
come to characterize US involvement in Central America.145 
Special Forces became its own branch in the late 1980s, theoretically giving it equal 
status with the other branches of the Army. More Light Infantry Divisions were added 
from the original number and given increased funding; these divisions contributed to the 
“contingency corps.” Other events ranging from the momentous Goldwater-Nichols Act to 
the more mundane establishment of the Joint Readiness Training Center, indicated the 
growth of an alternative Army subculture.146 
145 See, for example R. Lynn Rylander, “SOF After the Rise,” Military Review, February 1989, pp. 87- 
89. 
146 Goldwater-Nichols created the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and gave even more credibility 
to the subjects of LIC, insurgency-counterinsurgency, unconventional war, terrorism and direct action. The 
Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) was designed on the National Training Center (NTC) model but 
modified to address low and “mid intensity conflicts. Battalions in every Light, Air Mobile or Airborne 
division rotate through JRTC and receive training on LIC. 
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Establishment of ASD/SOLIC and SOCOM were supported with increased hours 
on LIC subjects in the service scho01s.l~~ These changes helped the Army address the types 
of missions falling under the LIC category. Because they ran against the institutional grain, 
however, they most always had to be sold as supporting the Army’s conventional 
mission.148 The Army allowed these capabilities to be developed but not at the expense of 
its conventional mission. 149 
The political-military events in Latin America contributed to the growth of this LIC 
subculture. Its growth and recognition may have lain dormant for years if not for the 
turmoil surrounding Daniel Ortega, Contras, Cartels and El Salvador. Furthermore,, it is 
unclear whether the events in Latin America fortified the lessons of Vietnam or whether the 
lessons of Vietnam were sufficiently established to be cogently applied in keeping the US 
out of conventional war. 
The synergy of these issues-the memories of Vietnam, the reality of Latin America 
and the continuing need for advantages against the Soviets in Central Europe-seemed to 
have deepened a latent split in the Army’s c~lture.15~ Though the LIC community had made 
institutional gains, conventional war in Europe was still the dominant paradigm in the 
Army. Moreover, peace operations as a sub category of LIC was anathema: 
As for peacekeeping activities, we have seen that a man standing in the middle of the road 
gets hit by trucks (or Silkworms) going both ways. Peacekeeping is for diplomats; blood 
and steel are for soldiers. . . We have no patience for prolonged low intensity conflict 
like ~ietnam.151 
Contemporary events, however, challenged old assumptions. As the nature of the 
Soviet threat became dubious, the old paradigm seemed in danger of being made an equal 
of, if not subordinate to, the competing subculture. Heavy divisions with all their tanks 
and armored personnel carriers were being inactivated in the states and sent home from 
Europe. Assignments in Light Divisions were esteemed and SOF recruiting efforts 
blossomed. Rangers Instructors trained Drug Enforcement Agents for Latin American 
147 Pearleman, “The Fall and Rise of Low Intensity Conflict Doctrine and Instruction,” p. 78. 
148 William J. Olson, “Low Intensity Conflict: The Institutional Challenge,” Military Review, February 
1989, pp. 7-17 and Pearleman, “The Fall and Rise of Low Intensity Conflict Doctrine and Instruction,” p. 
78. 
149 Michael W. Menser, “Light Infantry and Change,” Military Review, December 1987, pp. 53-57. 
150 Daniel P. Bolger, “Two Armies,” Parameters, September 1989, pp. 24-34. Bolger acknowledges this 
cultural split but with a different twist. He sees one part of the Army as a “display” or “show” Army and 
the other part as an expeditionary Army-the one that fights the wars (since Vietnam). 
Michael W. Symanski, “Hoist With the LIC Petard,” Military Review, September 1988, p. 24. This 
article was the 1988 writing contest first prize winner. 
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operations. With the increasing tension between the United States, Colombian Cartels and 
corrupt dictators, the war on drugs seemed more important than the war on 
Comm~nisrn.15~ Amidst all the prospects for change, how did these accepted lessons of 
Vietnam influence Army attitudes? Would the lessons of Vietnam not embodied by 
Summers and Weinberger be institutionalized or would they escape? 
152 See the March 1990 issue of Military Review for a deluge of articles on drug wars. 
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V. APPLICATION: 1989-1995 
A. PANAMA, COLD WAR COLLAPSE AND COMPETING CULTURES 
Defense Dick Cheney, Secretary of State James Baker and General Powell briefed the press 
in Washington D.C. They answered questions as if passing Weinberger’s tests.153 
Questions included: Why was the US invading, particularly at this point? What were the 
objectives? What types of units conducting the operation? How large was the force? How 
were they going to accomplish their mission? Was this invasion legal? 
Cheney, Baker and Powell answered questions: Protecting American lives, 
establishing the duly elected President, ensuring uninterrupted operation of the Panama 
Canal and destroying drug-cormpt General Manual Noriega and his Panamanian Defense 
Forces (PDF) were the objectives; by allowing the Army’s best Light Infantry, Airborne 
and Special Forces units to swiftly knock out PDF strong-holds with the overwhelming 
force there would be certain victory and no tying the military’s hands. Intelligence was 
good enough to give a reasonable chance of apprehending Noriega. He had been warned 
he should step down and was given a last chance to cooperate. With this effort to make the 
war “legal,”154 how could the American public not be supportive? The question and 
answers suggest the Panama invasion was the first deliberate application of the lessons of 
Vietnam. 155 
Both of the competing subcultures participated in the planning and execution of the 
On December 20, 1989, while U.S. troops were engaged in Panama, Secretary of 
operation and each applied its own lessons from previous wars. For promoters of The 
Concept, overwhelming firepower was the key to success. Bringing more troops and 
weaponry to bear than the opponent worked in both world wars, it worked in Grenada and 
it worked in Panama. Nothing succeeds like the success of destroying the enemy’s forces- 
the enemy’s center of gravity. Even the special operations troops performed on reduced 
scale the tasks that they would perform in a conventional, linear, mid-intensity AirLand 
153 New York Times, December 21, 1989, IA18-20. 
154 For a detailed justification of the Panama invasion, see Abraham Sofaer, “The Legality of the United 
States Action in Panama,” Colombia Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 29,1991, pp. 288-292. Sofaer 
was George Bush’s legal advisor during the Panama invasion. 
155 The lessons Viemam were present throughout the debate on Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua in the 
1980s. These examples were avoidant (using the lessons of Vietnam to avoid war) whereas Panama was 
interventionist (using the lessons to win war). Peter F. Herrly, “Middleweight Forces and the Army’s 
Deployability Dilemma,“ Parameters, September 1989, p. 52, acknowledges that fear of “another” Vietnam 
kept troops out of Latin America and posits it will prevent any development of a genuine “LIC” force. 
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Battlefield: conducting stealthy reconnaissance missions and disrupting the enemy’s “rear 
area.” Operation Just Cause was viewed as the model for future conflicts and seen as a 
justification of the AirLand Battle D 0 ~ t r i n e . l ~ ~  
For the alternate or limited war paradigm the war offered different opportunities. 
First, the Army’s next war was positively not going to happen in central Europe. The 
month before the Panama operation, unification smitten Germans toppled the Berlin wall. 
The Army needed to focus its energy and resources on other missions; LIC was accepted as 
the most likely future engagement.lS7 Panama provided an opportunity to adjust 
institutional priorities from armored warfare to “other” types of warfare. 
Second, the utility of SOF, Airborne and the Light Infantry Division, during this 
operation were exemplary. Rangers theen Berets and SEALS proved their ability to fit 
into the accepted paradigm. Men wearing green berets would be quick to note, however, 
that their special skills, familiarity with the people, above average IQs and ability to speak 
the language was essential.158 Additionally, the largest American airborne operation in over 
40 years successfully paralyzed the PDF.lS9 Light-fighters nimbly maneuvered in both 
urban and jungle terrain smashing strongholds and rooting out Noriega’s “Dignity 
Battalions.” 
Third, the Army fought a war with very few tanks involved. Some armored 
personnel carriers were used, but the predominant source of firepower was the infantryman 
with his ensemble of unarmored, portable weapon systems. Intelligence, synchronization 
and mobility were at a premium in this war. Information about the PDF and Noriega’s 
location were the two critical pieces of information in this short war.160 Quickly tracking 
him prevented him from leaving the country. 
Shield/Storm, mentions of Vietnam dropped to an eight year low.161 There was not much 
reason to remember past failures. Still, authors recognized the divergent trends in the Army 
As a result of the success in Panama and the preoccupation with Desert 
156 Army interview with Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon Sullivan, “U.S. Army 1993: Power 
Projected, Contingency Oriented,” Army, April 1993, p. 25. 
lS7 A typical spectrum of conflict diagram shows LIC as the most likely type of war but the lowest level of 
risk. Nuclear war is the least likely type of war but the highest risk. 
lS8 Army interview with Lieutenant General Wayne Downing, Commander Untied States Army Special 
Operations Command, April 1992, p. 24. See also Carl Stiner, “The Strategic Employment of Special 
0 eration Forces,” Military Review, June 1991, pp. 2-13. 8 Victor M. Rosello, “The Airborne is Not Obsolete,” Army, September 1992, pp. 40-44. 
Bernard Trainor, “Gaps in Vital Intelligence Hampered U.S. Troops,” New York Times, December 21, 
In 1991,16 mentions of Vietnam, the lowest number since 1983 and the ninth lowest number of the 
1989, IA21. 
entire twenty-three year period. 
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and tried to come to grips with the effects of the end of the cold war. Counterinsurgency 
forces and doctrine evolved into LIC forces and doctrine. LIC doctrine would soon 
become synonymous with peace operations doctrine.162 
Military Review awarded first prize in its 1991 writing contest to an article 
describing a force structure for the post-cold war ~ o r 1 d . l ~ ~  In the article the author 
recognizes one facet of the cultural split. Similar to earlier articles on the United States 
“two Armies,“ this author makes the case for small wars being handled by the 
“contingency” Army. Full mobilization of the “reinforcing” Army, made up of the 
Reserves and the less easily deployable active, stateside units would be required to fight 
anything larger. 
supporters of The Concept. The LIC subculture had grown in strength throughout the 
1980s. With the easing of east-west tensions, “peace-dividend” became a fashionable 
buzz-word. Expensive mechanized units were slated for inactivation. Had Desert Storm 
not occurred the dominant Army paradigm would have been under extreme pressure to 
make severe reduction in its armored f 0 r ~ e s . l ~ ~  
Desert Storm, replete with mobilization of the reserves, proved to be a windfall for 
B. SCHWARZKOPF, DESERT STORM AND VIETNAM 
Despite the surge in light forces and LIC doctrine, the Army had still primarily 
prepared for armored warfare. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and subsequent refusal to leave, 
provided the United States the chance to showcase its military might. General H. Norman 
Schwarzkopf was the commander of US forces in Desert Storm and Vietnam veteran. He 
had bitter experiences during and after Vietnam and brought feelings of resentment to the 
war against Iraq. In fact, Schwarzkopf claims nearly every general officer in the Gulf War 
had served in Vietnam and had experienced feelings of abandonment and betra~al.1~5 In 
Schwarzkopf‘s autobiography he emphasizes that the war in Vietnam heavily influenced 
him. 
Schwarzkopf is a product of the organizational learning model applied to Army 
officers coming out of Vietnam. While other soldiers left military service disenchanted 
with their experience many others, including Schwarzkopf and Colin Powell chose to stay 
162 Donald B. Vought and Michael A. Babb, “Support For Insurgencies, Nike or Nemesis?” Military 
Review, January 1990, p. 17 describes how peacekeeping missions grew as a part of LIC doctrine. 
163 Jeffery A. Jacobs, “ A Mobilization Force,” Military Review, November 1990, pp. 3-10. 
164 S e e  for example Daniel P. Bolger, “The Ghosts of Omdurman,” Parameters, Autumn 1991, pp. 28-39. 
Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take A Hero, (New York: Bantam Books, 1993) p.441 
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in, rose to high levels of leadership, took individual action and ultimately influenced the 
Army’s organizational action. Schwarzkopf‘s influence was felt at the tactical and 
operational level, but driven by past events at the strategic and policy levels. He is a 
manifestation of the Second World War-”no more Vietnams” culture. 
Schwarzkopf was able to right some Vietnam wrongs during the 1990-91 Gulf War 
because of his powerful position. As Commander In Chief (CINC), Central Command 
(CENTCOM), Schwarzkopf was at the pinnacle of the military hierarchy. Along with 
Powell who was serving as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), 
Schwarzkopf answered only to the Secretary of Defense and the President. 
Desert Shield phase of the war, Schwarzkopf philosophized about the ‘‘can do” attitude 
prominent during Vietnam: 
When planning defensive operations as ordered by President Bush during the 
The U.S. military in Vietnam had been accused of regularly sugar coating the truth in an 
effort to please the President and on the basis of bad information the President made some 
disastrous decisions. We are not going to repeat that mistake.166 
A consummate student of the never-again school, Schwarzkopf expressed his 
concern about the ethical conduct of officers. Professionalism was his cherished value. 
Subsequently, he made a concerted effort not to give overly optimistic views of the threat 
and the status of the war to either the public or the National Command A~thority.16~ There 
would be no false reports in this general’s command. Candor in relations with the media, 
the public and civilian leaders was a priority. 
regarding his thoughts on body counts and the media. He encourages his readers: 
More evidence of his understanding of the lessons of Vietnam manifests itself 
Think back to what caused the disenchantment of the American public with Vietnam: 
they felt they were constantly being misled with false body counts and optimistic talk 
about the light at the end of the 
With thoughts of Vietnam in mind, Schwarzkopf exhorted his leaders never to Lie to the 
citizens of the US when giving interviews or holding press conferences. He was aware of 
166 Bid, p. 347. 
167 In keeping with his stab-in-the-back theme, Summers wrote in “Full Circle: World War I1 to the 
Persian Gulf,” p. 48, “In the Gulf War, as in World War 11, there was no reference to “national command 
authority,” a Vietnam-era euphemism for whoever, if anybody, was making the key decisions for the war.” 
(emphasis added). Given that Summers knows full well who the NCA is, and was, his attempt to place 
blame obviously reflects his distrust of civilian leaders. 
H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take A Hero, p. 399. 
76 
the role public opinion plays in military operations and wanted to keep the public's support. 
These demonstrated concerns about candor and public support are a result of two of the 
Summers-Weinberger lessons: get the support of the people and guard against a stab-in- 
the-back. 
The role of the media was the tenth most frequent subject of the nearly 100 coded 
subjects. Figure 21 shows the most frequent subjects of the study. Relations with the 
media were a sensitive subject because of what the Army's perceived to be biased reporting 
during the Vietnam war. In large part the media was held responsible for turning the 
American public against the war. 
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Figure 21. The Media was Often seen as a Participant in the Stab-in-the-back 
Conspiracy. 
During Vietnam, Schwarzkopf was exposed to over-involvement of politicians as 
well as military acquiescence. Watching generals acquiesce in civilian decisions on strategy 
issues and reporting useless body-counts help explain Schwarzkopf's desire to not repeat 
the mistakes of Vietnam. But all of Schwarzkopf's assignments in Vietnam were at the 
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operational level. His understanding of the strategy and policy lessons of Vietnam had to 
be reinforced through what he learned in military schools, what he heard from fellow 
officers and what he read in the journals. Only from these post-Vietnam experiences were 
his opinions about political-military relations solidified. 
concerning political-military relationships. Schwarzkopf did not want Washington 
developing the target list and he did not want the President “issuing orders to the tail gunner 
in a bomber.”169 He wanted to keep responsibilities straight and was satisfied with the way 
things went, 
More applications of the lessons of Vietnam surface in his autobiography 
. . . . unlike the way things had gone in Vietnam, the U.S. chain of command worked as 
it should. . . The President had been Presidential, the Secretary of Defense had 
concentrated on setting military policy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had 
served as the facilitator between civilian and military leadership and as theater commander, 
I’d been given full authority to carry out the mission.170 
A final and salient point in understanding a Schwarzkopf-like view of political- 
military relations is evident in the way Desert Storm ended. Winning was one of 
Weinberger’s tests. Having an end state in mind would supposedly prevent a conflict from 
dragging on indefinitely or becoming a quagmire. Political leaders were not supposed to 
ask the Army to fight a war and then tie the generals’ hands behind their back. 
Baghdad and “finish the job?, The answer for Schwarzkopf is that neither the American 
public or the Coalition governments would have supported continued operations into Iraq. 
One of Summers’s lessons of the Vietnam war-the “political” constraint preventing US 
ground troops from operating outside the confines of South Vietnam proper-was deftly 
“learned” by the Army and applied in Desert Storm. In Vietnam, an artificial border 
constraint overstated the concern of the executive branch that China or the Soviet Union 
would perceive offensive ground operations into North Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia as 
escalation or an attempt to “capture” a neighboring country. As applied to Desert Storm, 
the Weinberger Doctrine gave the Army the troops and authority to get the job done-the 
authority Schwarzkopf claimed he had been given. 
Iraqi commanders believed that U.S. troops would not cross the border into Iraq. He 
thought Iraqi units might consider hiding beyond the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border, “like the North 
Why didn’t Schwarzkopf take the coalition force or even the US all the way to 
In Desert Storm Schwarzkopf was aware of this problem and was concerned that 
169 Bid, p. 428. 
170 Ibid. 
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Vietnamese troops that hid in Cambodia.”I7l Unlike complacent generals in Vietnam, 
Schwarzkopf insisted on having the authority to go across the border, not to capture the 
capital or control the country, but to destroy the enemy Army. The Iraqi Army was the 
center of gravity. Schwarzkopf wanted his hands free going after the Republican Guard 
and George Bush decided to loosen the political-military knot. 
resolution providing a legal basis for the expulsion operation. No such pretense existed in 
Vietnam. 
Schwarzkopf believed one difference between Vietnam and Desert Storm was a UN 
If we look back to the Viernam War we should recognize that one of the reasons we lost 
world support for our actions was that we had no internationally recognized legitimacy for 
our intention in Vietnam.172 
Schwarzkopf‘s comments echo Weinberger’s just war concerns. His introducing 
the issue of multilateralism in the use of US forces, however, often conflicts with other 
criteria. Multilateralism rose in popularity because of Soviet approval and Chinese 
abstention of UN Security Council Resolution 687. Schwarzkopf was caught in this burst 
of liberalism, but with the arrival of complex peace operations, multilateralism was 
overshadowed by the National Interest test. In the years after Desert Storm, stopping 
famines and brutal “genocides” would not be in the United States Vital National Interests 
The United States would help when it could: when the intervention passed the Weinberger 
tests. 
Soldiers are often the first to deplore war, but too much hesitation could be 
construed as cowardice.173 Being non-interventionist under the auspices of the Weinberger 
Doctrine makes hesitation seem more like support of policy than dereliction of duty. 
Because the influential Caspar Weinberger incorporated the military lessons of Vietnam into 
the political ones, the Army feels assured it will never again have to fight an ”unpopular“ 
war. When the Army does recommend the use of force in limited situations, it is more 
confident that some version of the Weinberger Doctrine will be used, nearly guaranteeing 
success. The Army enjoys the Presidential and Congressional acceptance of these tests 
because it frees them of some responsibility in extremely tough and complex missions. 
Ibid, p. 401. 
172 Ibid, p. 579. 
173 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theow and Politics of Civil-Militarv 
Relations, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1957) for an elaboration of this notion. 
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C. POWELL, VIETNAM AND PEACE OPERATIONS 
Though Colin Powell was an integral part of Desert Storm, he also stayed on active 
duty long enough to have an impact on peace operations in northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda 
and Bosnia. Desert Storm enjoyed the luxury of dealing with a conventional Iraqi threat. 
Restore Hope in Somalia and UNPROFOR (the U.N. Protection Force) in Bosnia, 
presented an ill-defined problem. Powell was left to deal with these more unconventional 
conflicts. As with Schwarzkopf, Powell was heavily influenced by his experience in 
Vietnam and his indoctrination into Army culture. 
Powell’s understanding and correction of the Vietnam syndrome played itself out 
differently than Schwarzkopf s experience. Powell recalls a renewed interest in the 
teaching of Clausewitz in his National War College Class (NWC) of 1975-76. “It was a 
good time to be at the NWC. In the wake of Vietnam, the soul searching-the-what-went- 
wrong-syndrome created lively ferment.”174 Powell remembers his affection for a 
Clausewitz passage already shown to be influential: 
‘No one starts a war, or rather no one in his senses should do so, . . . without first being 
clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to achieve it.’ 
Mistake number one in Vietnam. Which led to Clausewitz’s rule number two. Political 
leaders must set a war’s objectives, while armies achieve them. In Viemam, one seemed 
to be looking to the other for the answers that never came. Finally the people must 
support a war. Since they supply the treasure and the sons, and today the daughters too, 
they must be convinced that the sacrifice is justified. That essential pillar had crumbled 
as the Viemam war ground ~n.’~~(ernphasis added) 
Most of Weinberger’s tests are embodied in this one passage: enoughforce to win, 
political-military objectives, obtaining public support and making sure the war is justfzed. 
Powell reintroduces the tempting notion that those who start wars without weighing costs 
and developing a plan are senseless back-stabbers. 
gave his National Press Club speech announcing the six tests. Powell applauds 
Weinberger for developing these criteria and credits him (along with Ronald Reagan) for, 
“the resurgence of the US as a respected and credible military power after the debacle of 
Vietnam and Desert One.”I76 Powell admits using the Weinberger Doctrine as the CJCS 
when advising presidents on the use of force.177 He thought the tests were useful guides 
Additionally, Powell was serving as Weinberger’s assistant when the Secretary 
174 Colin Powell, Mv American Journey, (New York Random House, 1995) p. 207. 
175 Ibid, pp. 207-208. 
176 Ibid, p. 315. 
177 Ibid, p. 303. 
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but that making them public and official policy, “would lead potential enemies to look for 
loopholes.’’~78 
the subject of a peace operation in Bosnia. When asked by the New York Times why the 
US could not assume a “limited” role in the Balkans he recounts, 
In his autobiography Powell regularly references Vietnam-one time in 1992 and on 
I had been in limited military involvements before, in Vietnam for starters. I told the 
Times reporter, ‘As soon as they tell me it’s limited, it means they do not care whether 
you achieve a result or not.’ 179 
This attitude reflects Weinberger’s Win criteria and the Army’s preference for total wars 
using massive force. Limited warfare was anathema for Powell and he immediately 
equates it to not winning. No end-state, short of destruction of another country’s military 
might satisfies Powell or even Schwarzkopf. Yet, this was the mission presented to the 
Army in Vietnam: defeat the enemy but with restrictions on pursuit of its forces. 
Peacekeepers in Somalia were given a similar task control the belligerents without going 
directly after their forces. 
In the passage above, Powell’s ambiguous use of the word “they” is telling. It 
connotes the stab-in-the-back myth which Summers denies ever took root in the Army. 
Another excerpt, this time from President Bush’s 1992 Department of Defense farewell 
ceremony, supports Powell’s sensitivity to this notion, 
Mr. President, you have sent us in harm’s way when you had to, but never lightly, never 
hesitantly, never with our hands tied, never without giving us what we need to do the 
job.18o (Eimphasis added) 
Not only was Powell sympathetic to the stab-in-the-back idea, but he also 
recognized the Win and Reassess Force Size tests. The essence of these tests was 
ensuring the in-theater commander had sufficient forces and equipment to achieve the 
political objectives (i.e., not forcing the Army to fight with one hand tied behind its back). 
To Powell’s (and Schwarzkopf‘s) credit, traces of the stab-in-the-back myth come without 
lasting resentment. The lessons serve only as a reminder of the duties and responsibilities 
of the professional officer. The legacy of constraint, however, is still pervasive.181 
178 Ibid. 
179 Ibid, p. 558. 
181 An interesting example from the late 1980s is illustrative. The graphic on the title page of one article 
shows a picture of an American eagle struggling to take flight because it has a chain around its leg. Richard 
D. McCreight, “Strategy, Technology and the Capacity to Act,” Military Review, April 1988, p. 44. 
Ibid, pp. 567-568. 
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Powell brings the Vietnam-peace operation connection full circle in his 
autobiography. On two occasions Powell compares the Serbs (and Croats and Muslims) to 
the North Vietnamese. First, he compares them because of their ability to match their 
objectives to their military actions.lS2 Second, he recognizes the U.N.'s nation-building in 
Somalia to the U.S. mission in Vietnam (where he first heard the phrase).lS3 In Colin 
Powell's writing, Vietnam provides a dominant reference point regarding use of force in 
military operations. His experience in Vietnam shaped beliefs about peace operations. 
Those never-again beliefs are pronounced in his autobiography. 
what is now sometimes called the "Powell Doctrine." Again the words, tone and intent are 
similar to his predecessors. Powell narrows the list of criteria to four: 
Po Lvell put his own words to the Summers-Weinberger concepts and developed 
1. Force should only used as a Zast resort. 
2. Military force should be used only when there is a clear cut military objective. 
3. Military force should be used only when we can measure that the military objective 
has been achieved. 
4. Militaryforce should be used only in an overwhelming fashion.lg4 (emphasis added) 
Schwarzkopf and Powell were not alone with Vietnam experience nor his position 
of influence. General William "Gus" Pagonis, the top logistics officer during Desert 
Storm and the man responsible for mobilizing the American defense industrial complex, 
was also a Vietnam veteran. Pagonis acknowledges the Army's effort in the 1970s to 
incorporate the reserves into the TFC and credits his organization as a validation of that 
restructuring.185 He recognized the insulation the Army experienced in Vietnam as a 
stumbling block to success and correctly attributed failure (in part) to the lack of reserve 
unitshndividuals participating in the war.186 Over 70% of Pagonis's 80,000 soldier 
support command was made up of reserve s01diers.l~~ Activating the reserves attached 
America to its Army and mobilized public support for the war. 
Pagonis and hundreds of others have written. These retired generals, however, wrote 
their autobiographies at the end of illustrious careers, out of the Army's bureaucratic reach. 
Summers devotes entire chapters to the ideas about which Schwarzkopf, Powell, 
lS2 Colin Powell, My American Journey, p. 577. 
lS3 Bid, p. 580. 
lS4 As seen in Edwin J. Arnold Jr., "The Use of Military Power in Pursuit of the National Interest," 
Parameters, Spring 1994, p. 7. 
185 William G. Paponis, Moving Mountains, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1992) 
lS6 bid. 
lS7 bid, pp. 101, 172. 
p.100. 
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Vietnam’s influence on these generals’ understanding of the Army, its employment and its 
relationship to American politics is both strong and specific. 
D. VIETNAM, THE PERIODICALS AND PEACE OPERATIONS 
Colin Powell was not the only military officer to note a similarity between the 
situation in Vietnam and the one in Bosnia. Two Air Force lieutenant colonels noted: 
The belligerents in Bosnia display a commitment equal to that of the Viet Cong and their 
North Vietnamese allies, while societies in Haiti and Rwanda resemble those of Somalia 
in terms of sophistication.lg8 
Similarly, a former U.S. Army War College professor noted that the U.S. inability to 
properly apply force in Vietnam was repeating itself: 
If the type of power is wrong for the setting (e.g., heavy tanks to counter Vietnamese 
or Afghan guerrillas: air power to stop a three-sided civil war) you are undertaking an 
infeasible strategy.189 
Most of the authors writing in this period were on active duty (65 authors or 56%). 
This percentage was higher than the other two phases.190 The Spring, 1994 issue of 
Parameters, for example, contains four articles on peace operations. Three of the articles 
directly linked the American understanding of its experience in Vietnam to use of military 
force in peace operations. The fingerprints of On Strategv, Weinberger, Powell and 
Latin America are all over these articles. The authors debate the pros and cons of American 
military involvement overseas using the influence of Vietnam on the U.S. role in U.N. 
peace operations.191 
operations.192 Authors used phrases like the “trauma of Vietnam” to warn readers how 
devastating limited conflicts could be.193 Ultimately these thee authors conformed to the 
In general, authors during this period did not enthusiastically embrace peace 
Mark Codfelter and John M. Faucett, Jr. “The RMA and Air Force Roles and Missions and Doctrine,” 
Parameters, Summer 1995, p. 27. 
Ig9 Michael G. Roskin, “National Interest: From Abstraction to Strategy,”Parameters, Winter 1994-95, p. 
12. 
190 In phase I, 50% and in phase II,43% of the authors were on active duty. 
191 Edwin J. Arnold Jr., “The Use of Military Power in Pursuit of the National Interest,” p. 10. 
19* Darien Keams, “The Need for U.N. Criteria in Peace Operations,” MiZifary Review, July 1994, p. 40, 
“The United States should not commit large combat formations to peace keeping operations.” See also 
John F. Hillen 111, “UN Collective Security: Chapter Six and a Half,” pp- 36-37 and Edwin J. Arnold Jr., 
“The Use of Military Power in Pursuit of the National Interest,” p. 10-12. 
193 Frederick J. Chiaventone, “Ethics and Responsibility in Broadcasting,” Military Review, August 1991, 
p. 70. 
83 
Weinberger convention, applying the lessons of Vietnam to peace operations and 
methodically explaining the six-tests. 
tests. The Last Resort test evolved into a legal test, represented by extensive U.S. 
justifications for its intervention in Panama, Iraq and Somalialg4. Because of near 
unanimity of the U.N. vote, the legal test became the multilateral test. Despite some uses 
of force passing the multilateral test, U.S. vital national interests are not always threatened. 
Edwin Arnold recognized these tensions and noted the increasing weight of the multilateral 
test. He cites Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia as examples of U.S. involvement in countries 
where no vital national interests were at ~take.19~ 
Of the four authors connecting the Smers-Weinberger-and now Powell-doctrine 
A contentious point in these articles was the clash between two of Weinberger’s 
to peace operations the Spring, 1994 Parameters issue, three were on active duty (one 
recently left active service and entered the reserves) when they wrote. To find dissenting 
opinions on use of force in limited wars the reader must look to civilian or foreign 
authorship. 196 
In the 1980s, the majority of the authors promoting limited military intervention in 
the Latin American LIC were civilians. Similarly, in the 1990s very few of the remaining 
87 authors avidly supported the use of force in peace operations. When they did support a 
limited use of force position, the authors were usually civilians. Figure 22 shows the 
number of military and civilian authors arguing that the Army needs to look beyond its 
preoccupation with The Concept. 
1990- 1995. In 1993, for the first time, more articles in the periodicals were written 
mentioning peace operations than were written mentioning Vietnam (see Figure 23). 
Vietnam and peace operations were either linked directly197 or through the use of the 
Authors wrote 28 articles mentioning both peace operations and Vietnam between 
lg4 See F. M. Lorenz “Law and Anarchy in Somalia,“ Parameters, Winter 1993-94, pp. 27-53, as an 
example of this increasing awareness of a need for “legal“ intervention. 
Ig5 Edwin J. h o l d  Jr., “The Use of Military Power in Pursuit of the National Interest,” p. 10. 
1% James H. Allan, “Peacekeeping in the Persian Gulf,” Military Review, August 1991, p. 56-63, is a 
retired Canadian officer. Regina Gaillard, “The Case for Separating Civic Actions from Military Operations 
in Low Intensity Conflict,” Military Review, June 1991, pp. 30-41. Gaillard provides an excellent 
description of the tensions between civic action-peacekeeping and military operations, pp. 39-41. Of course 
more criticism was voiced in newspapers and other, non-military periodicals. An editorial in the New York 
Times, for example, pointed out that the Powell Doctrine was too restrictive. The article points to the 
success of the NATO air strikes as the reason the Serbs came to the negotiating table. Eric Schmia, 
“Powell Takes a Hit,” New York Times, 29 October 1995, Section 4, p. 4 
lg7 Regina Gaillard, “The Case for Separating Civic Actions from Military Operations in Low Intensity 
Conflict,” Military Review, June 1991, pp. 30-41. 
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Summers-Weinberger p0ints.19~ Criteria for determining intervention was topical during 
















Position on “The Concept” 
Figure 22. More Civilian Authors Were Against the Army’s Rigid Emphasis on 
”The Concept” than Active Duty Military Authors. 
On one hand, many of these articles used Vietnam to show how fear of another 
Vietnam kept the US out of Bosnia, caused withdrawal from Somalia and restricted combat 
troops from going to Rwanda.200 On the other hand, several articles invoked the successes 
198 S e e  for example, “Gordon R. Sullivan and James M. Dubik, “Land Warfare in the 21st Century,’’ 
Military Review, September 1993, p. 20-21 and Darien Kearns, “The Need for UN Criteria in Peace 
Operations,” pp. 34-42. 
199 Two examples are James H. Allan, “Peacekeeping in the Persian Gulf,” and Darien Keams, “The Need 
For Criteria in UN Peacekeeping Operations,” Military Review, July 1994, pp. 34-42. Both articles 
reference a need for a criteria determining intervention and recommend tests similar to Weinberger’s. Neither 
author , however, directly references or even footnotes Weinberger‘s tests. 
2oo Jeffrey Record, “Ready For What and Modernized Against Whom? A Strategic Perspective on Readiness 
and Modernization,” Parameters, Autumn 1995, pp. 24,26. Summarizing an argument made by AJ. 
Bacevich, Record writes that the “Pentagon is still so petrified by the prospect of another Vietnam that it 
has deliberately blocked attempts to prepare effectively for unconventional conflict . . . .” Also, Victor 
Rosello, “Lessons From El Salvador,” Parameters, Winter 1993, pp. 103,107-8, succinctly connects the 
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of Desert Storm,2°1 Provide Comfort and (pre-October 1993) Restore Hope as the burial of 
the Vietnam syndrome.202 In both cases, however, Vietnam was invoked as a convenient 
metaphor to remind readers of the dangers of unwinnable wars, adversarial political- 
military relations and a hostile public. 
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Figure 23. More Articles were Written about Peace Operation than were Written 
about Vietnam for the First Time in 1993. 
Twenty-eight articles that had peace operations as a main subject were written from 
1990-1995, compared to six and eight between 1972-81 and 1982-1989, respectively. 
The level of discussion in most of the articles aimed at the political-strategic level. Figure 
24 shows the difference in the number of articles written at the policy-strategy level as 
compared to those directed at the tactical-operational level. This data may support a 
growing belief that military-technological advances are blurring the distinction 
between tactical, operational and strategic levels of war.203 
lessons of Vietnam to El Salvador and applies them to Bosnia. On p. 101 Rosello notes that the “specter 
of another Vietnam” was the rallying cry for opponents of U.S. foreign policy in Central America. 
201 Michael Mazaar, “Middleweight Forces for Contingency Operations,” Military Review, August 1991, 
!02 Thomas DuBois, “The Weinberger Doctrine and the Liberation of Kuwait,” Parameters, Winter 1991- 
92, p. 37. “Succinctly put, the Vietnam syndrome, at least in its more literal and paralyzing forms, has 
been relegated to history.” John F. Hillen, “UN. Collective Security: Chapter Six and a Half,’’ p. 32. 
203 See for example, Douglas A. MacGregor, “Future Battle: The Merging Levels of War,” Parameters, 
Winter 1992-93, p. 33 and David Jablonsky, “U.S. Military Doctrine and the Revolution in Military 
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Figure 24. The Narrowing Gap Between Articles Written 
at Different Levels of War. 
On the strategic level, political-military relations, foreign policy, and military 
strategy were three subcategories. Every article coded specifically at the political-military 
relations level mentioned Vietnam, even if its primary subject was political-military activity 
in a peace operation. An enduring legacy of Vietnam in the periodicals, appears in this 
relationship between poor military and governmental cooperation and inability to implement 
an effective national and military strategy. 
Professionalism as a subject dipped early in this period but resurfaced as a 
dominant subject. The dramatic changes of 1990,1991 and 1992 precluded the luxury of 
writing about the “art” half of the military arts and sciences. The operating tempo for all the 
services was high during these years. Accordingly, the pages of the journals were filled 
with descriptions of wars and deployments. This increase in operating tempo also partially 
explains the narrowing gap between the number of policy-strategy articles and the number 
of tactics-operations articles. 
Clausewitz, however, was still being referenced regularly. One author used the 
quote that Summers and Powell learned in prior years to show how senseless uniformed 
leaders could be.204 The editors even extracted the quote and enlarged it as a caption, in 
effect using the connotation as an advertisement for the article. 
204 Darien Kearns, “The Need for U.N. Criteria in Peace Operations,” p. 41. 
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Awareness of the stab-in-the-back myth persisted during and after Desert Storm.205 
Authors recognized the importance of civilian-military interface, particularly in politically 
sensitive peace operations. One article titled the “U.N.’s Vietnam,” immediately prepares 
the reader for applying the lessons of Vietnam to peace operations. 2ofj Trying to be 
positive, another author emphasized the need for the military to educate civilians on 
missions the military does successfully.207 Still a different author implies, however, that the 
Army should speak up when civilian leaders ask soldiers to perform missions ill-suited to 
the Army. His comments resemble those of General Weyand in 1976 and Colonel 
Summers in 1982. 
Several authors noted that civilians asked the Army to do something that was not in 
its “tool kit.’720g Many of these articles on peace operations acknowledge the impact of 
political constraints both on the battlefield and in Washington; the Rangers-in-Somalia 
incident was even mentioned as causing former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s 
resignation.209 Whether or not the government was asking service members to perform 
missions they were not culturally capable of performing became a question of some debate. 
peacekeepers? Often this question was associated with a specific chapter of U.N. Charter. 
Chapter Six actions were viewed as the traditional peacekeeping mission where soldiers 
intervened as observers after a cease-fire was reached by both belligerents. U.N. missions 
separating the Arabs and Israelis in the Sinai or Greeks and Turks in Cyprus are classic 
examples. Chapter Seven missions were defined as more violent operations authorizing 
“U.N. forces” to conduct offensive operations under the aegis of the U.N. Charter’s 
The specific question became: were soldiers capable of being both warfighters and 
205 See for example, F. M. Lorenz, “Law and Anarchy in Somalia,” p. 38. Lorenz mentions the restrictive 
rules of engagement in Somalia and in a footnote (27) compares the restriction to those placed on the 
military in Vietnam. 
206 Timothy L. Thomas, “The U.N.’s Viemam,” Military Review, February 1994, p. 47-55. The title of 
this article shows how the American experience in Viemam is seared into the minds of so many authors 
when it comes to using U.S. forces in limited conflicts l i e  peace operations. 
207John F. Hillen, “U.N. Collective Security: Chapter Six and a Half,” p. 35. Also, Allan R. Millett, 
“Why the Army and the Marine Corps Should Be Friends,” Parameters, Winter 1994-95, p. 39, “ The 
number of lives lost may not be large in absolute terms, but they may be proportionally large when 
compared with the number of people deployed. Such is a characteristic of counterinsurgency and 
peacekeeping. Who is ready to teach this lesson to American politicians if not the Army and the Marines?” 
Emphasis added to show, once again, how authors connect peace operations with counterinsurgency. 
208 Debate over the peacekeeping vs. warfighting mission is on-going. See for example David Jablonsky, 
“U.S. Military Doctrine and the Revolution in Military Affairs,” p. 31, William A. Stoft and Gary L. 
Guertner, “Ethnic Conflict: The Perils of Military Intervention,” Parameters, Spring 1995, pp. 30-42 and 
Regina Gaillard, “The Case for Separating Civic Actions from Military Operations in Low Intensity 
Conflict,” pp. 30-41. 
209 David Jablonsky, “U.S. Military Doctrine and the Revolution in Military Affairs,” p. 26. 
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Article 5 1 and self-defense. The Korean War and Operation Desert Storm are the most 
popular examples of Chapter Seven actions; the second U.N. mission in Somalia 
(UNISOM II) is the lesser known example. 
The current twist on this old debate is whether U.S. troops are capable of 
effectively participating in police-action oriented peace operations.210 Some believe the 
U.S. troops are trained to act with extreme violence and that a passivity switch cannot not 
simply be turned on. Retired Canadian General Bruce MacKenzie spoke at the CGSC at 
Fort Leavenworth in 1993 and promoted the notion that the United States role in U.N. 
mission should be executing “kick in the door” Chapter Seven missions. He baldly stated 
that U.S. troops are the best in the world at warfighting but that Army culture prevents 
soldiers from performing well under the restriction of Chapter Six peace operations. His 
comments drew applause from the audience, many of whom were veterans of either Desert 
Storm, Somalia or both.211 
This debate captures the differences in ideologies of the two Army cultures. 
Promoters of The Concept and The Lessons of Vietnam would agree with MacKenzie’s 
notion that U.S. soldiers are not suited for certain types of missions. Individuals trying to 
further the other lessons of Vietnam would argue that through training and education 
soldiers in the Army can become suited to perform well in these limited engagements. 
given the enormous shifts in international power relationships. Cold war collapse had 
necessitated reexamination of the force structure. Force structure, for example, was the 
main topic of 15 articles between 1990-95, compared to 17 and 10 between 1972-1981 and 
1982- 1989, respectively. Figure 25 shows the proportionally greater emphasis on force 
structure in the third phase. 
Despite the rhetoric on change, though, authors noticed some hypocrisy: 
Several articles on organizational change appeared during these years-no surprise 
Clearly, we are an Army that treasures adaptability. We chant the mantra of the 
continuous challenge of change, and we have added versatility as a tenet of Army 
operations. Paradoxically, we suffer from an institutional blind spot in out vision of 
adaptability. That blind spot is organization-more specifically reorganization. For all 
practical purposes we simply don’t do it. 
Pentornic experiment, we have not substantively reorganized the US division since World 
War II? . . . What about the light divisions? They are poorly conceived and under not 
You doubt this? . . . Have you noticed that, except for the aberration of the 
210 Discussion over the Army’s role as a police force was evident, though sparse, during the 1970s. See, 
Martin Blumenson, “The Army as Cop: Not a Role It Relishes,” Army, May 1976, p. 50-56. Not 
surprisingly, the author is a civilian. 
211 The author was present for MacKenzie’s speech. 
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small amount of institutional pressure. . . We revise our doctrine. But we do not 
reorganize. . . Reorganization is viewed as a consequence not a technique.212 
David Fastabend’s comments highlight the Army’s rigidity regarding change. 
% of Articles on Force Structure 
14 
I I I  Ill 
Phase 
Figure 25. Despite the Actual Changes in Phase II, a Greater 
Percentage of Articles Written in Phase Ill Addressed the Topic 
of Force Structure Changes. 
In the 1980s, external (structural) events caused some change in the Army. The need to 
deal with LIC pushed the Army to develop doctrine and units to deal with the LIC threat. 
Recent changes in the international balance of power, however, do not appear to the Army 
to be permanent enough to cause a reorganization. 
Alternately, internal (bureaucratic) rigidity was softened by the events of the 1980s. 
Desert Storm, however, reversed this process of thawing the frozen cold war paradigm. 
The parochial interests of the mechanized infantry and armor proponents received a reprieve 
from increasing pressure to change to nature of the Army and its mission. 
Army bureaucracy seems intent on keeping its old paradigm. The Army’s recent 
efforts to develop a force structure for the twenty-first century were paltry. The findings of 
the Army’s Force XXI study, heralded for the past two years, was recently sent back to 
212 David A. Fastabend, “Checking the Doctrinal Map: Can We Get there from Here with FM 100-5?” 
Parameters, Summer 1995, p. 39-40. Allen L. Tiffany, “A Light Infantry Division with More for the 
Fight,” Military Review, August 1991, p. 45, argues that twenty years after Viemam the Army still does 
not have a division to fight in restricted terrain. 
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the drawing board. The recommendations were rejected because there were no significant 
changes. 
This organizational foot-dragging defies arguments of both the structuralist and the 
functionalist. The functionalist might argue that the Army is simply sticking with doctrine 
and structure that won the cold war (and the three big-wars before it). The extinction of a 
Soviet or similar threat and the emergence of too many new threats, however, provides the 
Army with the opportunity to seek out new roles, missions and resources. Peace 
operations are only one of many missions the Army could latch onto to increase its power 
and prestige. Counter-proliferation and counter-tenonsm round out the field of current 
missions the Army could preoccupy itself with. The Army, however, seems content with 
its place in society: responsible only for fighting the nation’s massive ground war. 
Unfortunately, the Army might be waiting for the war that will never come. 
Figure 26. The increase in mentions of organizational change as a secondary subject 
coincides with publication of the Army’s doctrinal manuals, supporting David Fastabend’s 
notion that the Army talks change and changes its doctrine but does not reorganize itself. 
Increases are visible in the year of publication or the year immediately following publication 
of major doctrinal manuals. 
Peace operations were thought of as LIC.213 As missions, peace operations were a 
subset of LIC. As terms, they shared the Army’s disfavor. One author suggests: 
Organizational change as an under current remained relatively stable as shown in 
LIC began life as a euphemism. The term reflects our failure in Vietnam and our long 
dislike (not entirely dissipated) of discussing it. We had used counter revolutionary, 
counterinsurgency, stability operations, internal defense and development and maybe 
other terms. Whenever there coded meaning was discovered and the government was 
suspected of planning for another Vietnam, the name was changed. 214(emphasis added) 
By mentioning “other terms,” the authors unwittingly foreshadow inclusion of peace 
operations in this collection of taboo terms. This passage recognizes the Army’s (and 
Colin Powell’s) allergy to limited war. LIC and peace operations had become synonymous 
with limited war and were treated as maladies.215 
213 For an example, see Waldo D. Freeman, Robert B. Lambert, Jason D. Mims, “Operations Restore 
Hope: A U.S. CENTCOM Perspective,” Military Review, September 1993, p. 63. 
214 John B. Hunt, “Emerging Doctrine For LIC,” Military Review, June 1991, p. 54. Also, Victor 
Rosello, “Lessons From El Salvador,” p. 100, notes that in the 1980s the word “advisors” was changed to 
“trainers” because of the negative Vietnam connotation. 
215 Daniel P. Bolger, “A Power Projection Force: Some Concrete Proposals,” Parameters, Winter 1992-93, 
p. 50 
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Organizational Change as an Undercurrent 
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Figure 26. An Increase in Mentions of Organizational Change as a Secondary Subject 
Occurred in the Years New Doctrinal Manuals were Published. 
The doctrine developed in the 1980s to deal with peace operations had few 
historical UN peace operations to use as guides. There were only ten U. N. peace 
operations from 1945 to 1985.216 The United States did not participate at all in many of 
these; when it did it was largely in logistic and diplomatic roles. The original intent of UN 
peace operations was to not involve the superpowers. Increasing demand, however, 
required superpower involvement. Between 1988 and 1993 the Security Council approved 
an additional 13 missions. 217 Peacekeeping became a growth industry21s and the United 
Nations wanted the United States to be Chief Executive Officer.219 
216 Michael Lind, “Alboutros,” New Republic, June 28, 1993, p. 18. 
217 Ibid. 
218 Boutros Boutros Ghali, “Empowering The United Nations,” Foreign AfJaairs, Fall 1992, p. 89 and 
Laurence Martin, “Peacekeeping as a Growth Industry,’’ The National Interest Summer 1993, p. 3. With 
the increased number and complexity of missions, Boutros-Ghali offered specific definitions in An Agenda 
For Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, Report of the Secretary General (New 
York: United Nations, 31 January 1992), p. 11. After some debate, the terms peacekeeping, peacemaking 
and peace enforcement have become accepted categories. Peacekeeping is the traditional mission consisting 
of third party forces monitoring an established cease-fire. Peacemaking refers mostly to diplomatic efforts 
brokering a cease fire. Peace enforcement usually is identified with missions where forces operate under a 
mandate from the United Nations and force is authorized to return peace to a chaotic situation (as in 
Somalia) or as a reprisal against 3-n act of aggression ( l i e  Desert Storm). 
219 Elaine Sciolino with Paul Lewis, “U.N. Chief Has To Direct Peace Efforts at U.S., Too,” New York 
Times, October 16, 1993, p. Y7. 
92 
Just as LIC out grew FM 100-5 and earned its own FM 100-20, so too, did peace 
operations. Because of distinctly different characteristics, peace operations (as a sub 
category of LIC) earned its own manual. In 1993, the Army published FM 100-23, Peace 
Operations, to address the subject. The manual used a mix of FM 100-5 principles of war, 
LIC environmental characteristics and the addition of a new doctrinal tenet to address peace 
operations.220 
missions, though the manual’s publication and dissemination came after the initial spate of 
post cold war operations. Undoubtedly, updates and changes are forthcoming. The 
doctrine is, however, the manifestation of a Vietnam-COIN-LIC-peace operations thought 
process. This honest but incomplete doctrinal effort mirrors the Army’s collective thinking 
on peace operations. 
Operations Other Than War (OOTW). Interestingly, of the 12 illustrative historical 
examples listed in the 1993 edition of FM 100-5, not a single mention of Vietnam can be 
found. The mainstream Army was satisfied to peripheralize Vietnam-like operations into 
separate, subordinate manuals. FM 100-20 and FM 100-23 are two such manuals. 
Of the 41 articles where peace operations were the primary subjects, only 17 
mentioned doctrine. There were only 17 total articles written about peace operation where 
doctrine is mentioned. Doctrine and peace operations still are not thought about 
concurrently. Versatility was introduced as a tenet to help the Army cope with the complex 
post cold war missions. As Fastabend pointed out, however, versatility is an insufficient 
panacea. 
references to SOF dropped in 1990,1991 and 1992. In 1993 an increase in mentions 
represents the increased role of SOF soldiers in Kurdish humanitarian relief and Somali 
street fighting. SOF had been institutionalized and the efforts of the Goldwater-Nichols 
Act were coming to fruition.221 
The SOF community still struggles with its dual identity. SOF must fit into to both 
subcultures. It must fit into The Concept for practical and bureaucratic reasons: to maintain 
FM 100-23 was a step in the right direction for doctrinally dealing with these UN 
Peace operations receive secondary status in FM 100-5 as only a component of 
After a burst of Special Operating Forces (SOF) activities in the mid and late 198Os, 
220 The four old tenets-agility, initiative, depth and synchronization-are still included in peace operation 
doctrine but, “versatility” was added to FM 100-5 and 100-23 in 1993. See James R. McDonough, 
“Versatility, the Fifth Tenet,” Military Review, December 1993, pp. 11-14. 
221 Wayne K. Maynard, “The New American Way of War,” Military Review, November 1993, pp. 12-14. 
The author notes an institutional shift toward SOF. 
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funding and a seat at the planning and policy table it must conform to convention. SOF 
must also fit into the limited conflict culture for political and structural reasons; the country 
needs a force capable of conducting limited military operations in pursuit of foreign policy 
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Figure 27. The Rise and Fall of Mentions of Special Operating Forces (SOF). 
E. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE LESSONS OF VIETNAM: 
The lessons of Vietnam had taken two divergent paths during the 1980s and the 
1990s have not brought them closer together. The utility of the lessons of history in the 
periodicals is shown at Figure 28; the percentage of the articles mentioning either a lesson 
from Vietnam or a lesson from some other conflict is shown. Lessons from other wars 
seemed more useful to authors in this third phase, more so than in the previous two. This 
graph also shows, however, that The Lessons of Vietnam are still very much alive in the 
professional journals. Despite not having Vietnam war experience, authors continue to use 
Vietnam war as a reminder the dangers of not garnering public support, not having clear 
political-military objectives and not using overwhelming force. 
94 
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Figure 28. More Lessons from Other Conflicts were Referenced in 
Phase IT1 (1990-1995) Than the Other Phases. 
These Summers-Weinberger-Powell Lessons have been institutionalized. One step 
in the organizational learning cycle was made complete by individuals writing both books 
and periodical articles. This individual action resulted in complementary organizational 
doctrinal development. For many, the organization's action was justified by Desert Storm. 
The Army assisted in changing the environment by defeating Iraq, changing the regional 
balance of power and increasing its prestige at both home and abroad. The success of 
Desert Storm reinforced many individual beliefs about the role of the Army. 
for fighting limited wars (unless conducted within the narrow confines of the Weinberger 
Doctrine). In this case of limited use of military force, the learning cycle may also appear 
complete but in the negative sense. Individuals believe the Army could not succeed in the 
constrained environments of Korea, Vietnam and Somalia. The Army does not embrace 
Conversely, problems in Somalia reinforced the Army's notions that it is not suited 
95 
peace operations.222 It acknowledges peace operations but treats them peripherally.223 
The Army enacts no lessons. Rather, it avoids the difficult test of limited conflicts. The 
Army’s unlearning cycle in limited conflict is completed. 
The torch bearers of these lessons struggle to keep a cultural split from becoming a 
chasm.224 Currently these less popular lessons have no strong political sponsor to 
promote their institutionalization. George Schultz’s ideas on how to use the military never 
gained support or popularity with the generation of Vietnam veterans the way Caspar 
Weinberger’s concepts did. No strong political figure has stepped forward in a position or 
with a personality similar to Schultz’s to help shape popular opinion. Many civilian 
strategists support use of force in diplomacy but the military avoids this idea. 
the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School but rarely find their way into 
official military documents. Even the U.S. Army Special Operations Command Directorate 
of History and Museums’ history of Special Forces allots nine bland pages to its ten-year 
training commitment in El Salvador. It dedicates 23 enthusiastic and often rambling pages 
to its barely year-long fighting commitments in Desert Storm and few months in Somalia. 
The best known of the lesser discussed lessons of Vietnam-one kept alive mostly 
by retired military officers and academics-is that overwhelming force does not always 
work.225 The corollary to this lesson is the “hearts and minds” lesson. Living with a 
people, getting to know their culture, sharing rather than forcing ideas are all aspects of a 
less popular, “how we could have won Vietnam” school of thought226 These lessons 
The alternate lessons of Vietnam have been captured but in less conspicuous ways. 
Many of these lessons linger in the offices of the ASD/SOLIC and in the halls of 
222 The Army has used other countries experiences to support its aversion to approaches to war. Karl 
Weick, The Social Psvchologv of Organizing, p. 151. talks about “vicarious learning.” The Soviet failure 
in Afghanistan and the British success in the Falklands are two example of vicarious learning. In their own 
ways, these two wars reinforced the Army’s self-perception and notions about how to wage war. 
223 In Harry Summers’s latest book, he makes the case for keeping peace keeping peripheral. This 
position is one of his recommended “Ten Commandments” for guiding U.S. smtegy formulation. S e e  
Harry Summers, The New World Strategv, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995) p. 224. 
224 Steven Metz, “A Flame Kept Burning: Counterinsurgency Support After the Cold War,” Parameters, 
Autumn 1995, pp. 31-41. 
225 For example, Jimmie F. Holt, “LIC in Central America: Training Implications for the US Army,” 
Military Review, March 1990, pp. 14-15, Rudolph C. Barnes, “ The Diplomat Warrior,” Military 
Review, May 1990 p. 59 and Peter Maslowski, “American Values and American Values,’’ Military Review, 
April 1990, p. 18 
226 James B. Motley, “U.S. Unconventional Conflict Policy and Strategy,” p. 12. 
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were partially applied in Central America and they can be applied in peace operations. 
These lessons are not captured in the Summers-Weinberger theses.” 
stab-in-the-back bitterness was directed at the South Vietnamese government. The South’s 
chaotic and complex political system was seen by some as the reason the United States was 
not successful in Vietnam. Some warn against similar situations in peace operations and 
use warring Somali clans as an example. Nation-building was not coded but it seemed to 
be an avoided term in the 1970s and 1980s. When it came to the fore in U.N. discussions 
on Cambodia and Somalia, many authors dubiously recalled efforts in Vietnam. 
Two other lessons that appeared sporadically throughout the journals included the 
importance of coalition and joint operations. Command and control were major points of 
Harry Summers but did not easily translate into Weinberger’s tests. Evidence of this 
concern is present in the controversy surrounding U.S. forces serving under foreign 
military generals. Though the United States has a history of participating in allied 
operations, it has not always demanded that its units be commanded by Americans at the 
tactical and operational level of war. 
Though not coded, mentions of joint operations were non-existent prior to the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. After the Army realized the implications of this law, 
authors gradually reflected impacts of the change. Operations in Panama and Iraq 
highlighted the “jointness” of future wars. The controversy over jointness continued into 
peace operations. Army helicopters being deployed to Haiti on Navy aircraft carriers was 
just one example of the increased difficulties of joint operations. 
They are escaping, however, into civilian and academic circles where their credibility will 
be severely damaged. Fortunately for the Army and the American people, a generation of 
soldiers, though in the minority and at risk to their careers, worked hard at developing 
COIN and LIC doctrine and capabilities. Undoubtedly, peace operations and similar 
missions will be present in the years ahead. The country will call on the Army to deal with 
these challenges and be grateful to those worked diligently to institutionalize the counter- 
culture lessons of Vietnam. 
Political legitimacy was also a recumng lesson of Vietnam. Some of the authors’ 
The Army is not really in serious danger of losing these “other” lessons of Vietnam. 
227 In fact Summers belittles the “hearts and minds” lesson in a discussion on centers of gravity in The 
New World Stratew, p. 43. He acknowledges that the Clausewitzian trinity (government, army, people) 
applies to the United States and that the American public is very much the U.S. center of gravity. 
Paradoxically, Summers does nof see that other countries’ publics (their hearts and minds) are their centers 
of gravity. 
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Failure to implement these lessons may not immediately jeopardize America’s 
national security, but being afraid to use the military instrument of power in political 
discourse is a violation of the Army’s beloved Clausewitz maxim: war is a continuation of 
politics by other means. Damage to United States credibility regarding use of force could 
result from failure to properly execute a sensitive and internationally popular peace 
operation. Would-be challengers (either state or sub-state) to international and regional 




A. WHAT HAPPENED? 
1. What Was the Question? 
This thesis set out to answer a question about Army thinking and attitudes toward 
peace operations. The answer was not found in a trivial, "no more Vietnams" metaphor. 
Army attitudes have been shaped by failure in Vietnam, counterinsurgency in Central 
America, armored warfare in the Middle East and peace operations on four continents. 
2. The 1970s 
As was shown in Chapter III, the confusion and shock of the 1970s nearly 
paralyzed the Army's organizational development. The Army was in disarray after Vietnam 
and refocused its energy on the one thing it knew it could do well. It had been tested on the 
European battlefield and proved victorious: to Europe the Army would return. 
The Army shied away from strategic issues and leaned toward operational and even 
tactical issues. The Army turned away from limited conflicts and vicariously learned fiom 
the Arab-Israeli war. The Army used the October 1973 war as a model for future conflicts 
and a partial justification for its reorientation toward conventional mechanized warfare. 
Though the Army made some doctrinal changes, it narrowed its doctrinal focus and 
refused to develop a method for future success in wars similar to Vietnam. 
No wide agreement existed about the meaning of the Vietnam war. Authors in 
A m y ,  Military Review, and Parameters wrote about a wide range of topics regarding 
Vietnam. As a profession, the Army was not esteemed. It was criticized by the American 
public, civilian academics and government officials. 
3. The 1980s 
Motivated in part by this harsh criticism, the Army seized the opportunity to 
reestablish itself as a credible fighting force in the 1980s. Chapter IV described the 
significant events influencing the Army's understanding of Vietnam. 
First, the Army published an influential book explaining what went wrong in 
Vietnam. The book placed some blame on the Army but spread it around enough to make 
the Army feel better about itself. Harry Summers's book, On Stratem, made sense to most 
of the Army. 
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Second, a Secretary of Defense adopted many of the lessons of Vietnam promoted 
by the Army in the 1982 book, On Strategy. Caspar Weinberger gave his 1984 speech 
outlining six tests for the use of military force in operations overseas. With the work of 
Summers and the words of Weinberger, the Army had found a comfortable road map for 
future interventions, doctrine development and force structure changes. A fundamental 
purpose of the analyses by Summers and Weinberger was to keep the United States out of 
ill-defined limited wars. 
Third, the threat of communism in the western hemisphere seemed to revive the 
Domino Theory. A communist government in Nicaragua and an insurgency to overthrow 
the government in El Salvador forced the Army to reassess its preparedness for limited 
conflict. Fear of the United States becoming involved in "another Vietnam" was 
commonplace. Many active duty military officers wrote in the journals about the 
drfficulties of using the Army to deal with the problems in Latin America. 
1980s. The establishment of Light Infantry Divisions, the expansion of Special Operations 
Forces and the publication of a Low-Intensity Conflict field manual indicated the Army's 
recognition of a limited or unconventional war threat. Because of the Army's reluctance to 
support these developments solely for use in limited conflicts, many of the innovations 
were sub optimal. Light forces had to fit into the central European battle scenario. 
Consequently, training and doctrine were compromised by dividing efforts between two 
missions: big war in central Europe versus limited warfare on other continents. 
This division was strong enough to effect a split in ideologies. Though the 
differences in ideologies had long existed, events of the 1980s allowed a competing 
subculture to attain status within the larger Army culture. In addition to political turmoil in 
Central America, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 laid the foundation for this competing 
subculture to become institutionalized. The creation of joint warfighting commands gave 
special operations and "contingency" units a powerful new sponsor. The creation of a new 
office in the Department of Defense gave this community a vehicle for policy influence. 
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special OperationsLow-Intensity Conflict and the 
United States Special Operations Command were indicators of the subculture's growing 
influence. 
Both subcultures participated in the 1989 Operation Just Cause, marking a 
transitional period in war paradigm shifts. The Army's dominant culture, still centered on 
mechanized war in Europe, was dealt a heavy blow. The Army leadership ordered the 
The Army developed some capabilities to deal with low-intensity conflict in the 
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deactivation of heavy forces focused on a Soviet threat. The impending unification of East 
and West Germany and the conciliatory policies of the Soviet Union left the Army without 
an easily identifiable threat. 
4. The 1990s 
Chapter IV showed how the Army applied The Lessons of Vietnam to peace 
operations. Enthusiasm over the organizational changes of the 1980s was dampened when 
Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. Operation Desert Storm was a throw back to the big-war 
paradigm. The Army had prepared steadily for that war and had only just recently begun to 
shelve The Concept. The U.S. Army's success in the deserts of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and 
Iraq helped the dominant Army culture surge past the limited war subculture in terms of 
influence. Desert Storm halted the growth of the competing subculture. 
American government officials and Army officers viewed the success of Desert 
Storm as a burial of the "Vietnam syndrome." The United States proved that it was not 
afraid to act decisively, use force, risk casualties and be successful. The Lessons of 
Vietnam developed by Summers and Weinberger were refined in the 1980s and 
meticulously applied during Desert Storm. 
Almost immediately after Desert Storm was over a new type of mission emerged. 
United Nations Peace Operations sprang up in Iraq, Somalia, Cambodia and Rwanda. The 
Army was caught on a fence. Before Desert Storm, the Army prepared itself for conflicts 
similar to these 'hew" peace operations. In the immediate aftermath of Desert Storm, 
though, it marginalized them. 
These peace operations had many characteristics of the war in Vietnam and the 
Army wanted no part of them. The Army reluctantly participated in these operations half- 
convincing itself that the successful approach taken in Desert Storm was applicable to other 
environments. The Army hoped that The Lessons of Vietnam had been institutionalized at 
the policy-maker level, thereby protecting the Army fiom "another Vietnam." The fine 
political performance in Desert Storm reinforced the Army's wishful thinking. 
The U.S. Army Ranger raid on Somali outlaws in October 1993 was one event that 
brought the 'Inever again" rhetoric into public view. Losing 18 of the United States' finest 
troops to a bunch of bandits did not sit well with the American public. The Vietnam 
syndrome may have been buried in the sands of Iraq, but Vietnam's never-again legacy 
was still very much on people's minds. Public opinion quickly called for a return of U.S. 
forces fiom Somalia. There would be no Vietnam in Somalia. 
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A second event was the United Nations' authorization of intervention in Bosnia- 
Hercegovina. Though European allies pressured the United States to participate in this 
mission and to re-demonstrate its Desert Storm prowess (this time in stopping a genocide), 
the American public would not allow it. Fear of an involvement in an "unwinnable" war 
was evident in the military periodicals: authors often used Vietnam and Somalia or Bosnia 
as parallel examples. Vietnam had influenced America's attitude toward peace operations. 
The Army was caught slightly off-guard by the increasing number of peace 
operations. The 1980s effort to lighten the Army's force structure was reversed after 
Desert Storm. The Army had deactivated at least one armor division in the late 1980s, but 
reactivated because of Desert Storm. After Desert Storm, the Army inactivated its premier 
Light Infantry Divishn-the one that enjoyed so much success in Panama. It was also 
reducing and relocamg other units, making them unable to deploy. The Army was, it 
suddenly realized, not trained or organized for its most frequent form of conflict. The 
Army's cultural aversion toward limited war had prevented it from fully developing a 
capability to deal with less than mid-intensity wars. The innovations it had arduously 
developed throughout the 1980s were almost reversed by the success of Desert Storm. 
Internal conflicts, humanitarian catastrophes and violations of international law in remote 
regions have not proved to be serious threats to United States security. The Army has 
therefore not adjusted its organization, doctrine or training to meet these apparently 
transient threats. 
B. BUREAUCRATIC AND STRUCTURALIST THEORIES 
A bureaucratic politics or functional theory argument does not answer the questiorn 
presented in the introduction. Why the Army thinks the way it does about peace operations 
is not because of a quest for domestic power or international prestige. Certainly in the 
1970s the Army's efforts at reprofessionalization were motivated by a desire for credibility, 
but once the Army found the respect it was looking for, it was content to stay within its 
previous limits. 
special capability forces in the 1980s and the non-existent growth in the 1990s. 
Bureaucratic politics prevented the Army from embracing a low-intensity conflict paradigm. 
The Army had a significant investment in a big-war paradigm. If the Army had been driven 
by bureaucratic politics during these years, it would have embraced innovations oriented 
toward defeating Latin American communist and narcotics threats, containing internal wars 
In fact the bureaucratic explanation falls short when explaining the slow growth of 
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and dealing with humanitarian calamities. Some improvements were made during the 
1980s and history will probably show the Army's level of emphasis on low-intensity 
conflict to have been appropriate. Currently, however, no innovations are underway to 
help the Army conduct these peace operation missions. 
International circumstances influenced the Army more than any bureaucratic 
motivations. In the 1970s the perceived conventional Soviet threat drew the Army back to 
Europe. This perception justified its minor doctrinal changes and lack of organizational 
developments. In the 1980s, the threat in Latin America caused an increased emphasis on 
low-intensity war capabilities and doctrine. The Soviet communist bloc had one more team 
member in Nicaragua and was about to get another in El Salvador. It was this change in the 
structure of the international system that influenced the Army's decision to innovate, in 
spite of its own bureaucratic preferences. In the 199Os, there is no significant evidence of 
Army innovation meeting the challenges of peace operations. The Army inactivated units 
traditionally tasked with executing these limited conflicts. 
This inaction by the Army defies a structuralist explanation of the Army's doctrinal 
and organizational choices. The international system has changed so drastically that no 
threat to United States conventional military power exists. One would expect, then, to see 
the United States guard against other possible threats to its position. The most immediate 
threats on the horizon are those presented by instability, internal conflicts, humanitarian 
crises, weapons of mass destruction, counter-terrorism and violations of international law. 
Today these threats are often dealt with multilaterally sometimes under the auspices of the 
United Nations. 
But the United States has rejected extensive involvement in United Nations 
operations. It prefers to work with smaller groups of allies or coalition partners. 
Accordingly, the United States has not developed a coherent strategy for working with the 
United Nations or executing peace operations. The United States enjoys a preeminent 
position in the international order today. The U.S. Army should not, however, be caught 
unawares by what it sees as a peripheral threat to America's security. 
C. ARMY CULTURE 
The Army's culture has influenced peace operation doctrine and organizational 
structure. Before the 1970s the Army had not had to deal with failure, because its use of 
overwhelming force had always achieved country's objectives. There was little first hand 
experience in overcoming a military defeat. The stalemated end of the Korean war did not 
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force the Army to come to grips with defeat. Culturally, the Army had no mechanism for 
institutionalizing the lessons of defeat. Its culture did point toward a possible solution to 
understanding the defeat in Vietnam. The arguments articulated by Summers and 
Weinberger provided an interpretation of the lessons of Vietnam that allowed the Army to 
avoid far-reaching self-criticism. As a result, a thorough examination of COIN doctrine 
was never conducted. The Army's long-standing culture, validated by many pre-Vietnam 
historical experiences, encouraged the Army to return to something identifiable. It returned 
to a focus on Europe not because of the international threat or bureaucratic self-interests, 
but because it was culturally unprepared to deal with failure and preferred to emphasis 
experiences of success. 
limited war. During this period, the Army's culture reinforced the normal resistance to 
change of every bureaucracy. Real changes in the international structure, however, 
pressured Army culture. Army culture was then modified by both The Lessons of Vietnam 
and the "other" lessons of Vietnam. By the 1980s, the Army had begun to develop an 
understanding of what the war in Vietnam meant. Vietnam became the antithesis of Army 
culture. The Army believes overwhelming force was not used in Vietnam. The Army sees 
its inability to use all its might as the reason the United States lost the war. 
and the expansion of communism in Latin America. While the dominant Army culture 
worked hard to keep the United States out of conventional war in Latin America, the 
growing subculture implemented effective counterinsurgency plans. In some senses, 
counterinsurgency had not changed that much since Vietnam. Proponents of this mission 
claimed that the Army had just not executed its doctrine properly in Vietnam. The rest of 
the Army, which was not involved in Latin America., seemed both surprised and envious of 
the success of the operations. 
In t k  199Os, the Army shifted positions quickly and showed how its culture really 
had not changed drastically. The Army hurried back to the big-war paradigm after Desert 
Storm. The changes that had seemed to prepare the Army for the 1990s were repressed by 
the Army preference for conventional war on a major scale. The Army did not see Desert 
Storm as the aberration. Vietnam and Latin America were the aberrations. Desert Storm 
supported the fine tradition of overwhelming force. This tradition was established during 
the Civil War by the Union Army, was first brought to Europe by the American 
In the 1980s, Army culture slowed the development of forces designed to deal with 
A strange synthesis emerged between the development of The Lessons of Vietnam 
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Expeditionary Force during World War I and epitomized during World War I1 by the units 
commanded by General George S. Patton Jr. 
These missions are highly politicized. That politicization is the part of Clausewitz's theory 
on war the Army sometimes forgets. The Lessons of Vietnam have contributed to the 
Army's belief that the Army has no business in limited wars. The Army has a slim usable 
tradition dealing with such missions. Police actions are not consistent with the American 
Army's self-perception. The Army does not "do" mountains, cities or jungles. It does 
deserts and plains: anywhere with a good line of sight. These positions are articulated by 
the authors in the Army-oriented periodicals. They are the voice of the dominant Army 
culture. These positions explain why the Army thinks the way it does about peace 
operations. These positions are reactions to the Army's defeat in Vietnam. 
The Army's culture prevents it from embracing peace operations in the 1990s. 
D. UNITED STATES CULTURE AND FOREIGN POLICY 
In Presidential Decision Directive Twenty-Five (PDD 25), President Clinton 
established guidelines to determine when US military intervention abroad is appropriate. 
Ten years earlier, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger suggested six tests for the use 
of military force in foreign policy. The criteria in the so-called Weinberger doctrine and 
PDD 25 show many similarities. They are similar in both intent and words. This thesis 
has shown the relationship between Weinberger's tests and the Army's understanding of 
the Vietnam war. The military must understand both sets of lessons from Vietnam. 
Invoking Vietnam remains a powerful tool in U.S. foreign policy debates. 
lists eight criteria for the use of force."8 Five of the eight criteria match Weinberger's 
almost word for word. Only the Last Resort criterion has been omitted. It s eem 
reasonable to presume that Secretary Perry may have been heavily influenced by his Army 
advisors when writing this report. The lessons of Vietnam, the principles of the 
Weinberger Doctrine and the Never-Again School, have made their way into America's 
policy toward peace operations and all other uses of the military. 
The most current Secretary of Defense Report to the President and the Congress 
228 William J. Perry, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, (Washington D.C.: Government 
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